Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

354. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, July 28, 1960—5 p.m.

177. Department pass DOD, ICA, CIA, USIA. Following are summary, conclusions of and forwarding comments concerning “Current Estimate of Internal Security Situation in Laos” dated July 13.² Paper prepared by Country Team Internal Security Committee (MILATT, Chairman, Chief PEO, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and CH/PSD USOM) which was requested in late June to make continuing study of internal security situation Laos and to develop basis for reporting on this subject. Country Team concurred July 22. Entire estimate pouched on July 27 as Embdes 32. Having only just arrived,³ I lack sufficient basis to evaluate or change contents and must therefore withhold comment until I have had opportunity to give paper due consideration.

Summary: During past year both rebels (Pathet Lao) and (Lao Armed Forces) had improved their respective capabilities. Improvement in FAL is relatively greater than in Pathet Lao. Through U.S. supported troop augmentation, receipt of equipment, expanded deployment, and as result of training given by the U.S.-French teams, FAL are now capable maintaining fair degree internal security in most of Kingdom. While FAL are not yet overall combat ready force, they can contain Pathet Lao insurgency except in those areas contiguous to Communist frontiers. Recently FAL have been able to establish reserve which first time has been possible since July–August 1959.

Pathet Lao have gained strength particularly due to desertion last year of about 900 ex-PL troops who deserted with their arms rather than be integrated into FAL. They continue to receive some support in equipment and training from DRV, though it is very doubtful that this support is sufficient adequately to support extensive operation or offset current shortages which exist in rebel forces. Pathet Lao continue to maintain initiative in sizeable areas of Laos and can instigate local guerrilla warfare on extensive basis; and, though barring introduction of sizeable forces from across ChiCom/DRV borders, their capability is not considered sufficient to displace RLG by military action, it is sufficient to cause disruption in vicinity of Communist frontier and those interior areas where population is not supporting RLG.

Conclusions: Based on best evidence now available, it is concluded that:

A. Pathet Lao will continue to maintain capability of initiating guerrilla warfare in sizeable areas of Laos, especially in those areas contiguous to DRV frontier and in certain interior areas where their influence is greatest, but for immediate future they will not have capability to displace RLG by military action.

B. Pathet Lao have capability of increasing their ranks through recruitment of disaffected and/or uncommitted tribal groups unless RLG initiates a prompt and effective program to align these tribal groups in support of Royal Govt.

C. At present time, despite a heightened probability, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that there will be marked intensification of insurgent activity in near future, although PL will continue their current efforts to expand their capabilities through propaganda, intimidation, terrorism, and similar tactics, and still [will] probably intensify these efforts.

D. It is doubtful that present support furnished by DRV to Pathet Lao forces is sufficient adequately to support extensive operations offset shortages which exist in insurgent forces, but sizeable introduction of forces and/or sizeable support overtly or covertly by ChiCom or DRV, of which they are capable, could quickly change this situation.

E. FAL, as currently constituted to include use of intervention forces, has capability to contain Pathet Lao forces in Laos today and, in fact, to continue to expand area of control, but this cannot be accomplished rapidly or throughout entire Kingdom.

Forwarding comments of committee:

1. Kingdom of Laos continues to be a primary target on Communist timetable for expansion and Communists will continue their efforts to subvert, intimidate and disrupt activities of RLG, using all means at disposal except overt aggression with ultimate aim of obtaining Communist-controlled Laos.

2. While this estimate indicates an improved situation, this condition is considered transient unless RLG/FAL continues to take aggressive action not only to maintain this improvement but to take initiative from Pathet Lao. Further, this improved situation does not imply any absence of hostilities (guerrilla action), as fighting is continuing in number of areas and, while RLG claims control of 80 percent of land mass, this control is marginal in some areas and its maintenance is subject to continuing aggressive operations against rebel elements.

3. Should RLG let up in its efforts to regain territory and to gain support of population or give Pathet Lao a breathing spell, capability of rebels probably would expand rapidly.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/7–2860. Secret; Noforn. Also sent to USUN and CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to London, Paris, Canberra, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Rangoon.
2. A copy of this study is in despatch 32 from Vientiane, July 27. (ibid., 751J.5/7–2760)
3. Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown was appointed on July 5 and presented his credentials on July 25.