Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

168. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Whittington) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)¹

Washington, March 14, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Operation of the National Front in Laos

1. In connection with Vientiane’s 1521² indicating that the Lao National Front is coming apart at the seams. [5 lines of source text not declassified].

[2 lines of source text not declassified] As of March 11 the hitherto defunct Central Committee was beginning to recognize the urgency of the situation. It had consequently organized provincial election committees headed by the Chaokhouengs in 10 provinces and the senior military commanders in Sam Neua and Phong Saly, and had proposed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a number of well-thought-out village political impact projects. Moreover, the plan to utilize the Crown Prince in the election campaign was jelling. The three countries supporting SIDASP had turned over their contributions for the election campaign, and SIDASP’s program against Pathet Lao candidates was getting off the ground. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] considered the foregoing information indicated the situation was not so bad as depicted in Vientiane’s 1521, but that complacency was obviously not warranted. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

So far as financial assistance is concerned, the time for use of this weapon has not arrived, inasmuch as April 1 is the scheduled date for whittling down the number of candidates to 21, which is our condition for handing over the remaining campaign funds.

We have agreed to examine the situation during the first part of next week in order to determine what further might be done.

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes it time to resume contact with Katay, who is apparently recovering relatively rapidly and is expected in Vientiane at the end of the month to take part in pre-election maneuvering. [2 lines of source text not declassified]They do wish as a minimum objective to keep tab on Katay’s activities and thinking, and as a maximum to obtain his collaboration with the National Front. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Recommendation

That you approve resumption of contact with Katay along the general lines set forth above.³

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, 350.01 Elections (Lao). Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Byrne.
2. Telegram 1521 from Vientiane, March 11, was the third weekly report on the Lao electoral campaign. (ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/3–1158) The first and second weekly reports, telegrams 1378 and 1439 from Vientiane, February 19 and 28, are ibid., 751J.00/2–1958 and 751J.00/2–2858. They are included in the microfiche supplement.
3. Parsons disapproved the recommendation. He wrote the following note after his disapproval: “I believe we should take another look at this at the end of the month when (1) Katay may or may not have come to Vte [Vientiane] and (2) funding crisis may or may not have been resolved. In any event I would much prefer for Katay (or a go-between on his behalf) to come to us rather than the reverse. J.G.P.”