Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, February 23, 1959—7:55 p.m.

1358. Phnom Penh 1080,² 1083,³ and 1085.⁴

1. Because GVN still apparently supporting Dap Chhuon, we agree we should again approach Diem re extremely delicate situation Cambodia. In addition strongly reemphasizing points made your last approach, request Amb. Durbrow remind GVN its commitment in MS agreement against use equipment provided by US for purposes other than defense against aggression and also utilization such equipment against RKG or transfer thereof to Cambodian dissidents could have grave effect future MAP. Furthermore as GVN capability interfere in Cambodia not solely attributable US assistance Durbrow authorized once again inform GVN that such interference by it is not matter which affects Viet-Nam and Cambodia alone but one which could gravely affect peace and stability all of SEA. View disclosure Vietnamese aid Dap Phnom Penh’s 1083, we view consequences possible strong reaction from GVN with particular concern. Durbrow should urge Diem adopt moderate attitude toward current developments Cambodia, disavow if possible alleged South Vietnamese officers aiding Dap, and promptly withdraw Hieu who now obviously can no longer play useful role Cambodia. Mention to Diem we have no indication as yet Sihanouk has appealed or planning appeal to ChiComs for assistance, and therefore all the more important at present crucial juncture GVN refrain from actions or statements which would tend push Sihanouk further toward Communists and seriously prejudice salvaging free world position Cambodia.

2. Finally, assuming truth of RKG allegation that GVN officers implicated Dap plot, Durbrow should stress to Diem that whole unfortunate affair has served give ChiComs propaganda asset discredit both GVN and its friends as well as helped undermine whole pro-West position Cambodia. Since our Embassy has received repeated disclaimers in past from various GVN officials re GVN involvement, Durbrow may wish to state US regrets apparent lack of trust which prevented GVN from consulting frankly with US this matter. Furthermore if GVN did indeed encourage Dap in his dissidence result has been to discredit and remove from position of power one of leading pro-free world influences in Cambodia.

3. Re Durbrow suggestion that Amb. Strom tell SihanoukUS will not countenance any action by GVN aimed at overthrowing Sihanouk regime, we recognize advantages as well as serious dangers this proposal. We realize that such statement to Sihanouk would (a) serve reassure him perhaps more than any other single action we have yet taken that not only US not involved in coup attempt but we are prepared also to pressure our allies to stop any such attempts they may be planning; and (b) if Strom statement to Sihanouk gets back to Diem, which seems likely, it may serve as most effective deterrent yet conceived for stopping GVN plots.

4. At same time we are seriously concerned by placing this kind of weapon in irresponsible hands of Sihanouk. Such statement made by Strom would indicate to SihanoukUS had been and still is aware of GVN plots thereby confirming his suspicions US and GVN involvement. Statement such as this in Sihanouk’s hands could be used by him against GVN to weaken Diem and would certainly result in severe strain in US–GVN relations. In other words, we might well be placed in position of strengthening Sihanouk at cost of weakening our ally and straining relations between our two countries. Such statement would also place US in anomalous position taking sides in this affair not with but against staunch ally and anti-Communist and in favor of unreliable Sihanouk who on this occasion has right on his side.

5. Furthermore, we frankly doubt US capacity to stop all GVN action against Sihanouk over indefinite period of time unless we are prepared to use sanctions such as aid reduction to force Diem accept our position this matter. This of course would again weaken GVN and lay ground work for increased Communist influence in South Viet-Nam, a situation which we certainly are unable to countenance. Dislike between RKG and GVN so intense Diem may well continue plot against Sihanouk despite representations which we may make to him and apparent failure past attempts. One result might be for Diem seek deeper cover as Strom mentioned recently. Therefore, on balance we believe it would not be advisable for Strom make statement to Prince suggested by Durbrow to effect US would not countenance any action by GVN aimed at overthrow Sihanouk regime.

6. Re last para Phnom Penh’s 1085, we agree Strom’s proposed representation Sihanouk along lines existing instructions (Deptel 732).⁵ If appropriate occasion arises (possibly in answer Sihanouk charge US aid permitting GVN interference Cambodia) Strom may care remind Sihanouk equipment supplied by US used by RKG to resist reported Dap Chhuon threat to public order and protect security RKG. Strom may add that US aid to RKG continuing which attests to continued US support Cambodia.

7. We agree (Saigon’s 1741)⁶ it desirable talk firmly to Sihanouk in interests future tranquility SEA. Accordingly believe Strom should also remind Sihanouk:

(a) As leader of SEA country Sihanouk must recognize his own responsibility to maintain peace and friendly relations that area. Substance and trend his recent actions and statements—such as recognition Communist China, and fulsome praise ChiComs—inevitably give rise genuine fear on part Cambodia’s neighbors that Sihanouk’s professed neutrality wavering and that he is permitting increase Commie influence in area thus threatening peace and independence all countries of SEA. Sihanouk should realize he is in minority in accepting ChiCom friendship at face value as well as purity ChiCom motivation.

(b) Such attitude on part Sihanouk completely undermines efforts of US and others to promote friendly relations between Cambodia and neighbors.

8. Request Amb. Strom’s advice whether he should defer departure view potential dangers US interests in current situation.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–2359. Secret; Niact; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Drafted by Kocher and Askew, cleared by Parsons and Robertson, and approved by Cumming. Also sent niact to Phnom Penh and repeated priority to Bangkok.
2. See footnote 4, Document 99.
3. In telegram 1083, February 23, the Embassy transmitted the text of a communiqué issued by the Cambodian Government, also on February 23, detailing its foiling of the Dap Chhuon coup. The communiqué explicitly stated that, Dap Chhuon had been recruited and supplied by an unnamed South Vietnamese diplomat resident in Cambodia. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–2358)
4. In telegram 1085, February 23, Strom filled in details of the failed Dap Chhuon coup and Sihanouk’s reaction. Strom also informed the Department that he had learned that Sihanouk planned to send Eisenhower a personal letter. When meeting Son Sann, Strom reported that he planned to assure the Cambodian leader that the United States was not involved in the plot. (Ibid.)
5. Document 99.
6. In telegram 1741, February 20, the Embassy in Saigon reported that South Vietnamese leaders were incensed by Sihanouk’s interview (see footnote 3, Document 96). The Embassy also reported that the French had agreed to use their influence in Phnom Penh to get Sihanouk to make a conciliatory gesture toward South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/2–2059)