Office of the Historian

135. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1

Washington, May 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Ambassador Trimble’s Assessment of Chou’s Visit to Cambodia

Ambassador Trimble’s report on the outcome of Chou En-lai’s visit to Cambodia (Phnom Penh’s 1461 at Tab A)2 parallels in many respects the observations in my earlier memorandum on this subject (Tab B),3 and it points up some disturbing prospects.

The Ambassador notes the absence of a formal joint agreement calling for ChiCom help in the event of aggression against Cambodia, and attributes avoidance of such an agreement to his frank talk with Sihanouk on May 2 (Tab C)4 and supporting démarches by the French Ambassador. Nevertheless, Ambassador Trimble believes Chou’s various unilateral statements on ChiCom support for Cambodia “in effect extended ChiCom influence deep into Southeast Asia.” The Ambassador concludes that the Cambodians do not consider the CPR a danger to Cambodia and that Cambodia is turning from India to the CPR as the “focus [of]5 its external orientation.” It remains to be seen, in the Ambassador’s opinion, whether Cambodia’s foreign policy will now “lean left sufficiently to raise [a] question [as to] whether it can be [Page 361] called neutrality at all.” The determining factor, he again notes, will be the manner in which Viet-Nam and Thailand handle their differences with Cambodia.

SEA Comments

The Chou En-lai visit serves to underline Sihanouk’s oft-repeated preference for closer accommodation with the bloc over absorption by his pro-West neighbors. In recent statements Sihanouk admitted that acceptance of substantive Communist protection would be at the sacrifice of some Cambodian institutions and of some measure of Cambodian independence, but asserted that it would at least permit survival of Cambodia’s national identity (Tab C). It would now appear only prudent to take these assertions at face value in our assessment of Cambodia’s position.

Nevertheless, a residual, intuitive pro-West orientation probably continues to exist, and Sihanouk undoubtedly would prefer for Cambodia to remain genuinely neutral and genuinely independent. These factors, I believe, still constitute a basis—now admittedly narrowed—for the exercise of constructive free world influence on Cambodia. The road is still open for rebuilding Cambodian confidence in effective US and free world support for the Kingdom’s independence and integrity. However, unless we can advance on this road, the prospects are for a continued deterioration in the situation leading to a serious crisis, possibly involving major Vietnamese and Thai intervention. The outcome of the present trend, if unchecked, can now only be regarded as potentially far worse than the existence of a neutral, independent—albeit troublesome—Cambodia.

As Ambassador Trimble has again indicated, Viet-Nam and Thailand constitute the key to the situation. It would appear that we have no real choice but to persist in our present policy of containing Vietnamese and Thai antagonism toward Cambodia, and must with some urgency continue to seek means to make this policy substantially more effective—if possible, prior to Sihanouk’s proposed visit to Communist China later this year.

The imminent return of Ambassadors Trimble and Johnson on consultation offers an opportunity for reviewing the problem with them at a particularly opportune moment.

  1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 16.2.1 Chou Visit to Cambodia, May 5–9. Secret. Drafted by Askew, cleared by Cleveland, and sent through Steeves.↩
  2. Not attached. (Ibid., Central Files, 033.9351H/5–1260)↩
  3. In this memorandum, May 10, Anderson concluded that the Chou En-lai visit to Cambodia, May 5–9, indicated no change in Cambodia’s policy of neutrality. Anderson noted that Chou had pledged support for Cambodian independence vis-à-vis its neighbors and condemned “imperialists” for their subversion of Cambodia. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  4. Reported in telegram 1409 from Phnom Penh, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51H/5–360; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  5. All brackets are in the source text.↩