Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

142. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 1960¹

Washington, June 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Cambodia

PARTICIPANTS

• The Honorable Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
• His Excellency Visutr Arthayukti, Ambassador of Thailand
• The Honorable Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State
• The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador to Thailand
• Mr. Daniel V. Anderson, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs

The Thai Foreign Minister called on the Secretary this afternoon for a fifteen minute interview which in fact lasted approximately forty minutes.

After an exchange of amenities Thanat said that he would like to discuss the situation in Cambodia. Thailand wanted to maintain good relations with Cambodia and had done its best to promote friendship between the two countries since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1958. In fact, he had told Sihanouk that if the Prince found any substance to charges of dissident activity in Thailand, the Thai Government would take appropriate action. In practice, Cambodian charges had been make in general terms and almost entirely in the press and by radio.

Recently there had been “disturbing indications” that Cambodia might change its policy vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. First of all there was the Chou visit and since then there had been many statements that were not reassuring. In fact, Thanat said he had gained the impression that, by attacking the Thais and the United States, Sihanouk might be seeking the role of victim of the “imperialists” in order to justify bringing in the Chinese Communists. He might even create an incident by arresting a group of men and claiming that they had “invaded” Cambodia. Thanat wondered what Sihanouk expected to gain.

Thanat observed that Cambodia considers certain parts of Thailand as belonging to the ancient Khmer empire and Sihanouk might have in the back of his mind the thought of recovering this empire and aligning himself with the Chinese Communists in order to do so.² As for Thailand, she had no desire whatsoever to recover any part of what is today Cambodia.

Recently, Thanat went on to say, our Chargé in Bangkok had cautioned the Thais to be calm and patient. Thanat said that his Government had, in fact, been both calm and patient but he was not at all sure, in view of the provocations from the Cambodians, that the Thais would remain silent indefinitely. Nevertheless, Thailand had decided to disregard Cambodia’s attacks.

Thanat said it had occurred to him that Sihanouk’s “whole game” might be exposed in the UN. In fact, he had recently talked with Secretary General Hammarskjold about the possibility of using the good offices of Mr. Zellweger, the UN representative in Laos.³ Thanat said he would welcome a UN investigation and would be glad to show the UN representative everything there was to be seen in Thailand. Such a representative could ask Sihanouk what specifically was troubling Cambodia and could ask him to spell out his accusations. Thus any incipient coup could be exposed.

The Secretary said that we too were concerned over the situation which we hoped could be adjusted. The Secretary suggested that a UN representative might be useful and might even be able to assist in monitoring charges made by radio, as had been done with good effect in the Middle East.

In a discussion of possible UN intervention, Thanat said he understood that Zellweger was being succeeded by a French woman who also would have charge of UN technical assistance in Laos but who would not be a suitable representative to deal with the Cambodian case. Ambassador Johnson raised the possibility of another Beck-Friis mission but Thanat said Hammarskjold felt that Beck-Friis was “too stiff” and would not be suitable for this sort of job. There was a general discussion of the possible routes by which the Chinese Communists could be brought into Laos, e.g. covertly through the DRV and Laos via the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” and overtly by air or by sea via Sihanoukville.

In answer to Thanat’s question about Sihanouk’s travel plans, which included a visit to Peiping, the Secretary said that we had no precise information. However, it was pointed out that Sihanouk was expected to go to France and that we thought such a visit might be helpful since it usually resulted in improving both his health and his mood. We hoped the visit to France would precede that to Peiping.

In a discussion of Sihanouk’s motivations, Mr. Anderson emphasized that the Prince no doubt felt he was surrounded by enemies plotting against his regime. There was some reason for such a feeling since there has in fact been plots against Sihanouk in which at least one neighboring country had been involved; the Palace bomb plot had undoubtedly left its mark. We had the impression that Sihanouk also felt frustrated by the lack of interest shown by the outside world in the recent referendum. We therefore felt it important that countries of the free world which had received the recent Cambodian circular note should respond in a reassuring and helpful way. Such action would also show our support for the conduct of diplomatic relations through normal channels rather than by press and radio. We had in fact discussed this subject earlier today with British, French, and Australian representatives in Washington.

It was agreed that Thanat would seek an interview with the Secretary General on Tuesday in New York to sound out the possibilities of UN action and that Ambassador Johnson, who would be in New York that day, would get in touch with Thanat to learn the results of his interview.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/6–3060. Secret. Drafted by Anderson. Foreign Minister Thanat visited Washington June 28–July 2, as a member of the party of the King and Queen of Thailand who were visiting the United States.
2. Thanat’s speculation that Cambodia may have designs on Thai territory is the first such statement we have noted from any Thai source. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Thanat Khoman discussed this possibility with Hammarskjöld on July 5 and July 14. (Circular telegrams 44 and 79, July 9 and 14; Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/7–960 and 751H.00/7–1460, respectively)