Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 13, 1959—7 p.m.

1934. For Parsons from Durbrow, Johnson and Trimble.² Following summary our views and suggestions:

1. Historic mutual antipathies three countries so deep-rooted that unrealistic expect any fundamental change their attitudes in short run. However, we believe by effectively playing on their short range mutual self interests, manifestations these antipathies can be somewhat reduced.

2. One basic problem is to induce Sihanouk it to his own advantage maintain tolerable relations with Thai and VN neighbors and that in common with other two, greatest danger he faces is ChiCom enemy. If Sihanouk can be convinced of latter and also convinced appeasement ChiComs will not reduce danger, should do much inhibit his oscillating diplomacy. These oscillations rather than neutrality policy per se are regarded by Thais and Vietnamese as main obstacle to better accommodation with him.

3. The basic problem is convince RTG and GVN that despite their dislike and distrust of Sihanouk they have to live with him as neighbor and their desire to remove him from power completely unrealistic. Furthermore, only effects their amateurist efforts to foster internal dissension Cambodia are to antagonize Sihanouk, divert his attention from ChiCom danger and counter-developing tendency towards more positive neutrality with Westward orientation.

4. To convince Sihanouk appeasement policy not answer to ChiCom danger we suggest consideration following additional actions:

(a) Encourage maximum contacts with Sihanouk by neutralists such as India, Burma and Indonesia who have seen their policy of appeasement fail. Sihanouk is Asian Nationalist and experience other Asians who have unsuccessfully attempted policy of neutralism more persuasive with him than that of occidental nations.

(b) Utilizing strong Malayan interest in promoting Southeast Asian grouping, encourage Malayan initiative establish contacts with RKG so that they too can acquaint Sihanouk with facts of life.

(c) Seek effective ways to bring home to Sihanouk, by playing on his fear Viet Minh, seriousness of Communist subversive and guerrilla tactics Laos and fact that same tactics could almost equally well be applied within Cambodia, particularly if Laos should succumb.

(d) Endeavor disabuse Sihanouk his belief Soviet weapons superiority, along lines previously recommended by Embassy Phnom Penh.³ In this and in other points mentioned, it should be noted he is flattered to be in the know, particularly if it is “confidential.”

5. In order allay RKG suspicions we seeking induce its adherence SEATO, suggest Trimble be authorized at suitable time give Sihanouk characteristic assurances, in writing if this appears desirable, that USG has never sought and does not now seek Cambodian adherence to the Manila Pact. Trimble could also point out Pact can not be invoked with respect Cambodia except at specific request RKG. Furthermore, at no time has Cambodian adherence even been discussed within SEATO. (Johnson will check validity this latter point.)

6. Because exaggerated Thai and Cambodian respect for and confidence in UN (this applicable only small degree GVN), we consider “UN presence” in SEA, along pattern established by Beck-Friis mission and as suggested by Thanat Khoman, could play useful and constructive role, particularly with respect Thai-Cambodian relations. Not clear how this could be fitted in or coordinated with UN presence Laos, but recommend that Department explore proposal. Since GVN not member UN and Diem’s concern that any UN activity can be influenced by Communist bloc, Durbrow not certain Diem would be too receptive this idea.

7. All three countries need markedly improve caliber their diplomatic representation each other’s capitals, and should be brought to recognize that these rather than more distant posts call for utilization their best men. We will continue press this point. Also desirable if French would progressively replace ex-colonialists with career diplomats Phnom Penh.

8. Johnson and Durbrow should continue efforts induce cessation all support anti-Sihanouk dissidents and other disruptive activities including press campaigns.

9. Durbrow to press for VP Tho to visit Phnom Penh, preferably before rumored departure Tioulong, to follow through with RKG on Sihanouk Saigon meeting, particularly (a) Paris accords now that GOF and GVN have reached agreement, and (b) border control cooperation.

10. Johnson to encourage RTG to view Temple case as juridical matter.

11. Despite present sensitivity over Temple issue, Johnson and Trimble to explore possibility of Son Sann returning Thanat Khoman’s visit.

12. Johnson and Trimble will also sound out present status contemplated visit Thai King and Queen to Phnom Penh.

13. Indications past seven months show Sihanouk becoming increasingly concerned Viet Minh and domestic Communist activities within Cambodia as well as being more alive implications international Communism. Durbrow and Johnson will continue furnish any available evidence Sihanouk’s evolution this regard to GVN and RTG.

14. With respect to issue VN refugees in Thailand,⁴ Mau raised subject in conversation with three of us Decembr 11. However, he did not make issue of matter and spoke only of “40,000” who had registered for repatriation to DRV. In reply to suggestion GVN make gesture to receive some repatriates, he replied GVN Embassy Bangkok had “lost so much face” now would not be timely. Matter was left that presence in Saigon of thus [Thai] Foreign Minister in connection forthcoming visit Thai King and Queen would give opportunity for discussion problem.

15. We continue believe best course is for GVN not give public play to results Thai repatriation poll and await breakdown [called for in] DRV-Thai Red Cross agreement. In meantime, Durbrow should continue urge GVN come up with more constructive proposals to be made to RTG for solution this problem.

16. Even apart from repatriation issue, relations between Thailand and GVN are not as close and cordial as their common interests would seem dictate. Diem tends to be contemptuous of Thais, including Thai military capabilities, and Thais fear and distrust more energetic Vietnamese. Generally cool Thai-GVN relations contrast sharply with generally good Thai-Burmese relations in spite of many potential sources of friction between latter two countries. Part of explanation is respective personalities Diem, Sarit, and Ne Win, first two being basically antipathetic. Forthcoming visit Thai King whom Diem respects, will be helpful, but can not be expected produce any fundamental changes. As additional move, Durbrow and Johnson intend seek encourage exchange military and other visits. In view, however, likelihood Cambodians would consider any military visits as aimed at them, best way arrange such get-togethers would be have GVN military visit Thailand in connection with SEATO exercises.

17. All three of us feel meeting has been most useful and appreciate your having jogged us into finally getting together. We have had opportunity exchange ideas and information not only on subjects this telegram, but other matters common interest with which we would need not bother Department. Regards.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1451G/12–1359. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and Phnom Penh.
2. The three Ambassadors were in Dalat, Vietnam, for a 2-day conference on mutual problems.
3. During his visit to Vietnam, August 3–5, Sihanouk informed his Vietnamese dinner partners at an official banquet that the Soviet Union was far superior to the United States in terms of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). (Telegram 436 from Saigon, August 11; Department of State, Central Files, 751H.11/8–1159) In telegram 203 from Phnom Penh, August 17, the Embassy suggested the following courses of action to disabuse Sihanouk of his “misconception”: during a proposed visit by Lon Nol to the United States, the U.S. military would brief the Defense Minister and give him a weapons demonstration, and Ambassador Trimble would pass on confidentially to Sihanouk a modified National Intelligence Estimate on the latest comparative developments in the missile field. (Ibid., 751H.11/8–1759)
4. Reference is to the presence in Thailand of approximately 40,000 Vietnamese refugees who fled Vietnam during World War II and the first Indochina war. The refugees were given the choice of returning to North Vietnam, South Vietnam, or remaining in northeast Thailand. For documentation, see volume xv.