Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, July 1, 1958—1 p.m.

2. Phnom Penh 1348 rptd info Saigon 398, CINCPAC POLAD 94² and subsequent Phnom Penh and Saigon telegrams same subject.

1. US believes direct involvement current Cambodian–GVN dispute re alleged invasion unwise since motive of RKG request still unclear, RKG and GVN statement re facts are conflicting and only one country has requested such involvement.

2. Embassy Phnom Penh should inform Cambodians that in view Lon Nol press conference statement Vietnamese forces already withdrawn from Cambodia and since ICC investigation team already on spot, Department sees little it can contribute through US-Cambodian-Vietnamese commission of investigation. Nevertheless we remain interested in helping improve relations between Cambodia and Vietnam.

3. Both Embassies Phnom Penh and Saigon at appropriate moment should approach respective governments along lines para. 1 Deptel 2415 Saigon rptd Phnom Penh 887.³ They should continue inform officials both governments that US as friend believes necessary first step in improvement relations is cessation campaign recriminations through official press releases and statements and curbing of more virulent press articles. Following such cooling off period, we believe there are certain specific issues which could be negotiated by two governments such as financial settlement followed by border delimitation and treatment minorities. Embassy Saigon as suggested in Embtel 2580⁴ should take initiative at appropriate moment in suggesting meeting on financial settlement.

4. FYI. When specific issues such as above are being discussed US Government in response to requests would be willing offer opinion both sides but would wish avoid becoming active mediator.

Department also wishes avoid danger both governments lean too heavily on US to attempt to settle disputes rather than taking action directly with other government to reduce tension. In addition, Cambodia seems believe US has more influence with GVN than is actually case. In contacts with RKG Embassy officers should continue point out that GVN is independent and takes action over which US has no influence. End FYI.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/6–2758. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Price, cleared by SEA, and approved by Robertson. Also sent priority to Saigon and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In this telegram, June 27, Ambassador Strom reported that he had told Foreign Minister Troung Cang on the afternoon of June 26 that he had no instructions on the Cambodian request for U.S. assistance in the dispute with South Vietnam. Strom told Troung that it was doubtful there was an ARVN incursion, but in any case, South Vietnam had ordered its forces to withdraw. (Ibid.,)
3. In paragraph 1 of this telegram, June 6, the Department instructed the Embassies in Saigon and Phnom Penh to urge at the highest levels that both countries avoid action that might cause strained relations and search for ways to improve them. The telegram reads: “Vietnamese should not forget that one motivation for Cambodian neutrality policy and one which carried Cambodia dangerously close to accommodation to international communism is long-standing animosity with Vietnam. It is certainly to Vietnam’s own interest not to increase this animosity. At same time, Cambodia’s own self-interest from economic and general free world security viewpoints in maintaining good working relations with neighbor should be mentioned in order attempt avoid incidents for which Cambodia responsible.” (Ibid., 651G.51H/6–658)
4. In telegram 2580, June 26, the Embassy in Saigon reported that the MAAG Chiefs in Saigon and Phnom Penh had concluded that the Vietnamese incursion was probably a minor foray in pursuit of Viet Minh former prisoners. Durbrow concluded that his best role was to press for calm in Saigon and urge that Vietnam and Cambodia resume efforts to reach settlement of their outstanding financial differences. (Ibid., 651G.51H/6–2658)