154. Editorial Note
At 6:30 p.m., November 10, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Merchant and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray discussed Cambodian jets and jet training on the telephone as follows:
“Mr. Gray, after finishing another topic, continued that he had bad news on Cambodia. He had sent the minute to the President, and Ann Whitman was holding it because Mr. Gray was going to get concurrences of the Secretaries of both State and Defense. (Mr. Merchant interjected that he had delivered his last evening.) Mr. Gray said that Tom Gates doesn’t believe in it at all. Jack Irwin has passed this on—Mr. Gates feels that if the country had jets, they couldn’t take off without over-flying the borders. Mr. Irwin had said that if the meetings had included Mr. Gates, perhaps Mr. Gates might have had a different view. In the meantime, Mr. Gray has had a lot of trouble with Treasury because they wouldn’t go along as long as there was anything in it that might even suggest financial procurement from an alternate source—this was a balance of payments problem. He had told Andy to show to the President only the first part of the minute, for that is all that his decision was needed on. With reference to provision of aircraft, sympathetic consideration could be given at an appropriate time. Everybody agreed there was no military necessity for this and that this came to a political decision. Mr. Gray said he had told Andy that he would talk to Mr. Merchant and undertake to find out if the Secretary felt strongly enough about it to push this matter at present. This would mean that the President would have to be told about Defense’s disagreement. Mr. Gray has to let Ann Whitman know tomorrow morning what to do with the minute and he thought perhaps Mr. Merchant could get in touch with Defense tonight so that a decision on the matter could be taken tomorrow morning. It would be perfectly all right with him if State took it up with Defense. Then, if it is decided that State feels strongly that the project should go ahead, it will be presented to the President, giving State’s view and Defense’s objection.
“Mr. Merchant doubted that anything could be done this evening, and Mr. Gray suggested that perhaps the matter could be discussed again tomorrow morning. Mr. Merchant promised to call him some time between 9 and 11:30, November 11.” (Notes on a telephone conversation, November 10; Department of State, Central Files, 716.02/11–1060)
Merchant next telephoned Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight, at 7:10 p.m., to complain as follows:
“Mr. Merchant then voiced his complaint that Defense had withdrawn its concurrence on the jets for Cambodia on the eve of Sihanouk’s departure for the Iron Curtain. Jack Irwin had given Defense’s approval at OCB, and an agreed minute was sent by Gordon Gray to the President at Augusta, but now Gordon Gray was unable to say [Page 401] that it had Defense and State concurrence as Mr. Gates refused to go along with Mr. Irwin’s decision in the matter. Mr. Merchant said he hadn’t as yet had a chance to talk to the Secretary about this, but he felt he had to say now that this was a political decision and that there actually is no commitment to supply the aircraft.
“Mr. Knight interjected here that if we ultimately sold them the aircraft, we would be better off. He said he would check into it as he wasn’t familiar with this matter and would call Mr. Merchant back.” (Ibid.)
Merchant and Gray talked again at 10 a.m., November 11:
“Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary would like to have it put to the President that he strongly supports the furnishing of jet training to Cambodia on political grounds. The Secretary is going to give Tom Gates a call this morning just as a matter of courtesy to let him know that he disagrees with him and that it is being put up to the President.
“Mr. Gray thought that perhaps this call might have a melting effect on Mr. Gates.” (Ibid.)
At 11:40 a.m., November 11, Gray telephoned Merchant and explained the situation as follows:
“Mr. Gray said he had just talked to the President who had earlier been informed of a part of the Cambodian deal by the Secretary of Treasury’s excitement about off-shore procurement. The minute will have to be changed on that. Mr. Gray had told the President what was involved, stating that we would provide only training and not volunteer anything about the aircraft. If they asked about the aircraft, we should give them the response which had been agreed upon—that the matter would be given sympathetic consideration at the appropriate time. The President was told of Tom Gates’ disagreement and the Secretary of State’s feeling that it was important from a political point of view. He said this grant of training was fine and assumed that training would be in this country. Mr. Gray replied that he did not know.
“Mr. Merchant said he did not know for sure. His impression was that it would be.
“Mr. Gray said he thought the President made that assumption. It was not a condition. The President wants this project to get started right away. Mr. Merchant said he would get in touch with Mr. Cleveland. When speaking of numbers of pilots, Mr. Gray thought we had better think in terms of 10 rather than 6 because some of them will be refused. That probably was the point that Mr. Cleveland would discuss with Defense, but, in any event, it should be done promptly.
“Mr. Gray promised that he would send to State a copy of his memorandum of this telephone conversation with the President. (Ibid. The memorandum is infra.)
Gray also called Merchant at noon, November 11, to inform him of Secretary of Defense Gates’ opposition. (Ibid.)