Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

164. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief, Program Evaluation Office, Laos (Brown)¹

Honolulu, February 13, 1958—3:25 p.m.

0011/0027. Ref my 062345Z Jan 58² and Quarterly Activities Report, PEO, Laos dtd 20 Jan 58.³ Recent conferences with CHPEO and my staff have been most helpful towards increasing understanding of problems in Laos. Obviously the most immediate problem is to win May elections and set stage for winning general elections in 1959. From discussions which Chief PEO the Communists appear to be waging a vigorous, coordinated, and well financed campaign. Meanwhile indications are that the Nationalist Party is not conducting a vigorous, well planned campaign, either because they lack the means, the knowhow, or they underestimate the Communist threat.

I consider that the most important and immediate goal must be to assist the RLG in winning these special elections. The situation appears to me to be at a stage where the US can no longer adhere to a policy of “wait and see” but must take immediate and bold action. This action will require that the country team with full support from higher authorities act in concert in order to be effectively felt from top RLG officials to the grass roots. Attainment of this goal is of fundamental importance to future US actions and to Laos itself.

In order to achieve our longer range goal, but in no way to detract from the urgency of winning these elections, we must plan for the following objectives in the future:

A. Removal of the ICC from Laos subsequent to May elections.

B. Enactment of security legislation which will enable reduction of Communism in Laos.

C. Reduction in Communist infiltration.

D. Establishment of regular MAAG group to continue building a security force.

E. Development of a country socio-economic plan which can be executed to create a stable progressive society in Laos.

Planning to achieve these objectives should be underway in Laos, here, and in Washington. None of these will be possible, however, if the Communists win significant strength in the elections. To assist the country team I am prepared to recommend to Washington that the following be given consideration as a basis for immediate US courses of action to support the RLG:

A. Additional qualified planners and administrative personnel be made available to the Ambassador and the country team from Washington and my staff as necessary on a temporary basis. Since shortage of qualified personnel is a major obstacle to the implementation of US policy and programs in Laos, this would close the gap during this crucial period pending improved recruiting and training actions. Such augmentation should assist country team to plan and execute necessary actions.

B. The country team must have the resources to persuade Nationalist Party to establish a single slate of candidates especially in areas of doubtful outcome.

C. We should provide transportation to selected Nationalist Party candidates for use in specific areas. Air transportation and particularly helicopters would be most useful. Commercial means should be used if possible. CAT Airlines is a possibility and there may be others which could be used. If necessary US military helicopters could be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] flown by contract pilots on a commercial contract basis.

D. We should provide through USOM the means whereby the Nationalist Party can conduct a well organized dynamic political campaign throughout Laos. Essentially this will require campaign advisors, trained propagandists, printing and reproduction facilities and portable public address systems together with the necessary transport to insure grass roots campaigning. Personnel from Southeast Asia area experienced in political action should be utilized to the maximum. Commercial facilities and equipment could be primary sources of required services. Additional facilities under US control in Manila and US Army psywar units should be utilized to the maximum feasible.

E. The US should expand the civic action program immediately. This returns a large dividend for a relatively small investment and is something we can do at once. This requires:

(1) Allocation of necessary money.

(2) Trained personnel for the working level. MAAGs and Embassies in area would be possible source.

(3) Food, clothing, medicine. MAP and military as well as commercial sources should be utilized as feasible.

F. Every opportunity should be utilized to advise and assist the RLG thru other US personnel [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Laos. While these personnel are not numerous they exert a tremendous influence and are strongly anti-Communistic. Some are in critical areas.

I am fully aware that there are broad implications to some of the foregoing. I realize that the ICC, the Geneva accords, the French and our own red tape are obstacles which must be surmounted. In so far as I am authorized I am prepared to expedite implementation of program in Laos. I have within Pacific Command substantial capability and supplies which could be used provided I have proper authorization. The US has already expended over 130 million dollars in Laos. We run the risk of losing this investment if we lose Laos directly or indirectly as a result of May elections. The security of Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Thailand will then be much more endangered and thereby costly. The May elections are critical and the RLG must be advised, persuaded, and assisted to win. I am convinced that we must take positive action to preserve Laos now and to create opportunities for reducing Communism in Laos in the near future. Please discuss this with Ambassador and submit comments and/or recommendations to me relative to the points mentioned herein or others that may come up.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2). Top Secret. Dispatched with date/time group 140115Z. Repeated to the CNO.
2. Dated January 7. (Enclosure to letter from Admiral Burke to Robertson; Department of State, EA/Laos Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos 1958; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Not found.