Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, October 17, 1959—11:42 a.m.

376. Re urtel 403.² Amb Lodge should seek early appointment with SYG to discuss in detail questions re future Laos.

[1.] In order that no misunderstanding on Hammarskjold’s part about U.S. intentions regarding future of Laos, following factors should be pointed out clearly to him:

(a) We consider real problem in Laos is not primarily military but political. Laos could not remain free if Communists are permitted to grow within body politic and are supported from outside country, and protected from counter action on part RLG. US will take all appropriate and feasible action to assure Laos is not lost to Communists. We think that support Laos has been receiving from US and France and ability SEATO act if and when this might become absolutely necessary are vital factors in maintenance Laotian independence. We see no incompatibility, and assume SYG sees none, between instrumentalities and continuing UN presence in Laos.

(b) Because of its special nature, Laos should in our opinion adopt public posture of neutrality. By this we mean Laos should not belong to great power alliance and foreign bases (except Seno) or other foreign military installations should not be permitted on Laotian territory. We do not mean ideological neutrality or any obligation on part of RLG to accept assistance from both East and West.

(c) RLG should in our opinion not deny Geneva agreements but rather act in spirit of agreements.

(d) RLG should maintain only moderate sized army obviously having purely defensive capacities. It is our hope that US can phase out its training program as soon as RLG forces adequately trained. However, latter is essential for stability and peace in SEA.

(e) Programs of rural and social development should be expanded and accelerated.

(f) Other free world countries should be encouraged give economic and other aid to Laos; U.S. desires no monopoly in this regard.

(g) As long as RLG does not wish negotiate with DRV it should not be forced to do so.

If SYG’s views differ fundamentally from policy which we intend follow toward Laos, he might wish reconsider whether he still desires to accept responsibility for maintaining UN presence there.

2. As we understand SYG plan described reftel, ultimate objectives would be to establish continuing UN presence in Laos, to which US has already agreed in principle. If USSR goes along with procedure not requiring formal UN action, Department considers this would be preferable to formal UN debate on problem since such debate could prove acrimonious and difficult to control. Therefore Department agrees with recommendations contained in “Comment” section reftel,³ and you authorized so inform SYG. At same time, believe procedure outlined in SYG September 29 letter to Secretary, envisaging possible SC and GA action, should be held in reserve in event SYG finds through his consultations that USSR will not in fact agree to procedure described urtel 403.

3. However, important points still require clarification, and Ambassador should seek answers to following question:

(a) Is he still thinking in terms UN presence for Southeast Asia or exclusively for Laos? (For Phoui’s views see Vientiane’s tel 1025 repeated USUN 123.)⁴ In view what we understand are Laotian views, and since primary danger is in Laos, we believe UN presence should be established there and question of regional presence should be deferred until possible later stage. (Dept may have additional info on this point upon receipt replies from field.)

(b) Is SYG fully aware extent responsibility placed on balance Subcommittee group remaining in Laos with approach good fighting weather and is he prepared cooperate in assuring their presence serves as maximum possible deterrent to renewed aggression until new UN presence established? Department greatly concerned about restrictive nature recommendations made to Subcommittee by Secretariat. If, for example, remaining Subcommittee staff inhibited from receiving evidence on any new outbreak of hostilities, as now appears case, risk incurred that deterrent effect will be greatly vitiated. Renewed hostilities under these circumstances would make it more difficult, when transition to new arrangement is contemplated, argue UN most effective instrument for protecting Laos. If SYG agrees with these views, Department hopes he will be willing let Subcommittee know that its staff in Laos should give maximum cooperation to RLG in response to any requests for assistance in receiving new evidence.

(c) What precise terms of reference does SYG have in mind for UN presence in Laos? We would be interested in SYG’s detailed views. In this connection, since terms of reference, to extent they spelled out, will presumably appear in letter circulated to SC members by SYG, US would wish see draft letter before circulated. We believe terms of reference should be in terms of observation and reporting, not in terms negotiation and mediation. Does he have Laos’ views this regard?

(d) Does SYG have specific individual in mind to represent him there? We assume RLG agreement would be sought before he designates individual to head mission and we would appreciate opportunity make our views known to SYG in this regard.

4. Ambassador Lodge is also requested make our views known to SYG re his and Blickenstaff’s activities on basis information in para 4 urtel 405 and Vientiane 1089 repeated USUN 142.⁵ You should also firmly clarify erroneous idea SYG may have re Phoui trip. We clearly did not instigate this trip and in fact have sought to discourage it.

We leave it to your judgment as to whether it is best to take up all of questions contained this telegram with SYG at one or two meetings.

You should inform SYG that contents of this telegram also constitute US reply to his letters of October 10⁶ and 15.⁷

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–959. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Cargo; cleared by Chapman, Green, Parsons, and Wilcox; and approved by Murphy.
2. As reported in telegram 403 from USUN, October 8, Hammarskjöld planned to wait about 4 days after the publication of the subcommittee’s report and then inform the President of the Security Council that he intended to travel to Laos to arrange for the establishment of a U.N. presence. (ibid., 751J.00/10–859; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. In this section of telegram 403, the Mission recommended a favorable response to Hammarskjold’s letter of September 29 (see footnote 3, Document 276). In this proposed response, Herter would urge the Secretary-General to send a letter to the President of the Security Council indicating his intention to appoint a U.N. representative in Laos unless there was an objection, thus placing the onus of opposition on the Soviet Union.
4. In telegram 1025, October 9, Smith reported that Phoui was not enthusiastic about a regional U.N. representative believing that such a person would not be able to spend adequate time on Lao problems given Cambodian-South Vietnamese and Cambodian-Thai border conflicts. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–959; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. In these telegrams, October 12 and 15, respectively, USUN and the Embassy reported attempts by Blickenstaff of the U.N. Secretariat Staff to restrict the activities of the Laos subcommittee and influence its work. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1259 and 751J.00/10–1559)
6. Letter from Hammarskjöld to Herter, October 10. (ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Laos 1957–1961)
7. In this letter, which Hammarskjöld described as an addendum to his October 10 letter, he reported that the Malayan Foreign Minister approved of the concept of a U.N. presence in Laos. (ibid.)