Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

• JCS Recommendations for Recasting our Policy Toward Laos

The attached JCS memorandum (Tab A)² to the Secretary of Defense recommends, “as a mater of urgency, that we recast our policy toward Laos to free the U.S. from all restrictions on its actions in Laos.” It specifically proposes that we augment the U.S. training and support personnel in Laos (presumably discarding our obligations under the FAL training agreement) and that we establish a MAAG in Laos with U.S. personnel in uniform. The last two JCS recommendations are unclear, but, as I read them, we are already acting along lines they suggest.

Supplementing various points developed in the attached FE paper (Tab B),³ I believe the following considerations generally argue against the JCS proposals:

1. No case is made that these steps are necessary. Yet if we were to take them it would mean breaching the training agreement we laboriously negotiated with the French and RLG and compromising our declared position honoring the spirit of the Geneva Accords.

2. The JCS proposal appears to be overtaken by events of the past weekend. We agreed only 2 days ago to follow a course of action inconsistent with that recommended by the Chiefs. We have now invited the UN to send some 60 to 80 fact-finders on to the Lao scene. Were the JCS proposal now implemented the fact-finders would probably find a lot more that was damaging to Washington than to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow. The latters’ charges over the past two years would be confirmed even though we had observed the spirit of the Geneva Accords all that time.

3. If the military situation in Laos worsens, our next recourse is to SEATO. If we followed the JCS recommendations “to free the U.S. from all restrictions on its actions in Laos” and act “unilaterally,” then we might forfeit the support in any future SEATO action of the UK, France and other member countries.

4. The impact on India, Cambodia and other interested non-SEATO countries in Asia would be damaging to U.S. interests in Laos and elsewhere.

5. What intelligence basis is there for the statements contained in paragraph 4 of the JCS memorandum? The recommendation for new urgent U.S. actions which the JCS admit would probably lead to “active U.S. military intervention” contrast strangely with Ambassador Smith’s latest message (Vientiane’s 592)⁴ discussing the slowdown of activity and withdrawal of Communist forces. He suggests this is the result of prompt UN action. What is there in the current situation that would justify the U.S. taking the initiatives the JCS proposes? How could we rationalize it before the world?

On the other hand, I agree that we are faced with a severe long-term threat in Laos due in part to the inadequacy of the Lao Army. It needs more and better training; needs better equipment and direction. If the Joint Chiefs believe that the present training program (to which Defense gave its agreement) is not working and that it should be modified, then I believe we should be willing to discuss what modifications, if any, might be negotiable with the French.

In my opinion what underlies JCS thinking is fear that our military will be asked to do a crash rescue operation after most of Laos has gone under, and that our military will bear the burden of any sacrifices involved and of any possible failure. I think we must impress upon them that we shouldn’t go directly to actions which would risk spreading the conflict until we know that lesser measures are not having any desired effect.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Green.
2. Tab A is a copy of a draft of Document 254.
3. included in the microfiche supplement.
4. In telegram 592, September 8, Ambassador Smith anticipated a possible withdrawal of Viet Minh elements, and passed on Lao Army reports of a lack of activity in the areas of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. “While it seems too early for such a reaction to promptness of UN action it does not seem impossible Communists might have anticipated probable results of Security Council meeting three days ago and begun to take precautions accordingly.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–859)