Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

368. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, August 16, 1960—midnight.

274. Reference: (A) Vientiane’s 301 to Department repeated Bangkok 111.² (B) Report from [less than 1 line of source text not decalssified] representative with Phoumi at Savannakhet.³ In view reports contained references (A) and (B) concerning Phoumi counter-coup action and Thai government involvement, I asked for urgent appointment Prime Minister Sarit. He left Cabinet meeting with Foreign Minister Thanat and talked with me for more than one hour concerning Laos situation.

I explained that we had had word of Phoumi launching counter-coup operation, including dropping leaflets Vientiane, and that this a matter of such great importance that as representative of close friend and ally I was taking liberty of asking what information he could give me on subject. I knew my government would be studying situation very closely and therefore knew they would also appreciate his assessment situation and any views he wished pass along.

Sarit first reviewed events of past week noting Phoumi’s acute disappointment at what was in his view failure receive support from Thai and US Governments. His back is now to the wall and he has decided to go on on his own. Sarit informed me that Phoumi has force moving north on east bank Mekong which has arrived at Paksane.

Prime Minister then spoke at length of his grave worry concerning emerging government Vientiane, to be headed by Souvanna Phouma and according his information including Quinin as Minister Interior and Youth Touby Lifoung, Boun Oum and others. A number on list Thais consider leftists and Quinin as someone who has close association with Pathet Lao. Sarit knew this kind of government in Laos puts communist menace directly on borders Thailand and he gravely concerned for his country’s security. In course of discussion I several times made point how US is all prepared give RLG helping hand with paratroopers and broadcasting equipment, but never managed secure clear decision go ahead from RLG. Sarit takes simple view that we had clear request from Minister Defense Phoumi and this should have sufficed but I hope I finally persuaded him that on matters as important as those involved this case US had to be sure it was dealing with whole government and that government as whole was as determined as some of members.

I again expressed interest Prime Minister’s views and took occasion review US position as set forth Department’s 172 to Bangkok⁴ although avoiding any appearance accusing Thai Government. I emphasized our firm intention keep communism from Laos but at same time dangers in Phoumi type of action and also dangers outside intervention or interference. While emphasizing these are my instructions, I noted that USG now undoubtedly studying recent developments which have occurred subsequent to formulation this policy. Prime Minister’s views would be of value to Washington I knew. Sarit said he admits he would like to encourage and support Phoumi. In fact he feels his position such that he cannot either encourage or stop him since this would be interference with action Phoumi as Lao entitled to take. He then remarked on fact Phoumi was about to start broadcasting and Sarit has asked his people to try to pick up radio. He also made reference to fact that Khamphan Panya has been with Phoumi in Savannakhet and now returned to Luang Prabang to carry Phoumi message to King. Also stated he understands King’s acceptance resignation Tiao Somsanith Government under pressure and King unwilling; Sarit assumes King now supporting Phoumi effort.

I thanked Prime Minister for his information and his views and said I would speak frankly in mentioning report which had reached us that Thai Government permitting some Lao forces cross Thai territory to carry out operation against Vientiane. Sarit said no Lao forces were entering or crossing Thai territory. Much as he would wish to, he would not intervene. At this point Foreign Minister asked for further information and he and Prime Minister pointed out no need for Phoumi cross Thai territory since he can move his forces directly up east bank Mekong entirely in Lao territory. I referred rather vaguely to information reaching us, probably from sources in Laos, and noted at time like this all kinds of rumors will be circulating. Thanat explained, as further example, they had heard from Vientiane of Thai paratroopers being captured and he had sent back specific questions which would point up absurdity of this charge.

In course conversation Prime Minister received various reports including one to effect some Phoumi forces at Kilometer 27 (not clear whether this means 27 kilometers outside Vientiane; also could have reference to third para troop battalion now being formed). Thais understand that Souvanna Phouma expected receive vote of confidence in Assembly tomorrow and then visit King; speculated as to whether Phoumi arrival might head off this event.

Prime Minister asked me what US would do if Phoumi takes over Government. I remarked that diplomats never comment on events which have not yet taken place, but my personal opinion was that the US Government would probably deal with a government which was effectively in control of country.

Prime Minister inquired what was, in my opinion, US policy now and I explained again that much as we regretted capitulation Somsannith Government and its apparent lack of determination, now that it had fallen it was my Government’s judgment that military action unwise, and cited contents Vientiane’s sent Department 294 repeated Bangkok 104.⁵ I said again I could not speculate on what would be effect, if any, of most recent developments. I expressed regret that dropping of leaflets had not taken place five or six days ago when this action might have contributed to continued resistance RLG. When I departed I noted that I would see Prime Minister tomorrow morning at 0730 with Mr. Landon.⁶

Comment: Throughout discussion Prime Minister was entirely friendly and made point of reading to me from Thai Government telegrams and other materials, and apparently speaking quite frankly. I am nevertheless not fully persuaded that I received true answer to my query about Lao troops crossing Thai territory.

This does indicate to me however that Thais may not mean engage in any intervention or action which they feel likely to be detected and provoke international consequences, even though they probably are giving Phoumi covert support. If Thai something less than frank, probably also because wish avoid giving us any basis for trying obstruct such support. Impression gained from conversation was Thai rather confident Phoumi will succeed in retaking Vientiane fairly promptly. No evidence of their taking possible Pathet Lao action into account.

In view foregoing would appreciate Department guidance at earliest moment it available whether there is any change in my instructions received over recent days. Will continue follow these instructions until advised otherwise. Although no specific request made this conversation, possible that new circumstances will reopen questions put to us before re support from us on paratroopers, etc. In this connection can only recall how consistently over past week Thais have made clear they regard Laos situation in effect as test our willingness countenance drift toward neutralism and, conversely, strength our resolve support real friends.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1660. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated niact to Vientiane, to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 6:57 p.m., August 16.
2. Telegram 301, August 16, reported that the situation in Vientiane was deteriorating and the Embassy was considering the evacuation of dependents. (ibid., 751J.1122/8–1660)
3. Not further identified.
4. Document 364.
5. Document 366.
6. Kenneth Landon of the OCB was traveling in Southeast Asia on an orientation tour. He and Unger met with Sarit on the morning of August 17. The discussion centered around Laos and, “with regard to Laos ground covered very much same as my discussion last night” (reported in this telegram). Unger noted that Sarit’s comments in the morning meeting with Landon were if anything, “rather more pointed and persistent, reflecting something more like true degree his disappointment and frustration.” (Telegram 280 from Bangkok, August 17; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1760)