Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

124. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Saccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)¹

Washington, September 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador Trimble’s Letter Concerning U.S. Aid to Cambodia²

Ambassador Trimble has sent Mr. Riddleberger a copy of the letter he addressed to you on August 28, in which he listed a number of conclusions he had reached concerning the United States aid program in Cambodia. I have reviewed his thoughtful letter with deep interest; here are my comments on the several points which the Ambassador mentions.

A. FARK Support. The policy of pressing the Cambodians to assume a larger share of the salaries and allowances of their armed forces each year is an eminently sound one. If, as the Ambassador mentions, the point should be reached where this can be achieved only by a reduction in the size of these forces, I hope that the question of the existing force goals for Cambodia can be reexamined. Cambodia will not, in the foreseeable future have the economic capability of supporting armed forces of the present size from its own resources. I would especially urge that the State Department and the Department of Defense reconsider the necessity for an internal security force level of 31,000 in this small country. This matter may, of course, be dealt with in the Country Team paper which the Ambassador mentions in his letter. While the situation in Laos may make it inadvisable to raise the force goal question with the Cambodian Government at the moment, I believe that we should ask the Country Team to keep this matter under very close scrutiny, especially since such a large proportion of our economic aid program is devoted to the generation of local currency for military budget support.

B. Military Construction. This is a matter primarily of concern to the Department of Defense.

C. Public Works. As the Ambassador indicates, both the Country Team and the Washington agencies agreed over a year ago that no further large-scale public works projects should be financed by grant aid in Cambodia. His emphasis on technical assistance to insure proper maintenance of completed projects and of equipment is very sound.

D. Concentration of Technical Cooperation. I thoroughly agree with the Ambassador’s proposal for concentrating technical assistance on high priority areas. The priorities he suggests seem to me appropriate, although his list appears to omit technical assistance in the maintenance of public works equipment which he quite properly stresses in the preceding paragraph of his letter. He does not comment upon the proposal to provide modest technical assistance to encourage the development of small Cambodian industries; it would appear to me that this would be an important aspect of increasing Cambodia’s production and of reducing the country’s future need for external aid.

E. Coordination with Other Assistance Programs. The increasing number of countries and multilateral agencies providing aid to Cambodia undoubtedly makes coordination of effort a most important task.

F. Caliber of Personnel. I was very glad to note the Ambassador’s favorable comment upon the quality of USOM/Cambodia personnel. I know that the question of improving the language facility of its personnel is one which has deeply concerned the USOM and I am glad to know that this problem is being approached on an inclusive basis.

G. Size of Staff. The number of personnel required by USOM/Cambodia is primarily determined by the size and character of its program. While I am in full agreement with the Ambassador that the USOM staff should be kept at the minimum needed for effective operations, I am somewhat concerned at the establishment of a rigid ceiling. In our own review of the FY 1960 operational program and the proposals for FY 1961 we will be giving very close attention to this question, but I believe that the approach should first be to determine the activities to be undertaken and then the size of the staff required to carry them out, rather than to start with the number of Americans. In this connection, I am informed that the French have over 250 technicians and similar personnel in Cambodia under their substantially smaller technical and educational program.

The Ambassador’s proposal for amalgamating certain USOM and Embassy administrative services is one which deserves careful study.

H. Concentration of Personnel. The proposal to station USOM representatives in provincial centers is one with which we fully agree. I understand that USOM has been endeavoring to move in this direction, but that it has been difficult to recruit personnel fully qualified for this difficult type of assignment. I also understand that, since the “Dap Chhuon” incident, the Cambodian authorities have been somewhat reluctant to agree to the stationing of USOM representatives in provincial centers.

I. Mistakes and Abuses. The subject of refund claims for past mistakes and abuses is an extremely important one. I hope that the Ambassador will continue to make this a matter of high priority and that he will impress upon the political leadership of Cambodia the necessity of settling these claims. From the information available here, we understand that the Cambodians have already taken a number of steps which should help prevent the recurrence of these abuses.

J. Conclusion. I am, of course, glad to note Ambassador Trimble’s conclusion that the program, taken as a whole, has been very successful. As he indicates, we have no reason for complacency, especially since the Cambodian economy is relatively stagnant. Unless the country makes greater economic progress we are faced with the prospect of a continuing problem of relatively large-scale economic aid, especially for the support of the military establishment.

In addition to the question of the size of the military forces, which I have already mentioned, I would suggest that the Ambassador and the Country Team devote special attention to two major questions:

(1) Ways in which Cambodia’s increasing foreign exchange reserves can be used more effectively for the country’s economic development.

(2) The possibility that the Development Loan Fund might be utilized to meet some of Cambodia’s needs for productive facilities.

L.J. Saccio

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/9–2859. Confidential.
2. Attached to a covering letter from Trimble to Anderson, September 1. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/9–159; included in the microfiche supplement)