422. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, October 8, 1960, 12:45 p.m.1
At 1245 on Saturday, 8 October 1960 at a meeting in Mr. Dillon’s office attended by Mr. Dillon, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Irwin, Mr. Parsons, Mr. Steeves and Rear Admiral O’Donnell, Mr. Dillon outlined what he considered to be the objectives of the trip to Southeast Asia which is being made by Mr. Irwin, Mr. Parsons and Vice Admiral Riley.
- 1.
- Get as close as possible to a unified appreciation of the situation in Laos. What can be done with the resources available in the area? Isolate differences. Mr. Dillon hoped that there would be no differences.
- 2.
- See the King. Repeat the policy cited in State cable to Vientiane 384.2 Buck up the King. Do what is needed to evoke from him the actions necessary to support U.S. position in the current situation.
- 3.
- See Phoumi. Tell him that we support him. Tell him that he must support U.S. objectives with resources that are made available to him. Parsons wondered about his and Mr. Irwin’s going to Savannakhet. He did not believe it would be judicious for an Assistant Secretary of State and an Assistant Secretary of Defense to travel to Savannakhet to visit Phoumi. It was decided that talks should be held with Phoumi either at Luang Prabang or Bangkok.
- 4.
- The group should not go to Vientiane until after Souvanna Phouma had made a decision or had completed action on the conditions outlined in State cable 384. Going to Vientiane prior to a settlement of these conditions might provoke Kong Le to some imprudent action.
- 5.
- There should be agreement on the measure of support and the rhythm of military supplies into Savannakhet and for Phoumi.
- 6.
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For public relations purposes, an announcement will be made here in order to eliminate the speculation about this group being a fire brigade on its way to Laos. The cover story would talk about a visit to Southeast Asia and neighboring countries.
Mr. Dillon said that the visit to Saigon might be of almost equal importance to the visit to Laos in light of many alarming reports from there. He also knew about the civil guard going under the Department of Defense in Viet Nam and believed that the team could get valuable knowledge about the problems and determinations that will have to be made.
[Page 890]The point was raised as to whether it might be possible for Irwin to go to Savannakhet under circumstances where Parsons might not want to go. Mr. Dillon said we should decide that on the spot.
Mr. Steeves said that the French had been informed of the material in the State cable 384 and that they had bought it. Both General Lemnitzer and Mr. Irwin reminded the conference that there had been disturbing knowledge of French intervention on the side of Kong Le and also some interference with Phoumi and American traffic into Seno.
- 7.
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Mr. Dillon raised the point about the press stories which were based on Souvanna Phouma’s announcement that Americans were cutting off aid. Mr. Dillon went on to say that the team should be prepared perhaps to make decisions after consideration on the spot as to what is advisable. He said so far as he was concerned there was no intention to stop paying the troops or stopping economic aid. He recognizes the problems of paying either through the secular [regular?] channels of Vientiane or through Phoumi. He felt we must be ready to accommodate both situations. Mr. Irwin called attention to what he felt was weak language with respect to furnishing material in State cable 384. Mr. Dillon responded and said he did not believe that this language would give Mr. Brown the ability to hold up needed supplies. Mr. Irwin raised the point of sending a senior officer, perhaps a ranking Brigadier General to go into Savannakhet under existing cover, to act as a senior military advisor to Phoumi. This was discussed without determination and it seemed to be the consensus of the meeting that probably an officer of the rank of Colonel so as not to outrank Mr. Calhoun would be preferable. The name of Colonel Sidney V. Bingham who recently left OSD, where he had been Laos desk officer, and who is now attached to the MAAG in Saigon, was mentioned. Mr. Irwin asked what are our real views on Gen. Phoumi. What do we feel to be Phoumi’s long-term role so far as our policy is concerned. Mr. Irwin also mentioned that in the initial draft of the State cable 384 presented by State to Adm O’Donnell and General Gray, that they seemed to be continuing a policy of downgrading Phoumi. For example that the officer should be advised to keep Phoumi under “wraps.”
Mr. Dillon said that they believed Phoumi would need to be controlled, that they believed he should be supported but that he should have such control as to constrain him to use U.S. resources in a manner consistent with U.S. objectives. As to his long-term role, Mr. Dillon said he left that to the team to determine.
Another point was made that the interference at Seno had been protested to the French Ambassador.
Mr. Irwin also pointed out that State cable 384 did not seem to tell anybody to go to Phoumi and tell him that we were supporting him. State responded by saying that this was to be covered by a separate [Page 891] message [less than 1 line of source text not declassified],4 At the time of this meeting, it looked as though Mr. Jantzen who is now in Bangkok would be the representative with Phoumi and that he would be directed to give Phoumi assurance of support. Mr. Irwin raised the point whether it would not be desirable to tell the King immediately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] about our policy and about the visit of the team. State responded by saying that they did not think that anybody but the Ambassador should do this and they felt it would be counter productive to have the Ambassador press for another audience with the King at this time.