391. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)0
The President telephoned from Gettysburg to refer to Cahto 107 of June 121 and asked what I thought about it. I told him that Mr. Dillon and I had discussed the message late last evening and that we were both puzzled about the apparent inconsistency of the suggestion that Macmillan issue an invitation to the President, Khrushchev and DeGaulle to come to London and join with him for conversations without an agenda and the statement made later in the message that we should be firm in not discussing a Summit, if nothing is accomplished in Geneva.
The President said that he agreed that this would be an unacceptable proposal and that he was rather startled by it for the simple reason that everyone would regard such a meeting as suggested in London as a Summit meeting. He failed to see any difference. I said that we thought that in the light of the public position that the President has taken on this problem that the present suggestion could hardly be accepted. The President said that he was not bothered so much because he had taken the position publicly, as he was over the feeling that no other position could reasonably be taken. He was turning over in his mind whether it might not be wise at this stage for him to send a personal message to Khrushchev in effect saying that, while the President would be ready to agree that final agreements perhaps could only be made at some form of Summit meeting, an impossible situation is created when it is asserted on the Russian side that the Foreign Ministers can only be regarded as errand boys and incapable of concluding any agreement of substance. It would be suggested that some kind of a concession on the Berlin and German problem would be essential.
I said that I would discuss this with Mr. Dillon, but that it seemed to me a rather good approach, subject to what the Secretary’s reaction might be at Geneva. I mentioned that both Couve de Murville and Selwyn Lloyd are absent in their capitals over the week end, and that it might be well to send an urgent message to the Secretary seeking his [Page 895] reaction. The President agreed, saying that he would contemplate that the message to Khrushchev be drafted in conciliatory terms. He also asked that the Department try its hand at a preliminary draft of such a message, pending the Secretary’s reaction. He thought this could be telephoned to him at Gettysburg.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6–1359. No classification marking.↩
- Document 389.↩
- At 3 p.m. Dillon summarized this conversation in Tocah 102 to Geneva and asked for Herter’s reaction to the idea of sending a message to Khrushchev. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332) Four hours later a draft of the message was transmitted to Geneva in Tocah 104. (Ibid.) On June 14 the U.S. Delegation informed the British of the President’s negative reaction to Macmillan calling a meeting in London. In Cahto 111, June 14, Herter cabled that he approved the idea of sending a communication to Khrushchev, but not until the Western powers had seen Gromyko’s position in the meeting on June 15. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1459)↩