Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, April 24, 1960—3:26 p.m.

931. Your 1357² and 1365.³

1. Concur your concern over Chou En-lai visit. Believe possibly one means minimizing substantive Commie gains would be bolster Sihanouk’s confidence in understanding and support of free world, specifically US. Conceivably some headway might be made in this direction by covering substance following points in your forthcoming conversation with Sihanouk:

a) Reiterate sympathy for sorrowful burden King’s death and understanding of trying problems this must have caused. Refer reiteration US friendship and best wishes expressed by Parsons. (Deptel 900)⁴

b) Express understanding that view current circumstances and Sihanouk’s long period uninterrupted active leadership of government, he would feel need for period of rest. Note however his leadership obviously desired by people Cambodia particularly at present juncture and express your hope also that he will soon find it possible again take reins of government.

c) Express regret emphasis placed by some elements, apparently with deliberate intent, on alleged conflict of interest between Cambodia and US, whereas in fact none exists. Exploitation this fiction unfortunately appears have eroded somewhat confidence existing between our two countries. Acknowledge it perhaps natural for some people to draw inferences from close association between US and Cambodia’s two neighbors on specific aspects of international affairs. However, effect of this association on US attitude toward Cambodia has been greatly and falsely exaggerated. This association neither extends to all phases international relations nor, specifically, does it in any way affect basic principles US foreign policy, including traditional respect for rights of others and adherence to principle of peaceful settlement disputes in spirit international law and UN Charter. Furthermore, it by no means implies that US supports position these neighbors in their differences with Cambodia. Bases these differences, as graphically illustrated by Sihanouk himself at Kep (your 1365), antecede by centuries establishment US relations with the countries concerned. We believe any fair-minded person recognizes that US, a relative newcomer to scene, cannot and should not assume responsibility for every aspect such complex and long established problems and the deep sentiments they understandably have nurtured in parties concerned. Nevertheless, as often expressed by US at highest levels, US does view manifestations these differences with deep and active concern; has consistently exerted best efforts to help maintain and improve relations between Cambodia and neighbors; and in particular is alert to see that no aspect of a country’s relationship with US be misused to settle old differences.

d) In this context, US sought understanding of GVN position on recently erupted Gulf islands dispute and passed this information to RKG (Deptel 900 and and your 1350).⁵ Here again, once US assured neither party intends resort to force or other non-peaceable measures, scope of US action necessarily circumscribed. Would appear to us that view long-standing nature this dispute and apparent absence any promising basis for immediate resolution such complex problem, both countries might find it in their interests maintain status quo for the moment, leaving further discussion problem for more propitious moment. If our interpretation correct, believe this is in effect Cambodia’s basic attitude toward boundary delimitation problems.

e) Note our reassurance over Cambodian record settling disputes in peaceful manner. Cambodian actions and abilities in this sphere, notably demonstrated at Geneva 1954, with French during earlier negotiations for independence, and in ICJ, have evoked admiration for Cambodian statesmanship. If eventually Cambodia believes time ripe for raising issue, suggest that should bilateral discussion not offer promise, RKG again explore possibilities some form international mediation, e.g. Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, of which Cambodia a contracting party, or possibly a UN mediator.

f) Finally you may wish to reiterate basic US good will toward Cambodia and understanding RKG’s foreign policy inviting Sihanouk disregard what some people say and rather judge US on basis verifiable public record of consistent and unwavering support for RKG even at moments in which US motives publicly questioned in Cambodia. Trust statesman of Sihanouk’s stature and experience understands that US fidelity to basic principles of international justice (which foundation US policy toward Cambodia as well as other countries) is absolutely essential if US is to fulfill its heavy world-wide responsibilities. Even risk of serious disagreements with closest US allies has not deterred continued adherence these principles. Since US has explicitly eschewed resort to force (unless attacked) or subversion, its relations with other countries cannot be based on threats or coercion but rather on mutual confidence. US wishes therefore see this confidence rein-forced in relations with Cambodia.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9351H/4–2460. Secret. Drafted by Askew, cleared by Anderson and Usher, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 1357, April 22, the Embassy suggested that Chou En-lai’s upcoming trip to Phnom Penh, May 5–9, might have as its objective a treaty of friendship and nonaggression between Cambodia and China as well as more Chinese aid for Cambodia. (Ibid., 033.9351H/4–2160)
3. In telegram 1365, April 22, Trimble asked for instruction and guidance for an informal talk he proposed to have with Sihanouk in light of Chou En-lai’s upcoming visit and the Cambodian-Vietnamese dispute over the disputed islands in the Gulf of Siam. (Ibid., 751H.11/4–2260)
4. Parsons’ best wishes were offered in a discussion with Nong Kimny, April 14, in Washington, the gist of which was reported to the Embassy in telegram 900 to Phnom Penh, April 14. (Ibid., 751H.00/4–1460)
5. Dated April 19. (Ibid., 751H.13/4–1960) The islands were held by Cambodian forces, but had recently been visited by South Vietnamese naval vessels to bolster Vietnam’s claim to them.