Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

235. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State ¹

Geneva , August 4, 1959—7 p.m.

Secto 461. At Selwyn Lloyd’s suggestion I met today with him and with Couve to discuss Laos situation and possible course of action. Following were highlights of discussion:

1. Military Situation. I read contents Vientiane 2² and 3³ stressing that a North Vietnam battalion was now reported by the Provincial Governor to have crossed the border into Phong Saly. Lloyd said that the British military attaché still believed there was no proof of the introduction of North Vietnamese forces, but noted that he, Lloyd, had told Gromyko on Sunday that such forces were present and had even given the numbers of the North Vietnamese battalions, naming units believed to be in the area. We all agreed that the situation was confused and most difficult to assess, since we were dependent on second-hand reports from Lao sources. In general, Lloyd seemed during the discussion to incline to the view that this was quite possibly a major incursion that might sweep from Sam Neua and Phong Saly into other provinces, so that much of the country might be lost in a fairly short time. We took slightly less grave view, and French seemed to have little information.

2. Diplomatic Situation. It was noted that the RLG was definitely filing a statement of the facts with the SYG at the UN.⁴ Lloyd read extracts from the report of the acting British representative (Beeley) of consultations with the US, French, and Canadian representatives in New York. According to this report, it was the consensus of the UN representatives that without a specific resolution Hammarskjold would not be likely to act in a way that could be construed as partisan, but that the French should ascertain his views in a meeting scheduled (we understood) for the evening of the third. The Canadian representative had apparently suggested that if a favorable SC vote for action by the SYG could not be obtained, Hammarskjold might still act pursuant to individual invitations by the powers concerned; it was generally agreed this was impractical. Lloyd reported that there seemed to be agreement with Beeley’s judgment that although any SC initiative would be vetoed there would be the seven votes necessary to refer the matter to the UNGA under a uniting-for-peace resolution. As to the outcome in the UNGA, Beeley thought a two-thirds vote could be obtained provided that good evidence could be produced of North Vietnamese involvement. In this connection, Couve immediately pointed to the danger that a UN resolution would also include a paragraph calling for the return of the ICC. It was agreed that consultation at the UN should continue in order to lay the ground work for any action that should prove desirable

3. Lloyd also reported that the British had told the Indians (A) that there was no point in bringing back the ICC for the present and that an approach to the UN was preferable; (B) that, however, the ICC should be kept readily available to return on short notice as necessary; (C) that there was absolutely no truth in reports of US military activities in Laos, apart from the announced training program.

4. Possible courses of action apart from the UN or ICC .

A. Sending attachés to the affected areas. This was suggested by Couve, arguing that any first-hand information would be preferable to the present situation. We noted that the attachés might not find much unless there were some ANL action leading, for example, to the capture of prisoners. Lloyd mildly favored the idea, arguing that it would have some deterrent effect and would be a “morale-building exercise” at least; he also noted a danger that the attachés would be accused of involvement themselves. There was also some discussion of logistic difficulties. It was agreed that all three should ask the judgment of Vientiane as to the practicability and usefulness of this step. Embassy Vientiane please comment soonest.

B. Using the Indians as mediators to Vientiane and Hanoi. Also suggested by Couve, the mission to be that of (1) asking for the facts; (2) suggesting restraint. We said a diplomatic approach through established representatives seemed better than sending a special man. The British noted that the Soviet (and Hanoi) radios were already strongly denying North Vietnamese involvement, so that the Hanoi response seemed clear. In a lukewarm atmosphere, Couve did not pursue, and the idea was let drop.

5. Reactivation of the ICC . Lloyd still seemed inclined to favor this remarking that he would “like to see some Canadians around.” We noted that the Canadians had usually been outvoted, and that much would depend on the individual Indian named as chairman. (Addressees: Is there any information on latter?) Lloyd again argued that the Indians had learned much in the last two years. In discussion of a legal basis for reactivating the ICC, we noted that the provision in Article 27 (A) of the armistice about respecting frontiers seemed to provide a complete peg if we wanted one, and Lloyd suggested that the ICC might be reactivated for this sole purpose. It was agreed, however, that once recalled the ICC would be hard to restrict and would almost inevitably involve itself in the political situation, NLHX arrests, et cetera. Couve seemed clearly opposed and noted the time element, that it would take weeks to get the ICC in, but that thereafter it would be bound to stay at least several months. In the end discussion focused on the RLG attitude, it being agreed that RLG objections should not be overridden. Lloyd said bluntly that it was clear the RLG would not agree unless the US told them to. We repeated the sad experience of the ICC in the past indicating our continued skepticism, and in the end the issue was left without decision.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–459. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, New Delhi, Ottawa, and USUN.
2. Reference is to telegram 208 from Vientiane, repeated to Geneva as telegram 2; see footnote 2, supra .
3. Reference is to telegram 209 from Vientiane, repeated to Geneva as telegram 3, August 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–359; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. The text was transmitted in telegram 241 from Vientiane, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–559; included in the microfiche supplement)