Office of the Historian

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, December 30, 1959—8:07 p.m.

1340. 1. Your 18602 indicates we may expect early change of government. While it impossible predict composition new cabinet, we [Page 721] agree with French (Paris 2925)3 to extent that “radical change” might carry international consequences which need be mitigated at earliest opportunity. We would hope therefore that, very soon afer new government sworn in, its Prime Minister or Foreign Mininster would make public statement that traditional Lao policy of peace and neutrality remains unchanged. Such declaration will be important in direct relation to extent of CDNI–Army participation in government. There would be no objection to spreading word among different groups even in advance of resolution of crisis that US regards reaffirmation of Lao posture as an early must. Such action would have collateral advantage of counteracting any assumption on part of CDNI or others that US giving tacit encouragement to radical change in Lao policies.

2. While crisis may be working its way to solution, we still hold USG cannot take sides on constitutional issue between friendly non-Communist factions. In particular to counsel Phoui to defy King would be in Department’s opinion not only inappropriate but also highly impractical. We of course hope that energies of Lao leaders will not be much longer deflected from critical problems of country which it is their responsibility to face as patriots. In present confused situation we must let Lao work out own course and adjustments take place appraise most effective way to continue to help Laos progress and ensure its security.

3. You may impart philosophy this stand as you deem proper to Lao leaders of all coloration personally and through most trusted channels. It would be helpful if our position could be planted in manner to reach King. You may also reassure Phoui, if need be, that as he knows full well USG has not and does not encourage or support use of military force to effect political ends.

4. Inasmuch as your 18574 made reference to possible influences emanating from Bangkok and Saigon, would appreciate comments from these sources.5

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2959. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman, cleared by SEA and WE, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩

  2. In telegram 1860, December 30, Smith reported as follows:

    “Have just learned authoritatively that King sent General Phoumi to see Prime Minister Phoui late yesterday afternoon to tell him that King now prepared accept resignation government as offered in Cabinet meeting December 28 (paragraph 2 reference telegram) and that Phoui went Royal Palace last night and apparently received confirmation because on return to office Phoui dictated letter of resignation for consideration Cabinet this morning. Cabinet now meeting.” (ibid., 751J.13/12–3059; included in the microfiche supplement)

    ↩
  3. Dated December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2959)↩
  4. Telegram 1857, December 29, contained a report of a conversation on that morning between Phoui and Smith in which Phoui stated that King Savang had charged he was cooperating with the Vietnamese Government to overthrow the Lao monarchy. Phoui said that Savang, encouraged by Phoumi, was attempting to use Thai influence to counter Vietnamese presence in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2959; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  5. Telegrams 2053 from Saigon, December 31, and 1757 from Bangkok, January 1, 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3159 and 751J.00/1–160; both included in the microfiche supplement)↩