5. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 25. Paris pass USRO. Department pouch Baghdad. Following is text Secretary’s statement delivered today closed session Fourth SEATO Council Ministers Meeting Manila March 11–13, 1958, Agenda Item V “Exchange of Views on Matters Affecting Treaty Area”:
“Mr. Chairman, the important addresses already made by my fellow ministers have covered in considerable detail the situation in the Southeast Asia area. I will not attempt to duplicate what has already been done so well. I merely observe [with] some satisfaction, as it is generally conceded I think, that this treaty area feels more secure from the danger of war than was the case during the stormy days when this Organization was formed and when fighting had barely subsided in Indochina and was going on in the Straits of Taiwan. This should not lead us to ignore the fact that the military menace exists and that there is a vast military potential which hostile forces are building up, but at the moment we do feel somewhat more secure from the military threat.
There remains the danger from subversion of which the preceding speakers have spoken. That danger is particularly acute in these area countries which are still independent but the governments of which publicly take the attitude that in the world today the regimes established by international Communism, such as those of Soviet Russia and Communist China, can be equated with the governments established in the free world by democratic processes—that all the governments are equally good, or, if you will, equally bad.
That equating has serious consequences. It dulls the alertness of the people in these countries to the insidious plotting of the Communists. It affords those Communist plots a much better chance of success and any government which has told its people that the two societies can properly be equated finds it very difficult thereafter to take stern measures to deal with the internal menace of Communists. We see that danger around about us. It is conspicuous at the moment perhaps in Indonesia, and where that danger exists it is not just a danger to those countries, it is also a danger to us. An individual who refuses inoculation against a contagious disease endangers not merely [Page 15] himself but the community, and so it is with governments that fail to alert their people—they imperil not only themselves but their neighbors. This is perhaps the greatest immediate threat that the treaty area faces.
I will say a word now about the attitude of the United States toward China. A year ago I stated the policy of the United States at our meeting at Canberra2 as being not to extend political recognition to Communist China and to oppose its admission to the United Nations.3 Subsequently at San Francisco in 1957 I expounded fully the reasons for our position in a speech4 which was made with the full authority and prior approval in every detail of President Eisenhower. I brought here with me copies of that speech because it is the fullest and I think the only full exposition of the American position and the reasons for it. I am leaving copies with the Secretariat where they will be available to any who wish to have a copy.
I say today, Mr. Chairman, that the policy of the United States remains as stated in that speech for the reasons therein stated, and I can also state that that reasoning will continue to dictate United States policy in this matter.
I have been particularly struck in this connection with what has been said in some of the preceding speeches by some of our Asian friends as to the danger to them of Chinese minorities in their countries in the event that those minorities should be brought under the influence and direction of the Chinese Communists.
There is another matter to which I would allude which has been referred to to some extent as least in prior speeches and which I know is on the minds of many, and that is the question of the apportionment by the United States of the assistance which it gives abroad as between different countries, some of which are members of collective defense organizations with us and some of which are not. I would be the last to claim that in this difficult matter the United States exercises perfect wisdom but I do want to make clear the policies which guide us. The United States is striving to help to combat the spread of Communism in the world. We do not of course neglect humanitarian considerations or the special needs of our friends and allies, but the sums which we have available for external assistance are, unfortunately, limited and those funds have to be rationed, and, indeed, closely rationed, and, as a result, the bulk of our Mutual Security Program funds is used at [Page 16] times and places and in manners which seem to us best designed to serve our common desire and our common purpose; that is, that Communist imperialism shall be thwarted in its aggressive designs.
Our Mutual Security Program is not a ‘give-away’ program designed to confer presents upon those with whom we feel a special relationship of friendship and affection. If the program, I might say, were a ‘give-away’ program it would not be supported, in any such scale as now exists, by our people or by our Congress. It is a program which is designed for a purpose; if you will, for a selfish purpose, the purpose being to help to sustain for the United States an environment, a world environment of healthy independent nations. That is what the United States wants, and I think that our desire in that respect coincides with that of others who also want to be independent and have a healthy political, economic and social system.
The Soviet Union, on the contrary, wants a growing world environment of satellites with more Hungaries, more East Germanies, more Outer Mongolias, and more North Koreas. That is where the free world purposes and Communist purposes come into collision. That in essence is the Cold War. Our Mutual Security Program is designed to deal with it and to assure that this Cold War will be won by the cause of freedom and of independence.
In times of open war nations do not deploy their armed forces in accordance with sentimental concepts. They seek in the light of cold analysis to do what will serve the cause of victory. And so it is with the economic resources we use in the Cold War. We provide substantial amounts of economic assistance to nations of whose policies we do not altogether approve. That I know hurts some of you, but I can assure you it hurts us more than it hurts you! We do it not because it is pleasurable for us to do it. We would rather do it elsewhere. We do it because these nations are at least independent nations which desire to remain independent and because if they were captured by Communism and taken into the Communist camp, that would have serious consequences upon other free nations. In that sense such United States assistance to such countries is in effect indirect aid to our allies, and it is for that reason that we give it.
It would not, I am sure, serve the interests of the Asian members of SEATO if we provided economic assistance only to them and did nothing for, and became indifferent to the fate of, all other independent nations of the Far East and South and Southeast Asia. The Pact nations of the area would be faced by dangers so much greater that they would far more than offset the immediate benefit of such a policy; certainly, at least, that is our conviction, and that is the reason why we do what we do.
[Page 17]Turning to another aspect of our economic assistance, I would like to allude to the impression that sometimes arises that our assistance is given not for preserving the distinctive and independent character of the other free societies which we try to help, but to try to remake these other societies over into the image of ourselves.
I can understand why there is a basis for such criticism. Most Americans believe intensely in our own American way of life and it can hardly be expected that they will not in certain respects show that belief in the American way of life as they function abroad. Indeed, it is not only inevitable but I think it is quite right that Americans should believe in their own system. But I can assure you that we are not stupid enough to believe that we could, even if we tried, uproot the distinctive, ancient and honored cultures of other lands. And I assure you it is not American policy to try to impose our way of life upon others.
Our own system is a system based on nonconformity and on tolerance of difference. That dedication to diversity does not end at the water’s edge. The United States has no other aim in its foreign economic programs than to assist other free nations to remain independent and thus be able to fulfill their own destinies in ways of their own choosing.
Now I turn to another aspect of these matters. The United States is associated with a great number of other countries. We belong to, or are closely identified with, NATO, the Organization of American States, the Baghdad Pact, and we have bilateral relations with other countries. And sometimes we are asked which do we think is the most important, which is the one we really favor the most.
That is like asking whether it is more fatal to have your heart penetrated by a bullet or to have your throat cut with a knife. There is not only interdependence between the members of the different pacts but there is also interdependence between the pact areas themselves. No pact area anywhere would be safe if any one of the others was lost, nor could the members of any pact be indifferent, or be free from risk of involvement, if another pact area were involved in major war. Interdependence exists throughout the free world. There can be no ranking between areas, each of which is vital.”
[Here follow Dulles’ general views on the world situation, U.S.-Soviet relations, and U.S. national security policy; included in the microfiche supplement.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 990. Confidential; SEATO. Repeated to London, Paris, Karachi, Bangkok, Wellington, and Canberra.↩
- Held March 11–13, 1957. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. xxi, pp. 295 ff.↩
- For text of the Secretary’s statement on China policy made March 12, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1957, p. 351.↩
- Entitled “Our Policies Toward Communism in China,” delivered June 28, 1957. Text is ibid., July 15, 1957, p. 91.↩