362. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
261. Situation as described by Dixon and Major Johnston (Assistant Naval Attaché) of this Embassy based on their visit today to Luang Prabang and consultations with Fromer and others appears to be reaching crossroads mentioned last para my telegram 242.2 US may shortly be faced with choice, if RLG Cabinet resignation sticks and accepted by King, of permitting Laos pass into neutralist camp or supporting Phoumi in military effort to gain control country in his [Page 792] name alone, to set up one-man rule with free world oriented policy. From here I cannot pretend judge possibilities of situation Laos or proper course US action but wish call attention in strongest terms to effect [on] RLG and its future policies of our failing take strong steps to avoid Laos going neutralist.
Symbolic of choice is decision on providing planes to move Erawan unit to Savannakhet. At moment, according Deptel 166 to Vientiane, to Bangkok 169,3 decision rests with RLG as to whether it wishes have troops moved. Strong impression gained by Dixon and Johnston is that RLG, if one still in fact exists, seems almost incapable making this decision. Perhaps it could if Phoumi present, but he reported unable reach Luang Prabang today and tomorrow, if he tries, may already be too late. TG awaits our word on this and, under what appear to be circumstances of RLG (except for Phoumi) yielding to Kong Le, will expect us now go ahead and move troops as Phoumi originally requested and supply broadcasting unit to him at least at Savannakhet.
Recognize that we have only skimpy idea what kind military action Phoumi planning and what are chances its success. Moreover, TG could already have moved paratroopers by land to Savannakhet if that were central question. Point is they wish, before becoming irrevocably committed themselves, to know our firm intentions and have us committed as well. For this reason I consider it unwise, incidentally, until our fundamental decision made, to press them on setting up transmitter Udorn (Vientiane’s sent Department 283, repeated Bangkok 94).4
According our information Marshal Sarit sorely distressed recent developments and keenly disappointed failure US come through on tokens of commitment in support of Phoumi. Must recognize he has personal tie with nephew and that has undoubtedly been his ambition to establish special position Thailand in Laos through nephew; these factors will further accentuate his bitterness if US remains aloof.
Fully realize US decision re future course action Laos will be based many factors and support Phoumi in absence RLG may on balance represent unacceptable alternative. Recognize also that Thais are expecting US to bear greater load responsibility and would quite possibly not support Phoumi if decision up to them alone. US must nevertheless recognize that decision by US which leaves Laos to move [Page 793] closer to neutralism will encourage tendency in Thailand still not strong, which asks whether such course is not also best for this country.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1560. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated niact to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Saigon. Received at 5:27 p.m., August 14.↩
- According to telegram 242, August 12, the Chargé in Thailand reported that Phoumi considered the terms offered by the High Revolutionary Command (HRC) to the Royal Lao Government in Luang Prabang to be unacceptable. Chargé Unger asked permission to authorize, if requested, the CAT to transport to Savannakhet Lao Erawan paratroopers still located in Lopuri, north of Bangkok. (ibid., 751J.00/8–1260; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- In this telegram, August 13, the Department of State informed Unger that he was authorized to make CAT aircraft available to move Lao Erawan paratroopers to Savannakhet if the Royal Lao Government in Luang Prabang agreed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1360; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- In this telegram, August 14, the Embassy in Vientiane requested shipment of a radio transmitter to an area north of Udorn in preparation for use by the Royal Lao Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/8–1460)↩