80. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)1

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Actions with Respect to Cambodia (U)
1.
Cambodian recognition of Communist China points to the necessity for specific new actions to arrest a Cambodian drift toward a position more vulnerable to Communist subversion and/or domination. Having now gained diplomatic status in Cambodia, the Peking regime may be expected, if an opportunity is presented to them, to exploit this advantage in order to introduce a military mission into Cambodia. In order to safeguard and strengthen the present United States position in Cambodia, the U.S. must obviously indicate to Cambodia and its neighbors our displeasure over that country’s recognition of Communist China. However, the means taken to indicate such displeasure must not operate to present the Communists with an opportunity to expand their influence in fields of security significance. U.S. interests can best be protected by our remaining as long as possible in a position to influence the forces upon which Prince Sihanouk must eventually depend to take action to prevent further Communist encroachments in Cambodia.
2.
Although the military in Cambodia have not demonstrated much interest in political affairs to date, they do offer our best hope for an anti-Communist stabilizing force if the political drift to the left continues. Therefore, the U.S. must seek further to improve U.S. Cambodian military relationships rather than risk the sudden loss of hard-earned gains by withdrawing from them.
3.
In view of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense propose the following U.S. courses of action for the concurrence of the Department of State.
a.
Inform Prince Sihanouk that the U.S. is compelled by his action in recognizing Communist China, to consider that future U.S. aid programs must be related to the direction in which Cambodia moves.
b.
In considering any future U.S. aid reappraisals, consider cuts in the economic field along with any reductions in military programs. If, in addition to appropriate economic items, some military cuts must be made, these should not be maintenance items or projects which could cause retrogression of U.S. influence or Cambodian capabilities in the military field. In respect to economic cuts, highest priority for retention should be given to education, police and communications aid programs.
c.
Explain generally and confidentially to appropriate governmental officials of other friendly Southeast Asian countries U.S. actions in reappraising U.S. Cambodian Aid Programs.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F. Twining 2
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48 (2)). Secret.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.