233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
842. 1. One probable motive current Communist guerrilla activities Laos is creation situation provoke return ICC to Laos and GOI likely respond such situation by putting pressure on RLG to accept return.2RLG on basis public position and past dissatisfaction ICC almost certain bitterly resent and resist any such Indian move. US position remains that wishes RLG as most interested party this subject should be respected. Also on basis past performance ICC we see no advantage resumption ICC activities Laos. Broader objective Communists may be cause dissension among Laos’ friends abroad.
2. After standing firm against reconvening ICC for more than a year, RLG, if it accepted reconvening now would be giving in to use of force. We would then have to be prepared face consequences of such successful utilization of force by Communists.
3. While superficially current Communist actions may appear reaction to new ANL training program it should be recalled these actions planned and even executed before training program announced. Essentially current resort to violence is extension of rebellious activity which commenced when PL battalion Sam Neua took to bush in May. Furthermore Communist effort clearly not limited to reconvening ICC but is rather reversion to force in face of progress towards internal stability and security being made by RLG most notably in last few months and corresponding failure of Communist “soft” tactics in disrupting this process. How far Communists intend go in use force of course not yet clear.
4. Although GOI attitude ICC well known and not likely be basically changed by US, UK or RLG approaches believe it worthwhile make effort head off situation in which India on one hand and RLG and Western friends on other publicly at loggerheads on ICC issue. You should discuss with Foreign Office using rationale developed foregoing paragraphs possible representation to GOI by UK. Such [Page 548] representation would outline RLG position as injured party setting forth whatever evidence North Vietnamese responsibility can be adduced while subtly underlining UK, US and French determination publicly support RLG position against reconvention ICC. This approach might persuade Indians not publicly take line which would lead to open split between GOI and RLG on this subject Dillon
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3159. Secret. Drafted by Marshall Green and Corcoran; cleared by SEA, SOA, and BNA; and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Vientiane, Paris, New Delhi, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Geneva for the Secretary.↩
- In telegram 107 from USUN, July 29, the Mission summarized a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to Hammarskjöld, June 30, which Hammarskjöld showed a U.S. official. Nehru stated that the Geneva Accords of 1954 had foreseen the current tensions in Laos and stated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had a legitimate interest in the Royal Lao Government treatment of former Pathet Lao. Nehru suggested that the ICC should formally meet and attempt to mediate the differences between the two Lao parties. (ibid., 751J.5–MSP/7–2959)↩