Office of the Historian

480. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, December 8, 1960—8:03 p.m.

603. We are fully aware of political risks to which we expose ourselves in UN and elsewhere by our hand excessively showing in current military operations and political maneuverings. We have admittedly been taking risks on political front and believe we must continue to do so. On basis information to date Department has approved your refusal participation CAT aircraft in Phoumi troop lift into Vientiane area which we consider consistent with outstanding directives. Nevertheless success or failure of efforts overthrow Souvanna may depend on ability move Phoumi forces with maximum speed. Accordingly you are authorized at any time where you feel acceptance additional political risk justified by chances achieving result we desire to authorize use CAT aircraft for such purposes as you in your discretion decide. Defense concurs.

Herter

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–860. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant at 5:45 p.m. on December 8 and approved by SEA, in draft by Irwin and Parsons, and in substance by Lemnitzer. Repeated niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC.

    At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on December 9, 9:15 a.m., Parsons and Cummings briefed the group on the situation in Laos. Parsons observed that Kong Le openly controlled Vientiane and Souvanna’s claim to authority was “ridiculous.” Parsons stated that he envisioned two possible actions by the Kong Le–pro-Communist group: a request for reinforcements from North Vietnam in the event of an outright military struggle or an appeal to the United Nations. Parsons hoped that the National Assembly might vote the Souvanna government out of office and establish a new one. During the meeting, Herter approved sending this telegram. (ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

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