Office of the Historian

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, August 6, 1958—8:24 p.m.

184. Your 252.2

1.
Agree analysis reftel.
2.
First sentence final paragraph Deptel 1683 reflects our desire obtain new government of maximum effectiveness and avoid either weakening potential young elements or lessening their confidence in [Page 473] U.S. It does not indicate we intend encourage younger elements attempt coup at this time rather than enter government as now suggested by Souvanna.
3.
It appear to us events now in stage of achievement cabinet headed by Souvanna, made up of deputies and technicians in about equal proportions. It is understood maximum effectiveness such a government requires inclusion more new faces than old and assurance some key ministries under young leaders. However actual numerical superiority of new faces over old not indispensable requirement especially if some sound elements included among old faces. Only if this parliamentary solution fails of achievement or long drawn out government crisis develops would we seriously consider pros and cons of government by crown in legal, constitutional but extra parliamentary action.
4.
We are much disappointed Nouphat’s dependence on and fidelity to Katay who to us represents past not future (Embtel 235).4
5.
Since government now proposed by Souvanna seems best parliamentary solution obtainable you should encourage but not press young elements into joining. We assume such Souvanna government once formed would meet conditions numbered paragraph (2) your 2485 concerning determination accomplish reforms and support from RPL, ANL, and younger elements.
Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Corcoran; cleared by Kocher, Jenkins, and Parsons; and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. In telegram 252, August 5, the Embassy concluded that the major obstacle to Souvanna Phouma forming a government was the refusal of young elements of the CDNI to serve in his cabinet. Smith requested further instructions from the Department as to whether or not he should encourage these young elements to refuse to participate in a Souvanna Phouma government. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩

  3. This sentence of telegram 168, August 2, reads as follows:

    “You [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should ascertain exact position younger elements and if they are adamantly opposed to current Souvanna lineup avoid taking position directly opposed to them and in favor of Souvanna.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3158; included in the microfiche supplement)

    ↩
  4. In telegram 235, August 3, the Embassy reported that Nouphat had declined at least temporarily Souvanna’s invitation to join the new government for fear of alienating his political following which was also subject to Katay’s influence. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–358; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  5. In telegram 248, August 5, Smith stated that, if approached by Souvanna Phouma, he would decline to discuss personalities and would stress U.S. support for a reform-minded government that included younger Lao politicians. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–558; included in the microfiche supplement)↩