171. Editorial Note
The Department of State and the Country Team in Vientiane differed over the use of clearly-marked U.S. Air Force planes in “Operation Booster Shot,” the U.S. airborne operation in support of the Royal Lao Government’s pre-election program. Department of State officials became concerned that U.S. officials involved in the program were using planes marked as U.S. Air Force aircraft and were openly taking credit for the operation. (Telegram 1256 to Vientiane, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1658)
The Embassy in Vientiane responded that USAF C–119 and C–130 aircraft were the only ones available in the area for an operation of the magnitude of “Operation Booster Shot.” In any case, the Embassy believed that the United States was winning great psychological advantage from its participation in the operation. (Telegram 1742 from Vientiane, April 17; ibid., 751J.00/4–1758) The Department of State reluctantly approved the continued use of USAF planes.
Nevertheless, the Department stated that the U.S. role in “Operation Booster Shot” should be played down as much as possible because of Asian sensibilities, potential nationalist resentment, and possible International Control Commission protests, and because it felt that the Royal Lao Government should get maximum credit for the program. The Department suggested also that the airlift not end immediately after the election, but taper off. (Telegram 1267 to Vientiane April 18; ibid.) The Embassy agreed and stated that it would continue airdrops of additional supplies and equipment until the rains, which usually came around May 15. The remaining airdrops would be carried out by non-USAF planes. The Embassy also agreed that the Royal Lao Government should get maximum credit for the airlift. (Telegram 1811 from Vientiane, April 26; ibid., 751J.00/4–2658)
All the telegrams described are included in the microfiche supplement.