Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

467. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 24, 1960—4 p.m.

983. Addressees pass interested agencies. Ref: Embtel 974.² Souvanna’s note asking us immediately stop aid rebels presents us with difficult decision.³ Following courses of action appear open:

1) We can disregard note and continue aid to Phoumi. This places us in position openly supporting rebel against legal govt; consequences in UN and elsewhere obvious. Moreover, if we are to have continuing usefulness here we must avoid open break with Souvanna as long as possible.

2) We can comply fully. This means that while majority Phoumi forces presently well supplied arms and ammo, they and forces Phong Saly still short on rice and if extensive PL operations occur, resupply munitions and spare parts will become necessary. Important Phoumi need is aircraft for command, liaison, troop lift, and furnishing material and supplies and fuel.

3) We can say to Souvanna that basis of our aid is all or nothing and if we can’t supply whole army including Phoumi we won’t supply any of it. This will put us in position of open pressure on Souvanna govt with international embarrassment and probably also won’t carry much weight with Souvanna since we aren’t giving his forces anything at moment anyway and he is drawing on treasury for his current needs. Would probably also lead him turn to Commies for help despite fact that his note to us is in reasonably friendly tones as is letter we have just received from him asking for help for Vientiane and replying to our PEO questions as to disappearance munitions stocks from Vientiane depots. This course would thus give us almost same public onus as disregarding his instructions, would not get supplies to FAL and would leave field clear for Commies.

4) Another possibility would be agree suspend aid Phoumi but try to get Souvanna agreement supply Phoumi food and possibly some other items, reserving decision in our own minds as to our action when outcome forthcoming meeting Luang Prabang known. There is possibility Souvanna might be willing allow continuance supplies of food for humanitarian reasons.

5) Agree comply, but send supplies to Thai border opposite Savannakhet and let Phoumi bring them across. This could not be kept secret. Therefore has some [same?] disadvantages as course (1) and also puts responsibility on Thais which they may not wish accept.

Major factors leading Souvanna to send his note appear to be (1) a decision by Souvanna that he is going to try in every way possible to re-establish his control over the country, (2) his fear of Phoumi attack as result his intelligence information, (3) our failure provide supplies Vientiane, (4) he feels fortified by latest assurances support PL and Soviet support, (5) possible pressure by Indians or UN, or even French or British suggestion. Significant that his note quotes N.Y. ministerial meeting agreement which he could only have learned about from French or British.

I have not stopped any aid except movements CAT aircraft into LP itself which simply advertising fact our aid is continuing despite Souvanna’s prohibition in hope he won’t raise question again until he gets your answer.

For obvious reasons, I would be reluctant as yet to recommend that we disregard Souvanna’s note. A consistent and major objective of our policy has been to avoid getting into the position in the UN in which such action would place us, and an open break with Souvanna would greatly impair such capacity as we still have to influence course of events.

I doubt if even reassurance against attack by Phoumi or promise by us to furnish supplies to Vientiane, even if we were prepared to do so, would change Souvanna’s present position until at least he sees the outcome of LP negotiations if they take place. As far as aid to Vientiane is concerned, Souvanna regards himself as legal govt entitled to ask for such aid regardless of whether Phoumi gets it. We are going to be faced with this as a separate question next Monday⁴ when a specific request will be given us.

On balance therefore I see no alternative except to suspend aid to Gen Phoumi as requested by Souvanna.⁵ We should endeavor get Souvanna agreement continue supply food. If no countrywide legal govt emerges from projected negotiations LP and if we should then decide to resume aid to Gen Phoumi despite risks involved such action would have no more, and possibly less, serious consequences than it would if we decided today to continue aid in disregard Souvanna note.⁶

I am using Souvanna note as further pressure on King, Phoui and Gen Phoumi to get on with our plan to obtain new government. Souvanna states plans publish note when U.S. reply received.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/11–2460. Secret; Niact. Repeated for information niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 974, November 24, transmitted the text of Souvanna’s November 22 note. (ibid., 751J.5–MSP/11–2360; included in the microfiche supplement)

3. At the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting on the morning of November 23, Parsons summarized the note and indicated that “crucial decisions” would have to be taken soon on continuing aid. “The Secretary asked to what extent we had considered withdrawing recognition from Souvanna Phouma in order to legalize the continuation of aid to pro-Western groups.

   “Mr. Parsons replied that this issue was one which we might eventually have to face, but he indicated that we could probably temporize for a short time. Mr. Bohlen asked if consideration was currently being given to the possibility of the Lao raising the issue in the Security Council. Mr. Parsons replied that the possibility of the question being raised in the UN continued to be an important element in our thinking on the situation. He noted that the Lao delegation to the UN was now headed by a pro-Westerner. It seemed to be the consensus of the meeting that, as Mr. Parsons remarked, the ‘moment of truth’ in Laos may have arrived.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

4. November 28.
5. In telegram 522 to Vientiane, November 24, Parsons suggested that Brown “temporize” for the time being on Souvanna’s request. In telegrams 909 and 910 from Bangkok, both November 25, Johnson and Corcoran argued strongly against granting Souvanna’s request. (ibid., Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/11–2460, 751J.00/11–2560, and 751J.5–MSP/11–2560; all included in the microfiche supplement)

6. In telegram 557 to Vientiane, November 26, the Department of State responded as follows: “We agree we cannot disregard note. We cannot however accede to virtual abandonment of anti-communist forces in Laos. Neither can we take posture that could be so interpreted by RTG and GVN. Given present extremely precarious position and fact plan aiming at replacing Souvanna now underway, we must temporize by putting onus on Souvanna.”

   Included in telegram 557 was the text of the temporizing note which Brown was instructed to present to Souvanna on November 28, with copies to King Savang and Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2460; included in the microfiche supplement)