Office of the Historian

371. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1

Washington, August 17, 1960.

US POLICY FOR PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS

Souvanna Phouma’s cabinet is weak. It will not enable Souvanna to exercise real control over the affairs of the country. Without effective [Page 805] FAL support the cabinet will be at the mercy of the PL.2 The assumption of power by the Souvanna Phouma cabinet may represent the beginning of a Lao slide into Communism.

It is desirable, therefore, that Phoumi retain his present position of strength. From this position of strength he can exert a powerful influence to prevent the control of Laos from slipping out of Souvanna’s hands into that of the Communists.

If Phoumi exercises this influence by attacking Vientiane he will quite certainly antagonize thereby many elements of Laos’ top leadership. He would also immediately increase the danger of an outbreak of PL armed guerrilla action. Another result would be his strong condemnation by the British and the French, as well as presumably the Indians. These things would complicate the position of SEATO and the UN vis-à-vis possible maneuver to stabilize the Lao situation.

The big question seems to be whether Phoumi can exercise more beneficial long run influence by attacking or by political maneuvering from a position of strength. He has demonstrated capability for this type of maneuver in the past.

The answer to this first question would seem to depend on the answer to a second question, namely will Phoumi’s position be weakened irretrievably if he does not attack Vientiane.

Thus far the army, excepting of course the 2nd battalion, seems to have been willing to recognize his leadership, and there are no indications of any other elements having been inclined to desert him in favor of Kong Le. We have, of course, the position of3 Amkha and Sing to be considered. The evidence available indicates that there is no reason why they would favor throwing in their lots with Kong Le.

Conclusion:

1.
Phoumi should not attack Vientiane.
2.
We should endeavor to protect Phoumi’s position as an influential General in Laos.
3.
We should encourage negotiations between Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma in the course of which Phoumi would be able to establish a firm legal position for himself as an influential force in Lao affairs.

Recommendations:

1.
That we initiate an approach to the King to ask him to call for such negotiations.
2.
That we take the position with the Lao that we would continue support of the FAL only if we are satisfied that it is properly led toward the achievement of the objectives which have been mutually shared by the US and previous Lao Governments.
3.
That we use appropriate means to encourage Phoumi to negotiate rather than attack.

  1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, Laos 1960. Secret. Drafted by Usher. On the afternoon of August 17, representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency met with Acting Secretary Dillon to discuss U.S. policy in Laos. The only report on this meeting found is the following brief extract from the notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting:

    “Mr. Parsons said our position, established in an inter-agency meeting yesterday, will not satisfy those who wish a stronger stand and more immediate support for Phoumi, but it has already proved sound since there have been overnight reports of overtures by Phoumi to Souvanna through the French.” (ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

    Presumably the memorandum printed here was prepared for Parsons’ use at the interagency meeting.

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  2. At this point the following phrase was crossed out: “and its dupes such as Capt. Kong Le.”↩
  3. At this point “Generals Ouan” was crossed out.↩