NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, Bureau of
the Budget, by Memorandum Action as of April 2, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1885), adopted the draft
revisions of the Laos, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore sections of NSC 5612/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in accordance with
NSC Action No. 1826–b and
transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 20, 1958; subject
to:
Attachment
[Here follows a table of contents.]
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND
SOUTHEAST ASIA7
I. General Considerations
1. General. Since mainland Southeast Asia does
not represent a unified area, courses of action must generally be
determined in the light of widely varying country situations.
However, basic objectives and main directions of U.S. policy can and
should be established on a regional basis.
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2. Consequences of Communist Domination. The
national security of the United States would be endangered by
Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by
overt aggression, subversion, or a political and economic
offensive.
- a.
- The loss to Communist control of any single free country would
encourage tendencies toward accommodation by the rest.
- b.
- The loss of the entire area would have a seriously adverse
impact on the U.S. position elsewhere in the Far East, have
severe economic consequences for many nations of the Free World,
add significant resources to the Communist bloc in rice, rubber,
tin and other minerals, and could result in severe economic and
political pressures on Japan and India for accommodation to the
Communist bloc. The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus
have far-reaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S.
security interests.
3. The Communist Threat
- a.
- Overt Aggression. Although
Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the
danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as
Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically
hostile policy supported by substantial military forces.
There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic
hostilities continue in Laos. The Viet Minh have continued
to improve their combat capabilities since the Geneva
Conference of 1954.
- b.
- Subversion. In most countries of
Southeast Asia a threat also arises from the existence of
extensive local Communist capabilities for all types of
subversion activities, ranging up to armed insurrection.
Additionally, the large overseas Chinese communities in
Southeast Asia offer a fertile field for subversion. The
weak internal security systems of the Southeast Asian states
make them highly vulnerable to such activities.
- c.
- Communist Political and Economic
Offensive. At present overt aggression and militant
subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of
Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in
the area. The political instability, economic backwardness,
export problems, and extreme nationalism of these countries
provide many opportunities for Communist exploitation by
trade and economic assistance, conventional political and
diplomatic activity, and extensive infiltration. This
offensive now constitutes a threat to U.S. interests more
subtle and more difficult to cope with than other
threats.
4. U.S. Role. The United States is likely to
remain the only major outside source of power to counteract the
Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia. Thus, the
retention of this area in the Free World will continue to depend on
the extent and effectiveness of U.S. support as well as on the local
efforts of the countries themselves.
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- a.
- Political. The underlying purpose of
U.S. assistance in the area is to help the non-Communist
countries develop more effective political organizations,
strengthen their internal administration and enlist greater
allegiance in both urban and rural districts. In part, this
purpose will be served by programs for military and economic aid
dealt with below. In part it will require an intensification of
present programs for training competent Asian managerial and
technical personnel. And, in part, new approaches, both
governmental and private, will be needed. These should not
concentrate exclusively at the national level, but should
include activities designed to strengthen and vitalize
indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an impact on
village life, rural society, and educational systems.
- b.
- Military. Because these countries do
not have the capability of creating armed forces which could
effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the United
States will be required to provide a basic shield against
Communist aggression. For the foreseeable future, local will to
resist aggression will depend on a conviction in Southeast Asia
that the United States will continue its support and will
maintain striking forces adequate to counter aggression in
Southeast Asia with the capabilities described in current basic
national security policy. The combination of such U.S. forces
and local will to resist would constitute the best deterrent
against aggression. Should the deterrent fail, this combination
would also provide the most effective insurance that, in
conjunction with indigenous and allied forces, the United States
could suppress aggression in the area quickly and in a manner
and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities
broadening into general war.
- c.
- Economic and Technical. The insistence,
throughout most of the area, on economic development provides
the strongest lever for the exertion of influence by the Free
World or by the Communist bloc. Without increased external help
from some source, most of the governments of the area will be
unable, even with adequate indigenous effort, to manage the
political demand for rapid betterment in the conditions of life
and provide for sound economic development. Failure to obtain
such assistance from the Free World will tend to drive these
countries toward economic dependence on the Communist bloc. The
general preference in Southeast Asia for Western technical and
economic assistance gives the United States and the Free World
an opportunity to obtain primacy over Communist efforts in key
economic sectors. The outcome may, however, be strongly
influenced by the success with which the Free World can cope
with Communist efforts to exploit the existence of Southeast
Asian export problems, particularly those involving rice. In the
period ahead, flexibility of U.S. procedure and rapidity of U.S.
action will be increasingly important, if effective advantage is
to be taken of unexpected and transient opportunities.
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5. The Problem of Regional Association. Over
the long run, the small, vulnerable, and essentially dependent
nations of Southeast Asia cannot exist satisfactorily as free
nations without closer associations than now exist.
6. The Problem of Alignment. To preserve their
independence, strengthen their internal stability and protect
themselves against aggression, some countries in Southeast Asia
prefer to join regional security arrangements. Some, however, prefer
to avoid alignment with other nations. The basic objective of both
groups is to maintain the independence of their countries free of
outside interference or dictation, and the independence and vitality
of both are important to the United States and to each other.
II. Policy Conclusions
7. The national independence of the mainland Southeast Asian states
is important to the security interests of the United States. If such
independence is to be preserved, U.S. policies must seek to build
sufficient strength in the area at least to identify aggression,
suppress subversion, prevent Communist political and economic
domination, and assist the non-Communist governments to consolidate
their domestic positions. U.S. policy should not depend primarily on
the degree and nature of Communist activity at any particular time,
but should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the
economic capacities of the countries concerned and U.S. resources
available for the area.
8. Where a national determination to maintain independence and oppose
external aggression is sufficiently manifest, the United States
should be prepared to provide military assistance based upon the
missions of the forces as indicated in the “Country Courses of
Action” (Part V, below).
9. In the event of aggression against a Southeast Asian state willing
to resist, the provisions of the UN
Charter or the SEATO Treaty should
be invoked, but the United States should not forgo necessary action
in behalf of such a state or states because of the possibility that
other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish more than
token military forces.
10. In the long run, the ability of the non-Communist governments to
attain political, economic and social objectives will be the
dominant factor in defeating the Communist attempts to dominate
Southeast Asia. The United States should assist the non-Communist
states of the area to formulate and execute programs designed to
promote conditions of sound development, to demonstrate that they
can achieve growth without reliance on Communist methods or
dependence on the Communist bloc, and to give their peoples a
greater stake in the continued independence of their countries.
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11. The United States should continue to make clear its own devotion
to the principle of collective security, its belief that regional
security arrangements provide maximum protection at minimum cost for
all, and its expectation that a country’s decision to participate in
such arrangements is based on its own calculation of its best
interests and does not of itself constitute a claim for increased
financial aid. Where countries participate, measures to assure
adherence are desirable, normally including preferential treatment
in the fields of economic and military assistance as justified by
U.S. strategic objectives. Where new opportunities for affiliation
develop they should be encouraged. The United States should,
however, accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to
the future, and should not exert pressure to make active allies of
countries not so inclined. The genuine independence of such
countries from Communism serves U.S. interests even though they are
not formally aligned with the United States. The United States
should accordingly support and assist them so long as they remain
determined to preserve their own independence and are actively
pursuing policies to this end.
III. Objective
12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or
becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade
them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and
stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free World; and to assist
them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with
the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without,
and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free
World.
IV. Regional Courses of Action8
13. Support and assist the countries of the area on the basis of
their will and ability to defend and strengthen their
independence.
14. Respect each country’s choice of national policy for preserving
its independence, but make every effort to demonstrate the
advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the Free
World, as well as the dangers of alignment with the Communist
bloc.
15. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate closely
with each other on a basis of mutual aid and support, and support
indigenous efforts to develop regional associations so long as they
do not weaken SEATO or the spirit
of resistance to Communism.
16. Participate actively in SEATO,
and seek to develop both its military and non-military aspects in a
manner that will convincingly demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional association, the
usefulness
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of which extends
beyond deterrence of Communist expansion. Encourage limited
participation of non-Communist, non-SEATO Asian nations in certain SEATO activities.
17. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples
of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression as well as to
indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, and propaganda.
18. Maintain, in the general area of the Far East, U.S. forces
adequate to exert a deterrent influence against Communist
aggression, in conformity with current basic national security
policy.
19. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian
treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or
the SEATO Treaty, or both as
applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take
necessary military and any other action to assist any mainland
South-east Asian state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist
Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military
action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the
Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so
great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of
the United States.
20. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize
control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for
U.S. assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt,
including even military action after appropriate Congressional
action.
21. As appropriate, assist the police forces in Southeast Asian
countries to obtain training and equipment to detect and contain
Communist activities.
22. In order to strengthen the non-Communist governments of the area
and to help forestall their economic dependence on the Communist
bloc:
- a.
- Provide flexible economic and technical assistance as
necessary to attain U.S. objectives.
- b.
- Encourage measures to improve the climate for private
investment, both domestic and foreign, and to mobilize the
maximum investment of U.S. private capital in the area
consistent with the prevailing climate.
- c.
- Encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo Plan
countries, and other friendly countries to contribute
available resources to promote the economic growth of
Southeast Asia.
- d.
- Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to orient their
economies in the direction of the Free World and to rely
primarily on non-Communist markets and sources of supply for
trade, technicians, capital development, and atomic
development.
- e.
- In carrying out programs involving disposal of U.S.
agricultural surpluses abroad:
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- (1)
- Give particular attention to the economic
vulnerabilities of the Southeast Asian countries and
avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, detracting
from the ability of these countries to market their
own exportable produce.
- (2)
- Give particular emphasis to the use of the
resources to promote multilateral trade and economic
development.
- f.
- Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade
relationships between the United States and the countries of
Southeast Asia.
- g.
- Take advantage of adverse local reactions to Communist
barter agreements with countries in the area by
demonstrating the advantages to these countries of
conducting trade on a multilateral commercial basis.
23. Make a special, sustained effort to help educate an expanding
number of technically competent, pro-Western civilian and military
leaders, working bilaterally, through the United Nations, with the
other Colombo Plan countries and with other friendly countries.
Stress the development of potential and secondary leadership to
support the thin stratum of elite now administering the central
governments and bring to their support modern techniques and
technology in public information and organization.
24. Place increased emphasis on community development projects,
educational programs, and other activities aimed to influence the
welfare and attitudes of the people at the village level.
25. Strengthen informational, cultural and educational activities, as
appropriate, to foster increased alignment of the people with the
Free World and to contribute to an understanding of Communist aims
and techniques.
26. Hold or reduce the number of U.S. officials in each country to a
strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential
programs, in order to head off an adverse political reaction to the
presence of a large number of Americans in relatively privileged
positions.
27. Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact with and knowledge of
the Free World. Explore with friendly religious organizations ways
of developing Buddhist fraternal associations and identification
with Free World religious leaders and movements.
28. Continue activities designed to encourage the overseas Chinese
communities in Southeast Asia (a) to organize and activate
anti-Communist groups and activities within their own communities;
(b) to resist the effects of parallel pro-Communist groups and
activities; (c) generally, to increase their orientation toward
their local governments and toward the Free World; and (d)
consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their
local governments, to extend sympathy and support to the Chinese
National Government.
29. Discreetly encourage local governments to work toward
assimilation of racial minorities.
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30. Implement as appropriate covert operations designed to assist in
the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.
31. Promote economic cooperation between the countries of the area
and Japan and with the Government of the Republic of China, to the
extent feasible without jeopardizing the achievement of U.S.
objectives toward the individual Southeast Asian countries.
32. In order to promote increased cooperation in the area and to deny
the general area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influence or
domination, assist as feasible in the development of the Mekong
River Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual
aid.
V. Country Courses of Action in Addition to the
“Regional Courses of Action” Above
Burma
33. In view of the emerging opportunities in Burma and the
repercussions that developments there will have on the uncommitted
areas of Asia and Africa, make a special effort to influence an
increasingly favorable orientation in Burma’s policies.
34. Encourage and support those elements in Burma which can maintain
a stable free government that identifies its interest with those of
the Free World and resists Communist inducements, threats, and
programs to subvert Burma’s independence.
35. Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and international
responsibilities compatible with our own objectives.
36. For political purposes, upon Burmese request make available
military equipment and supplies on a loan or reimbursable basis, as
consistent with U.S. interests.
37. Encourage the Burmese Government to establish internal security
throughout the country, and discourage further foreign assistance to
Chinese Nationalist irregulars and ethnic rebel groups in Burma.
38. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Burma, invoke the
UN Charter and, subject to
Burmese request for assistance, take necessary military and any
other action to assist Burma if Burma is willing to resist Communist
resort to force and U.S. vital interests are involved: Provided,
that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior
submission to and approval by the Congress.
Cambodia
39. In order to maintain Cambodia’s independence and to reverse the
drift toward pro-Communist neutrality, encourage individuals and
groups in Cambodia who oppose dealing with the Communist bloc and
who would serve to broaden the political power base in Cambodia.
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40. Provide modest military aid for indigenous armed forces capable
of assuring internal security.
41. Terminate economic and military aid if the Cambodian Government
ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion
and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.
42. Assist where possible in solution of Cambodian-Thai border
problems and in fostering good relations between Cambodia and Viet
Nam.
Laos
43. Seek to strengthen the determination of the Royal Government to
resist subversion and to maintain its independence.
44. In order to prevent Lao neutrality from veering toward
pro-Communism, encourage individuals and groups in Laos who oppose
dealing with the Communist bloc.
45. Develop an attitude of confidence on the part of Lao leaders that
the UN Charter, SEATO, and U.S. support provide a
favorable basis for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and
inducements.
46. Encourage and support cooperation between Laos and other
Southeast Asian countries, particularly Thailand, Viet Nam, the
Philippines, and Burma, including such joint effort in the
anti-subversion, economic, communications, and military planning
fields as feasible.
47. Support the expansion and reorganization of police, propaganda,
and army intelligence services, provided anti-Communist elements
maintain effective control of these services.
48. Continue support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal
security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the
Viet Minh.
49. Terminate economic and military aid if the Lao Government ceases
to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to
carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.
Thailand
50. Promote the development of a Thai leadership which is
increasingly united, stable and constructive, is supported by the
Thai people, and willing to continue the alignment of Thailand with
the United States and the West.
[Numbered paragraph 51 (6 lines of source text) not
declassified]
52. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces
sufficient:
- a.
- To maintain internal security.
- b.
- To present limited initial resistance to external
aggression.
- c.
- To make a modest contribution to collective defense of
contiguous SEATO
areas.
[Page 36]
Continue efforts to persuade Thai officials to eliminate non-MAP supported forces which do not
contribute to the above objectives.
53. Encourage and support close bonds between Thailand and Laos and
between Thailand and Cambodia, including such political
associations, economic cooperation, and joint military planning as
will serve to draw Laos and Cambodia closer to the Free World
without weakening Thailand’s position with regard to the Free
World.
Viet Nam
54. Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and
constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an
increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present
Communist zone.
55. Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South
Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification
of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist
leadership.
56. Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that
all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied
that genuinely free elections can be held thoughout both zones of
Viet Nam.
57. Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces,
including independent logistical and administrative services, which
will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing
limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Nam.9
58. Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against
external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning
concepts based upon U.S. policy, and discreetly manifest in other
ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with
the SEATO Treaty, to defend itself
against external aggression.
Federation of Malaya
59. Encourage the continued development of a strong, stable Malaya
within the Commonwealth.
60. Encourage the Commonwealth to exercise primary responsibility in
Malaya but be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the maintenance
of Malaya’s stability and independence.
61. In the application to Malaya of the course of action in paragraph
22–a, be prepared to provide needed technical assistance to Malaya,
and consider the extension of loans for economic development if
alternate sources of financing prove to be inadequate.
62. Discreetly encourage the present Malayan leadership to improve
its position of strength and responsibility unless more favorable
alternatives develop.
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63. Discreetly encourage Malaya’s participation and membership in
SEATO, avoiding any actions
which might strengthen neutralist sentiment.
64. Encourage the Malayan Government to take vigorous actions to curb
Communist subversion and to rely primarily on the Common-wealth for
any assistance required.
65. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Malaya, place
initial reliance on Commonwealth, SEATO or UN resources as
appropriate, but be prepared, subject to Malayan request for
assistance, to take independent U.S. action along the lines of the
proviso in paragraph 19.
Singapore
66. Encourage and support the British in the exercise of their
primary responsibility in Singapore; but be prepared, after
consultation with the British, to take such independent action as
necessary to assure the continued Free World orientation of
Singapore.
67. Encourage the British and local authorities to take vigorous
action to curb Communist subversion and, after consultation with the
British, be prepared to complement such action, if necessary.
68. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Singapore, place
initial reliance on British or Commonwealth resources and, as
appropriate in accordance with paragraph 19, support SEATO or UN action; but, subject to British request for
assistance, be prepared to take independent action along the lines
of the proviso in paragaraph 19.
69. Support internal self-government in Singapore and incorporation
in the Federation of Malaya only if consistent with maintaining Free
World strategic interests in Singapore and the Federation.
VI. Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Special
Situation in North Viet Nam
70. Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government,
and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or
maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime.
71. Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political influence
and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.
72. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet Nam or
Laos.
73. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and
internationally whenever possible.
74. Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam as a means of
weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination.
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75. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake programs of
political, economic and psychological warfare against Viet Minh
Communists.
76. Apply, as necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, restrictions on
U.S. exports and shipping and on foreign assets similar to those
already in effect for Communist China and North Korea.
