Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

225. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 68–59

Washington, May 19, 1959.

THE OUTLOOK FOR LAOS

The Problem

To estimate the prospects for political stability in Laos over the next year or so with particular reference to the Communist threat.

Conclusions

1. The Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), although it has recently suffered some setbacks, is still the most effectively organized political party in Laos and a serious threat to continued non-Communist rule. The lack of unity between the non-Communist political groups, the Lao Hom Lao (LHL) and the Committee for Defense of the National Interest (CDNI), continues to hamper the development of an effective anti-Communist program. (Paras. 11, 12)

2. Nevertheless, important leaders of both non-Communist groups are beginning to appreciate the fact that continued disunity plays into Communist hands, and we believe that, with constant prodding, they will probably maintain their precarious modus vivendi for the period of this estimate. However, if the CDNI/LHL modus vivendi is not maintained and the CDNI and its army supporters become convinced that there is no other means of reducing the conflict and shifting governmental attention to the Communist problem, they may be tempted to seize power. Their decision would depend in large part on the prospect of US support. (Paras. 15, 17)

3. Government and army efforts to undercut Communist strength have had moderate success in the past half-year even in the absence of fully effective cooperation among non-Communist elements. It is probable that a broad government program, if supported and vigorously pushed by a united non-Communist front, would further reduce the strength and influence of the NLHZ and provide at least a better than even chance of continued non-Communist rule. (Paras. 16, 20)

4. The CDNI has developed considerable political power during the past six months. Its strength depends mainly upon the support of influential army officers and upon US backing. Although the CDNI organizational structure is still at an early stage of development, it is working to build a nationwide political organization. If the CDNI/army relationship is maintained, we believe that the CDNI will play an increasingly important part in the government. (Paras. 13, 14, 17)

5. Key Lao Army leaders are becoming more active in political affairs and the Lao Army will have a major role to play in any government program to reduce Communist strength. However, the army’s limited military capabilities are gradually diminishing, largely because of inadequate training. If the Lao Communists were to initiate a general program of terrorism or guerrilla warfare, the army would probably be unable to maintain internal security except in populated areas and along the country’s few main transportation routes. (Paras. 22, 23)

6. We believe that the Hanoi-directed NLHZ will seek to avoid overt actions which would invite suppression by the Lao Government, at least for the period of this estimate. Any decision for the NLHZ to revert to armed insurrection and forego its legal political status would probably be made by Hanoi and Peiping. Such a decision would probably be made only as a last-resort effort to preserve some assets should the government press an effective and large-scale program to suppress communism or as part of a broader Bloc plan to increase tensions in the area. (Paras. 19, 21)

7. We believe that given continued strong US support, Laos will not change its basically pro-US policy to any significant extent during the period of this estimate. However, the Laotian political and military leaders will expect the US to give continuing and concrete manifestations of its support, especially during the periods of heightened tension which will probably result from their anti-Communist effort at home and from their forthright pro-US foreign policy. The Bloc will probably increase its effort to reconvene the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos, in hopes of protecting the NLHZ, frustrating any US effort to improve the capabilities of the Lao Army, and exacerbating differences among the Western nations. (Paras. 24, 26)

8. French influence and prestige in Laos are diminishing. Major causes of this include Lao dissatisfaction with the training and support rendered by the French military mission and Laos’ increasingly close ties with, and heavy dependence upon, the US. The French resent their loss of influence in South Vietnam and are suspicious that the US is attempting to replace them completely in the rest of Indochina. De Gaulle and his government will almost certainly seek to limit growing US influence in the effort to increase the position and prestige of France. He will strive to retain the French administrative jurisdiction over the base at Seno. While the Lao Government will press hard for the prompt elimination of such French responsibilities, we believe that during the period of this estimate the Lao Government—if prompted by the US—would probably go along with a more gradual resolution of this problem. (Para. 25)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, which is included in the microfiche supplement.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. This estimate was prepared by the CIA, INR, and the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Air Force and The Joint Staff. It was submitted to the USIB on May 19 and all members concurred with the exception of the representatives of the AEC, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the FBI, all of whom abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.