Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

246. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

USDEL/MC/19

Washington, March 31, 1959, 11 a.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

APRIL 2–4, 1959

SUBJECT

• Negotiations with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy, G
  • Mr. Merchant, EUR
  • Mr. McBride, WE
• French Side
  • M. Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
  • M. Lucet, French Minister
  • M. Alphand, French Ambassador
  • M. de Beaumarchais, Chief of Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the meeting by inquiring regarding the Secretary’s health. He then noted that it now appeared we would be going to Geneva on May 11.¹ The Acting Secretary said that we were studying the differences in the Soviet replies to the different Western powers. He noted that in the reply to the U.S. the Soviets appeared to take the summit meeting for granted whereas in the reply to the French there were certain different shadings. The Foreign Minister agreed. He said that the point regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia participating was still not clarified so he assumed that we would spend a week at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting discussing it. Couve remarked on the amiable tone of this Soviet note. He concluded that the Soviets wished to have talks and they were therefore pleased by the tone of our last notes and by our having made a definite offer. He remarked that he had crossed on the plane with Mr. Hammarskjöld² and that the latter said he was pleased with the tone of the last French note.

The Foreign Minister said that the principal difference between the French and British positions on substance was that the British believe that we should be flexible at the start of negotiations with the Soviets whereas the French believe we should be tough at the start. The Acting Secretary said that we could discuss these problems at the tripartite meetings this afternoon and that the first point of discussion would be the French comments³ which had been submitted yesterday. Mr. Murphy said that we hope to have a U.S. redraft by 2:45 this afternoon. He added that the new French text had been helpful.

Couve stated that with regard to contingency planning we had been discussing details for the past three or four months without any agreement on a firm common policy. He said that admittedly it was difficult to plan in advance. However, the basic principle we should enunciate is the demonstration of our manifest will to maintain our access rights to Berlin. We must say that we must have the will not to be blocked by Soviet actions. Furthermore, demonstration of our will should not be dependent on the UN since recourse to the UN would merely delay any action. The Acting Secretary agreed a self-imposed blockade was unacceptable. He said we should make clear that if unacceptable conditions were imposed involving the East Germans we would send a force to Berlin of such degree as SACEUR believed necessary. We must also determine at what point no further negotiations were possible. In all events we must demonstrate that we have the will to maintain our rights. The Acting Secretary agreed with Couve’s reasoning and said it was of course clear that we must show manifest will to maintain our rights. However, there was also a question of timing and of what overt steps we should take in the military field to show this will and at what point we should establish a SAC air alert, etc. He said we were also considering the possibility of a naval blockade of the Black and Baltic Seas.

Mr. Murphy noted that we might at some point have recourse to the Security Council. The Acting Secretary said that if we went to the UN at all it should be presumably after the Soviets had granted full sovereignty to the East Germans and concluded a peace treaty with them, thus altering the status quo. Couve thought that the Western Powers might report to the UN under Article 51⁴ since this was undoubtedly a situation giving concern but that we should not submit a case to the UN. The Acting Secretary said that until such time as we might or might not decide to have recourse to the UN we should make clear our intent to exercise our rights in Berlin.

The French Foreign Minister said that the Soviets were unlikely to take any drastic measures during the long negotiating period on which we were now embarked. The danger would be great however after the failure of a summit meeting. The danger at that point would be so great that we would be bound to take measures. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Tactically, he thought it important to show our determination at the start.

The Acting Secretary agreed that this was extremely important. He also thought we must try to avoid the problem whereby we have the threat hanging over our heads during negotiations with the Soviets of the conclusion of a Soviet-East German peace treaty.

The Acting Secretary reverted to the Working Group paper⁵ on Germany and asked if there were any points to be made on this now. Couve said he did not believe so although much preparatory work remained. He thought disengagement was the principal problem. He said he was unable to ascertain what is in the minds of those who favor disengagement and he considered it a very vague concept. The Acting Secretary said that this point was not clarified at the Camp David talks.⁶ Couve said that the British had been vague in their recent talks with the French in Paris⁷ too and as far as he could see had been precise only with the press. Mr. Merchant said that he thought perhaps the United Kingdom might at a later date reveal a desire to break the disengagement element alone out of a package proposed allegedly in order to relieve tensions. However, this point had not been reached yet. Mr. Murphy said that we were opposed to disengagement but might consider some thinning out proposal as part of a package. Furthermore it was unclear whether we were really talking about a thinning out proposal or a freeze of the status quo. Couve said that for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting we were left with an agenda relating to Germany only and he wondered how disengagement fitted into such an agenda. He would not propose any disengagement scheme. The Soviets wanted to talk about a peace treaty and Berlin, and accordingly he did not see how disengagement arose in this context. He thought that the British idea was to present a disengagement scheme to the Soviets as a trade for the settlement of the Berlin problem. He thought that this implied the neutralization of Germany, and concluded that this matter should be discussed further in the Working Group. The Acting Secretary said that we did not intend to raise the disengagement question. Furthermore we had discussed a thinning out proposal only as part of an over-all political settlement of the problem and not as a trading point. Couve pointed out his belief that there would not be any general political settlement. The Acting Secretary said that, however, we should nonetheless have an over-all plan to present to the Soviets perhaps including proposals of this type but that it should be made clear that this was a nonseparable package.

Ambassador Alphand inquired regarding the British idea of a “new and better title” for Berlin. Mr. Merchant said that this was also rather unclear and was clear only on the point that the British intended to substitute a contractual right in Berlin for the present arrangement. Couve said that this was apparently envisaged under the aegis of the United-Nations. Mr. Murphy said that it was also apparently limited to East Berlin only and not to Eastern Germany. Couve said that he thought we should maintain our present title which was both clear and satisfactory. Furthermore he was afraid that a new title might involve a greater role for the UN which he opposed. Mr. Murphy said that we agreed and did not see why we should weaken our present clear rights. The Acting Secretary said that furthermore any solution must be acceptable to the German people. Couve said that we would probably have a very difficult discussion on this point and that he thought it was a mistake to accept something dangerous at the outset. The Acting Secretary agreed saying that the Soviets had taken the initiative in upsetting the status quo and he did not see why we should make concessions at the beginning. Couve agreed that we had not asked for any change in the present situation. The Acting Secretary said that the British apparently had in mind the consideration that East Germany can squeeze the economic life out of Berlin by a policy of harassment and that they therefore felt concessions might be necessary in order to preserve the status quo in Berlin.

Couve reported on Hammarskjöld’s impressions in Moscow. He said that the UN Secretary General said Khrushchev had repeatedly stated that he did not intend to menace or threaten the West but merely wished to negotiate. He did not consider any of his recent notes as an ultimatum. His policy was to consolidate the GDR and Berlin was accordingly a secondary problem. However, Berlin as presently constituted represented a weak point for the GDR. Therefore this was not a problem per se. Hammarskjöld concluded that any Berlin solution must therefore not be such as to prevent the consolidation of the GDR. The Acting Secretary concluded that from the tactical point of view the Soviets must present a convincing case before we should make any concessions on Berlin.

In response to a question from Couve as to how long the Foreign Ministers’ meeting might last, Mr. Merchant guessed perhaps a month. Couve said he thought that a summit meeting would probably be shorter. The Acting Secretary said it would certainly be shorter in so far as the President’s participation was concerned but that the Vice President could replace him if necessary. They agreed that it seemed almost inevitable that a summit meeting would end with directions being given to Foreign Ministers to implement certain questions as had been done in 1955. Couve said that he thought the idea of holding periodic summit meetings was a good method for insuring our having a crisis every six months. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the U.S. system of Government was very awkward for this idea of holding recurrent summit meetings. He mentioned the Congressional problems involved as well.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved by Herter on April 20. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 3645, March 31 at 8:23 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/3–3159) During the meeting Herter and Couve de Murville also discussed Spanish membership in NATO, tripartite talks, Algeria, SEATO, and East-West trade. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1226.
1. See Document 244.
2. Hammarskjöld was returning from Moscow where he discussed the Berlin situation with Khrushchev on March 25 and 26. On March 31 Lodge reported that Hammarskjöld had briefed him on the discussion and stated that Khrushchev had assured him that there would be no unilateral action on Berlin until the possibilities of negotiation had been fully explored. (Telegram 840 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–3159) Couve de Murville elaborated more on his conversation with Hammarskjöld in the quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting on April 1; see Document 250.
3. The French comments have not been found, but they are described further in Document 247.
4. Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter U.N. member states reported measures taken in self-defense, but these measures did not affect the authority of the Security Council to take actions it deemed necessary to maintain or restore peace.
5. See Document 242.
6. See Documents 235–240.
7. See Document 213.