14. Letter From President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister Macmillan1

Dear Harold: I have your letter of April eighteenth, suggesting, as I understand it, military planning by the two of us plus Australia and New Zealand with reference to Southeast Asia. I certainly see no objection to this provided it can be done, as you say, unobtrusively and in a way which will not run the risk of undermining SEATO and alienating the Asian members. However, it does seem to me that before there can be any very useful military talks, there is need for political discussion. I think this perhaps should occur in the first instance between our two countries. I wonder whether this could not be one of the matters we talk about when you are to be here in early June?2

The rebellion in Sumatra seems to have flattened out so that the problem there, while certainly as grave as ever, does not have the same time factor that seemed at one time to be the case.

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If you want Caccia to have some talks with Foster about this before you come over, I would see no objection. However, I must repeat my opinion that four-power military planning, in advance of political decisions by them, would incur more risk than advantage.3

Incidentally, Foster has the impression, derived from the SEATO meeting, that Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand is much less disposed than was his predecessor to vigorous action that could have military implications.4

With warm regard,

As ever

Ike
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Dulles prepared a draft of this letter and sent it to Eisenhower with a covering note dated April 24. The draft was cleared by Walter S. Robertson. (ibid., Dulles Papers, White House Correspondence)
  2. Macmillan visted Washington June 7–11.
  3. This sentence was rewritten by Eisenhower. As drafted by Dulles it read: “However, I think that four-power military planning at this stage carries more risks than advantages at least in advance of political decisions.” (Draft with alterations in Eisenhower’s handwriting in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DullesHerter Series)
  4. In a reply dated May 15, Macmillan wrote: “Thank you for your letter of April 24 about the defence problems of South-East Asia. I readily accept your point about the need for political discussion before military planning is undertaken, and I agree it would be useful if this were one of the subjects for discussion between us when we meet in June.” (ibid., Dulles Papers, White House Correspondence.)