Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

414. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 2, 1960—8 p.m.

660. Addressees pass interested agencies. Following is summary appraisal current situation Laos as I and members of CT see it as of October 2:

1. Crying need of country is still unity.

2. On military side some slight progress has been made within limitations still divided command. Military leaders left LP² in reasonably cordial atmosphere. Cease-fire agreed. Vientiane forces withdrawing north of Nam Cadinh. Sabotage ended Vientiane. Agreed supplies Sam Neua to be provided best available source. Anti-Communist attitude Army leaders reaffirmed. Jointly agreed send Amkha Plaine des Jarres ascertain facts military situation second region. Bounleuth also Plaine des Jarres to confer Amkha.

3. This still highly fragile structure under which mutual confidence only slowly beginning be restored. Desperately needs political underpinning. It is still very vulnerable shocks from political moves by Souvanna or Phoumi such as Souvanna’s proposed dismissal Phoumi and others from Army, gestures too great softness [toward?] PL, or by irresponsible action by Kong Le or saboteurs and paras not yet contacted by respective headquarters. We should encourage this unity in every possible way.

4. Political solution less hopeful. King appears no hurry call political meeting. Souvanna appears encouraged he can gain support country and undermine Phoumi’s support, and is trying do so. There has been substantial shift support from Savannakhet to Vientiane in second military region. This acknowledged tacitly even by Phoumi. Psychological effect Vientiane success Paksane (even though perhaps normal reaction less trained troops when faced by elite) has helped Souvanna.

5. Souvanna consciously tried persuade defenders Sam Neua come over to him, which certainly, whether intended or not, disrupted effectiveness defense city. Cease-fire orders by PL in regions loyal Souvanna, and scattered reports PL turning themselves in with arms, have undoubtedly helped him by lending credence claims his policies will restore peace in country. Results have made Souvanna less inclined compromise, especially when added his general self-confidence and sense he supported by legal and constitutional propriety.

6. Separatist tendencies in Savannakhet camp still evident despite Phoumi–Boun Oum assertions they will not divide country, e.g. Boun Oum refusal allow students from south to come Vientiane for examinations, separate arrangements with airlines, command army divide north and south regions.

7. PL position considerably strengthened since coup, largely as result their pivotal position when FAL and RLG divided. They have additional weapons, have made territorial gains Sam Neua Province and are able gain stature by support legal government whose policies they exploiting. They have played clever game of not appreciably intervening in Vientiane–Savannakhet conflict but remaining in wings, apparently with Vientiane approval, as menacing presence giving psychological and potential physical support anti-Phoumi forces. This intermittent liaison will inevitably continue so long as RLG and FAL divided and Kong Le feels he or coup ideals threatened. PL have also helped increase Souvanna influence in country by ceasing fire where his forces involved but continuing fight with Phoumi forces, thus giving tangible evidence to people correctness Souvanna claim he and not Phoumi can restore internal peace in country and encouraging him continue as Prime Minister. Division in country has also given PL greater freedom movement and propaganda and they have undoubtedly exploited this to seek further popular support.

8. Clear some kind negotiations with PL inevitable whatever composition government. Phoumi even reported via Colonel Houmphan as late as October 1 suggesting Souphanouvong be invited by King join political discussions.

9. Kong Le still in position strength. He has popular influence as result coup and appeal its objectives peace, neutrality and anti-corruption. He is commander military unit which still best trained, best led, best supported and most effective in FAL. Success his units Paksane enhanced his reputation. His influence with crowds undoubtedly still considerable. There is evidence Kong Le in direct liaison with PL. In addition sharing basic Souvanna position preferability peaceful settlement PL problem, Kong Le more naively prepared accept parallel action with PL, and where he feels necessary, even their assistance, especially when Savannakhet forces involved. Danger here is while he may think he using PL, they using him. Souvanna still finds him useful and vice-versa. His public announcements, however, should not be taken too seriously since he tends speak without thinking and has backed down from them on every major occasion when Souvanna has chosen to make an issue with him. Harm he does is in his cooperation PL, help of his units for leftist elements Vientiane, and in interference smaller things which Ouan and Souvanna do not know about, but cumulative effect of which has given Kong Le considerable influence and prestige.

Recommended action.

1. US should in every possible way seek achieve and support reunification FAL. We can do this by offering full support in form pay, food, airlift, munitions, Lopburi paras and other necessities provided requests made united basis. We should promptly honor agreed requests and keep up pressure on politicians; e.g., my démarche yesterday Souvanna re his proposed dismissal Phoumi. (Embtel 658)⁴

2. US should continue press viewpoint that essential government be strengthened by addition tougher anti-Communists from Phoumi camp or elsewhere no matter who Prime Minister every possible way on King, on Souvanna, on Phoumi and on others who can be helpful, e.g., Somsanith, Kou Abhay. Competent Minister Defense (e.g. Somsanith with Bounleut as State Secretary for Defense or Deputy C-in-C) with no other responsibilities essential.

3. We are considering with a few responsible Lao who might be best composition government and how deal with Kong Le.

4. It would be preferable for Souvanna be retained in new government because he represents wide elements which cannot be ignored and which no one else can equally effectively represent.

5. In applying our pressures we should endeavor get agreed political solution completed before resignation or reorganization Souvanna government in order forestall possible new coup d’etat in Vientiane and outbreaks PL throughout country. We should endeavor persuade King return Vientiane with new government so as give it maximum support. If, however, trouble breaks out Vientiane and this not feasible, we should be prepared support new government at LP.

6. I should keep closest touch with Souvanna or any new Prime Minister and constantly remind him risks any negotiations with Pathet Lao (vice them), even from position maximum unity and strength anti-Communist elements in country.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–260. Secret; Niact. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, London, and Paris.
2. See footnote 3, Document 412.
4. In telegram 658, October 1, Brown reported a long conversation he had with Souvanna concerning the Lao political and military situation. Brown warned Souvanna that his proposed dismissal of Phoumi, Bounleuth, and 25 other dissident Army officers would be misinterpreted to mean that Kong Le, who had told the press he was actively seeking such action, exercised great influence in the Souvanna government. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–160; included in the microfiche supplement)