Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

67. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 19, 1960—5 p.m.

876. Thirteenth Military Advisers’ meeting ended Bangkok November 18.² Australia joined US and Thailand in taking leading part in discussions. According US Military Adviser’s assessment, Australian Military Adviser³ proved his country good friend both US and Thailand in supporting strong points required give meaning to military planning.

As anticipated Thai Military Adviser⁴ proposed addition two new assumptions to MPO plan 5/60⁵ as basis counter-insurgency planning. These consisted of assumption that Lao Government will not ask for SEATO aid and assumption SEATO assistance offered but refused. Military Advisers agreed refer these assumptions to Military Planning Office for immediate study implications.

Other highlights of conference: 1) Agreed with US proposals amend communications committee recommendation for SEATO crypto center. US agreed supply SEATO and member countries with crypto materials (coding and decoding documents) to use for training, SEATO exercises and, third set, for operations. 2) Agreed Military Advisers would recommend airfields which respective member nations should equip with minimum navigational aids for SEATO forces use. 3) Agreed on clarification of responsibility of SEATO forces commander for coordination with respect to Council and RLG in MPO plan 5/60. 4) Agreed on theater estimate as basis for plan 6/60⁶ for defense of protocol states. Accepted US compromise wording for assumptions re use of nuclear weapons.⁷ 5) Also agreed on statement for plan 6/60 defining mission of SEATO forces.⁸ 6) Noted Thai intention submit paper to MPO proposing establishment of permanent intelligence office on military side. 7) Referred to Military Advisers representatives UK proposal that request for information from CSE and civil side be limited to items of purely civil intelligence and factual nature. 8) Considered communications committee recommendation for establishment communication circuits from Thailand to other treaty area countries for use particularly during SEATO emergencies.

Comment: Agreements on crypto materials and airfield designation may eventually be reflected in US assistance programs in form of requests for equipment and construction. UK position on MPO requests for civil studies appears to be rehash of position unsuccessfully taken on civil side in which UK attempted to shift burden for preparing intelligence studies entirely to military side. Thai assumptions, while expected, will raise issue of interpretation and application article 4 SEA Collective Defense Treaty.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/11–1960. Secret; SEATO. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Manila, Karachi, Canberra, London, Paris, Wellington, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. The conference took place in Bangkok Novenber 16–18. In telegram 867 from Bangkok, November 17, the Embassy summarized the public opening ceremony. (Ibid., 379/11–1760; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Vice Admiral Sir Roy Dowling.
4. General Surajit Charusreni.
5. “Plan To Assist the Royal Laotian Government To Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos,” dated August 31; forms Appendix B1 to “Report of the Military Advisers 13th Conference,” November 1960. (Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files, Reel S–4–60)
6. “Theater Estimate for the Development of MPO Plan 6/60 (A Plan for the Defense of the Protocol States Against Attack by Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam),” September 1; forms Appendix C1 to the Report cited in footnote 5 above.
7. In the draft theater estimate cited in footnote 6 above, the language on nuclear weapons in the “Assumptions” section stated that it was assumed that SEATO forces would use nuclear weapons on suitable enemy targets according to the general situation, but that this did not imply the automatic use of nuclear weapons in all situations. As revised by the Military Advisers in the “Summary Report” section of the overall Military Advisers report, the language stated, after changes had been introduced by the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, that SEATO forces would be prepared to use nuclear weapons on suitable enemy targets if the situation demanded, but that this policy did not imply the automatic use of nuclear weapons and would be dependent on political agreement.
8. In the draft theater estimate, the mission was defined as defense of the Protocol States against attack by the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the “Summary Report,” the mission was altered to include not only defense, but a “quick and crushing” defeat of the DRV.