70. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast
Asian Affairs (Whittington) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Washington
,
April 4,
1958
.
SUBJECT
- Chinese Communist Aid to Cambodia
Attached is Despatch No. 278, dated March 10, 1958,2 from Phnom Penh on the above subject.
This is an excellent Despatch, and contains information on the Communist
Aid Programs to Cambodia to date, together with possible repercussions
on the United States aid program to Cambodia and United States policy
toward Cambodia.
We have prepared a summary of this Despatch, which is also attached. You
may find this summary useful in forthcoming hearings before
Congressional Committees.
Attachment No. 2
Summary
Communist Bloc activities in Cambodia started in the Spring of 1956.
These activities have included aid and trade agreements with
Communist China, agreements with Czechoslovakia, agreements with the
Soviet Union, agreements with Poland, various gifts to Cambodia [Page 230] outside these agreements,
and preliminary talks with Yugoslavia and North Viet-Nam. By far the
largest aid program and the major activity has been carried on by
the Communist Chinese.
This Communist Chinese aid program appears to be a means by which the
Communist Chinese hope to gain respectability in Cambodia and
Southeast Asia. The Communist Chinese apparently hope to remove the
stigma of “imperialism” with which Red China and Asian Communism
were saddled during the Viet Minh invasion of Cambodia in 1954 and
Viet Minh sponsorship of uprising and terrorism within Cambodia. The
Communist Chinese apparently consider the $22.9 million program as a
cheap price to pay for a “good neighbor” reputation. All techniques
of the Communist Chinese aid program appear to be devoted to
pleasing the Cambodians, to flattering them, and to greasing the
skids in preparation for the day the “good neighbor” wishes to push
Cambodia actively into the satellite orbit.
While the aid programs are the most spectacular, the trade agreements
may be more dangerous for Cambodia in the long-run. Cambodia’s
exports are low-quality basic products which find difficulty in
selling on western markets, with the exception of rubber. For these
products to move, they must have either special incentives given by
the Cambodian Government or importing countries (such as France), or
be the subject of bilateral trade agreements such as those carried
on by the Communist bloc. At present the former situation obtains,
but if these export incentives are removed, increasing trade with
the Communist bloc is a distinct possibility, and the trade
agreements which at present are dead letters may suddenly take on
great importance. This indicates the importance of emphasizing in
our economic aid program the development of improved diversified
production to enable Cambodia to export competitively.
[Here follows the body of the summary which is included in the microfiche
supplement.]
