Office of the Historian

157. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1

Washington, December 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Notes on Cambodian Developments for Tri-Partite Talks at Paris

Sihanouk’s current tour of certain Sino-Soviet bloc countries and the commitments he may undertake with the Communist regimes are the major subjects of interest at present. Some results of his trip to Moscow already are available (see below); his visit to Communist China will be taking place toward the middle of December. It is expected that he will sign a friendship and non-aggression pact (or worse) in Peiping and may receive further economic aid, possibly for the Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville railroad. Sihanouk is scheduled to return to Phnom Penh December 17 or 18 and has said he will then make statements on the outcome of his trip.

Moscow Communiqué. A joint Soviet-Cambodian statement issued December 3 (Tab A)2 paid homage to several current Soviet themes, including general and total disarmament, liquidation of foreign military bases, an extraordinary UNGA with Chiefs of State, admission of CPR, etc. and indicated Cambodian acceptance of a technical school to be constructed by the Soviets in Cambodia as a gift. The Cambodians also requested (and obtained commitments for) Soviet aid (“credits” and technicians) for hydropower stations and mineral prospecing. (No mention of military aid.)

Status of U.S. Offer of Additional Aid. On November 12, 1960 we gave the Cambodians our preliminary response (Tab B)3 to their [Page 406] proposals for increased military aid. The response was limited mainly to what could be done in FY 1961 and included:

a)
Training of up to ten Cambodian jet pilots;
b)
Equipment for an Engineer Construction Battalion;
c)
Three additional LCM’s;
d)
Three additional M–24 tanks;
e)
Additional modern small arms and crew-served weapons for existing regular units;
f)
10,000 carbines from surplus stocks for paramilitary forces and the offer to make more available on a sales basis;
g)
Reduction of only 5% instead of the usual 10% in the US contribution to the pay and allowances of the Cambodian armed forces; and
h)
Additional training and equipment for the national forces.

We agreed to be guided by the Cambodian proposals in future years. The dollar cost of the additional military and police aid for FY 1961 is estimated at a maximum of $2.7 million. We also informed the Cambodians on this occasion of our readiness to send a survey team to determine whether and how we could help in the establishment of a technological institute. (Note: We have informed the French, British and other interested allies of our response in general terms, not including the dollar value.)

The Cambodians have not as yet responded to our offer, although both Ambassador Nong Kimny and Foreign Minister Tep Phan said they would immediately forward the offer to Prince Sihanouk (then in France).

Our Ambassador at Phnom Penh believes that Sihanouk’s acceptance of the Soviet technical school in the face of our offer reflects “blatant two-facedness by Sihanouk” and a deliberate slap at the United States. He fears that it reveals a sharper prospective shift toward the bloc than had previously been anticipated. He reports that the French in Phnom Penh believe Sihanouk in effect is now attempting to play the Soviets against the Chinese Communists for aid, much as he has been playing West against East. Our Ambassador recommends we consider the possibility of administering “shock treatment” by cutting US aid after Sihanouk returns to Phnom Penh and the extent of his commitments to the bloc has becme clear. (Tab C)4

(Comment: There would appear to be at least a possibility that Sihanouk was ensnared by the Soviets on the technical school offer and that he did not intend deliberately to embarrass the US on this score. His prompt protestations through (Tab D)5 Tep Phan that he [Page 407] had not raised this matter with the USSR may be true. In any event, we probably should hold our fire until we can assess Sihanouk’s actions and motives with more assurance.)

Cambodian-Lao Neutralization Scheme. It is noteworthy that the Moscow communiqué made no mention of Sihanouk’s proposal for Cambodian-Lao neutralization, guaranteed by “interested powers” under UN auspices. The communiqué notes that the 1954 Geneva agreement is a good basis for safeguarding and strengthening peace in former Indochina. It would thus appear that the Soviets did not support Sihanouk’s idea and, instead, are attempting to reinstitute the Geneva mechanism. (The British also have indicated a preference for reviving Geneva and the ICC to Sihanouk’s scheme, which also calls for “neutral” supervisory teams.) Meanwhile, recent indications in New York have been that the Cambodians were no longer pushing their neutralization proposal very vigorously. (Tab E)6 A different note, however, was sounded in Vientiane December 3 by a Lao Foreign Office circular strongly supporting Sihanouk’s plan (Tab F).7

Thai-Cambodian Talks. After initially urging both countries to undertake conciliatory talks, we had nothing more to do with the negotiations until Nong Kimny requested US good offices December 3 in connection with a problem on extradition of two specified “convicted criminals” (Sam Sary and A Seap) from Thailand. We subsequently raised the matter informally with the Thai in Washington and informed Nong Kimny of the result, namely that the Thai had difficulty dealing with specified individuals in an international agreement and had requested instructions on possible compromise language.

We have asked USUN to inform the UN Secretary General’s mediator of the Thai-Cambodian talks (Engen of Norway) of our action and to suggest that a bit of guidance or mediation from him would appear to be desirable. (Tab G)8 The talks have been concerned primarily with press attacks, border control and extradition of criminals.

We also suggested to USUN that this may be an appropriate opportunity to raise the possibility of a joint Cambodian-Thai-Vietnamese declaration of amity. (Tab H)9

  1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 65 D 169, 350 Political Affairs, From January 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Askew and cleared by Cleveland.↩

  2. The communiqué was summarized in telegram 1358 from Moscow. (Ibid., Central Files, 320/12–360) Tab A included telegram 621 from Phnom Penh, December 7, in which the Embassy commented on Sihanouk’s ongoing trip behind the Iron Curtain. The telegram ended with the following summary:

    “In sum, Prague and Moscow communiqués denote definite leftward swing by Sihanouk, but not so far as to warrant conclusion he intends abandon neutrality for closer alignment with bloc. In talk Afro-Asian diplomats Moscow, he reportedly stated Cambodia would continue follow policy ‘strict neutrality’. What is important is trend and what this may foretell for future.” (Ibid., 851H.433/12–760)

    ↩
  3. An account of the discussion between Parsons and Ambassador Nong Kimny, November 12, is in a memorandum of conversation of that date. (ibid., 751H.5–MSP/11–260; included in the microfiche supplement) Tab B is attached to that memorandum of conversation.↩
  4. Tab C, telegram 615 from Phnom Penh, December 6, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 851H.433/12–660)↩
  5. Tab D, telegram 609 from Phnom Penh, December 6, not attached. (Ibid., 851H.433/12–660)↩
  6. Tab E, telegram 1647 from USUN, December 6, not attached. (Ibid., 751H.00/15–660)↩
  7. Tab F, telegram 1077 from Vientiane, December 7, not attached. (Ibid., 751G.00/12–760)↩
  8. Tab G, telegrams 789 to Bangkok and 1089 to USUN, December 3 and 7, not attached. (Ibid., 651H.92/12–360 and 651H.92/12–760, respectively)↩
  9. Tab H, instruction CA–4577, November 18, not attached. (Ibid., 751H.00/11–1860)↩