359. Memorandum of Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 12, 19601

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3.

4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

In the intelligence briefing Allen Dulles turned first to Laos. He said the situation was confused with serious portents. He pointed out that on the night of 8–9 August, Captain Kong Le, who was twenty-six years old, staged a coup. The Captain was said to have a good military record, to have fought bravely in the Pathet Lao engagements, and to have been effectively trained in para-military operations. His commander was absent at the time, coming back from a trip to the U.S. Captain Kong Le had one battalion backed by a tank regiment and took over in Vientiane. At the time the government was absent in Luang Prabang with the King, engaged in planning elaborate burial rights for the late King. The Chief of Staff was also up there.

The Defense Minister, Phoumi, Mr. Dulles went on, was unable to get back to Vientiane and went instead to Bangkok. He happens to be the nephew of Sarit.2 The Prime Minister stayed on in Luang Prabang.

In Bangkok Sarit held a meeting with Phoumi and invited the U.S. Chargé, the head of MAAG, and a CIA representative to attend.3 At that time Phoumi stated that the Royal Laotian Government would set up two resistance points; one at Luang Prabang where the Prime Minister would be; and a second at Savannakhet, in the southern part of Laos, to which Phoumi himself would go. Phoumi reported that he would need help urgently in the form of aircraft in order to travel and to move the paratroops he would need. Mr. Dulles said that consideration was being given to getting commercial aircraft in the Bangkok area of the C–47 type.

Secretary Herter observed that the aircraft problem was acute because it was the rainy season in Laos and many of the roads were not passable.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the aircraft could be furnished by CAT (Civilian Air Transport), the crews of which were composed of American and Chinese citizens. Only a few pilots, he said, were available in Laos and those were not very dependable. He explained that there were only two airfields capable of accommodating C–54’s and [Page 788] that otherwise light planes, C–46’s or C–47’s would have to be used. He said that the Chief of Staff, General Ouane, had come down to Vientiane and had been warmly received by the dissidents. He reported rumors that members of the government in Luang Prabang may come back to Vientiane and said it would be dangerous if they returned while Captain Kong Le was still in command. Mr. Dulles also pointed out the possibility that there were sinister elements in back of the coup.

Continuing, Mr. Dulles said that Souvanna Phouma had been in Vientiane and may have been in touch with Captain Kong Le. There was a possibility that Souvanna Phouma might form a government of a neutralist type. The French would tend to look upon this favorably. Mr. Dulles said that anything might happen in Laos and that there were few people of any courage there. He said that one of the U.S. officials at the Bangkok meeting was disappointed with the performance which Phoumi had put up. He said that the immediate problem was a logistical one, if the Laotian Government decides to put up a struggle. He also pointed out that there were two pockets of Pathet Lao forces near Vientiane, consisting of a few hundred men.

Under Secretary Merchant was then called upon for comment. He said that we have made it clear publicly and privately that we give full support to the Royal Laotian Government and that we are encouraging them to restore the situation. One difficulty is that the only radio with any range is in Vientiane and thus the rebels have control of communications. He said that the U.S. was trying to get low-powered radio transmitters into the hands of the Laotian Government. He also pointed out that there was an American colony in Vientiane consisting of about 800 persons including dependents and that there were 500 Filipino technicians who had been brought there under U.S. auspices. He said that the city was quiet so far and that it was in Phase I. Mr. Merchant stated that both the British and the French had professed ignorance and surprise at the coup, adding that both reflected a disturbing complacency. The present government, he pointed out, came into office by popular election and that it was not a case of an old discredited government. He added that the movement of aircraft to Bangkok was already under way but he said that no offer had yet been made to the Royal Laotian Government of the aircraft and that no firm request had been received from that government. He suggested that planes should be used only in support of sensible military operations and he said that there was MSP equipment which could be diverted from Thailand if necessary.

The President said that the U.S. should provide aircraft only if the Laotians can develop a feasible program; in other words, the aircraft should not be wasted.

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Mr. Dulles said that the arrangement would consist of a commercial contract between the Laotian Government and the civilian airline CAT.

The President suggested that the way to proceed was to offer the Laotians one or two aircraft and that then we should wait and see if they can get around and make some plans. Then later additional aircraft could be used to move troops.

Mr. Dulles said that the U.S. military mission was in civilian clothes and did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. He said that General Heintges was under restrictions which might be something like house arrest. He reported that there had been no violence so far and that none was likely unless an armed attack were made against Vientiane.

In summarizing the situation in Laos, Mr. Dulles said it would be almost a miracle if we can hold on there and expressed the view that the cards were stacked against us. He pointed to the threat from neighboring North Viet Nam and Communist China and from the Pathet Lao. He concluded by saying the situation was difficult but not hopeless.

[Here follow discussion of matters unrelated to Laos and the remaining agenda items.]

Charles A. Haskins
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Charles A. Haskins on August 16.
  2. Phoumi, by his own admission, was only a cousin-once-removed from Sarit, but by local convention and out of respect he addressed him as “uncle.”
  3. See Document 356.