Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

269. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, September 11, 1959¹

Washington, September 11, 1959

SUBJECT

• Laos Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Acting Secretary Dillon
• Secretary McElroy
• Under Secretary Murphy
• General Twining, Chairman, JCS
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Allen Dulles, Director CIA
• General Goodpaster
• J. Graham Parsons, Asst. Secy

Mr. Dillon opened the meeting by saying that yesterday in discussion with Secretary McElroy and others² it had emerged that NSC policy in regard to Laos was clear but that Secretary McElroy felt that in anticipation of possible serious contingencies in Laos it would be helpful to talk with the President and have his approval for the general position we would take. Secretary McElroy then said that it was not entirely clear to him as to what our policy would be in connection with a specific crisis situation and he felt that it had to be worked out with the President. It was not clear whether we were thinking only in terms of training the Lao forces, or whether we intended to back them up with U.S. forces, if necessary.

The President remarked that as Laos was under the protection of SEATO, he assumed that it was our policy to do whatever was necessary militarily under SEATO and that we would not do anything completely by ourselves. If we acted unilaterally, then he did not see why we should have Collective Security Pacts. He would be willing for us to do our share, or perhaps even more than our share, under these Pacts but if our partners fell down and declined to participate, we should be very careful about going out by ourselves.

The Acting Secretary agreed and said that our SEATO partners had in fact been pretty slow at the beginning but now understood the situation better and showed indications that they would cooperate. It was their judgment and hope, however, that the UN could handle this situation.

The President expressed approval of U.S. activities to date, reiterated that we should be prepared and said that SEATO should get ahead and decide what it would do. The Acting Secretary went on to say our readiness measures were proceeding and we would be ready if there was an invasion. However, the French and certain others had some skepticism about the degree of activity there had been in Laos and he felt we should be careful not to get too far out in front. The President inquired if our troops, presumably Marines, were ready and General Twining said that they were, with shipping available. The President indicated a preference for someone else to be ahead of us in this situation and there followed a brief discussion of SEATO plans during which our own US plan was briefly described.

Secretary McElroy indicated that what bothered Defense most was the inadequacy of Lao troop training which led us to fear that the Lao might collapse rapidly under pressure. He indicated that we were handicapped by our arrangements with the French and could only carry on technical and logistical training. Mr. Dillon explained that more was involved than just the French as the whole Geneva structure and the attitude of the British and others was important. He added that we were trying to work out some ideas on training with Defense and Secretary McElroy added that the optimum would be for Laos to be able to defend itself. With regard to relying on SEATO, he felt that this had never worked out too well and that SEATO could not act fast enough. He doubted we could get a decision to move quickly enough. In reply to the President’s surmise, he then acknowledged that Defense wanted to be able to move troops within twenty-four hours if necessary. Mr. Dillon indicated that from their present readiness positions the Marines could be in Laos within three days, which might be fast enough given Lao conditions. He added that the Thais were willing to participate if we stood behind them, and could get in faster.

The President reiterated that SEATO ought to be in readiness and discussed command arrangements. He said that for once he hoped the U.S. would not have to be out in front and mentioned that the Australians and New Zealanders both were capable of providing competent command officers. It was generally agreed that the French should not be designated, with Mr. Murphy adding that the French were reluctant to get back into a fight in Indochina where they had been defeated before.

Mr. Dulles mentioned that an Army Attaché telegram³ today indicated the French took the position that there was little or no evidence of Viet-Minh incursions and said it looked as though this might be the position they would take with the UN group. The meeting ended with further discussion of military planning, both the SEATO plans and our plan. The President made it very clear that he desired SEATO planning to be firmed up quickly and said we would insist that all the members should be prepared to do their part.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1159. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Parsons and approved by Murphy and Dillon. Another, slightly different account of this meeting is in a memorandum of conversation, September 11, prepared by Goodpaster on September 14. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. See supra.
3. Telegram CX–122, September 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1159; included in the microfiche supplement)