Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

139. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Berlin and German Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Roger Jackling, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Kohler,—EUR
• Mr. Lampson—EUR: GER: GPA

Mr. Jackling opened the conversation by asking what press line we were planning to take on the Alsop article of Jan. 19 on Berlin.¹ He said he was worried by it and foresaw a half dozen parliamentary questions which would put the Government in an embarrassing position. He had no idea exactly how the Government would answer such questions and he had told the press people in the British Embassy to tell the press they should make no comments on the article except to refer to the Four Foreign Ministers’ Communiqué of December 14 and the NAC Communiqué of December 16² which represents the western position. They were told not to amplify on this.

Mr. Kohler replied that he had not had a chance to talk about this with Mr. Murphy who was at the Secretary’s morning staff meeting. He thought, however, that it might be possible to go a step further and say that it was well known that we were in regular and constant consultation with our allies on the Berlin situation created by the Soviet note. Mr. Jackling raised the objection that this language might carry the implication of confirming the substance of the article. Mr. Kohler then suggested broadening the language since it was well known that we have kept our allies informed about the Mikoyan visit. Why not speak of regular consultations on all aspects of the situation not only in respect to Berlin but to Germany as a whole created by the Soviet notes and by the Mikoyan talks? Mr. Jackling said he thought that this would be all right.

Mr. Jackling then said he has been asked by his ambassador to clarify three questions.

1. What did the U.S. think of the formula which the British and the French had agreed on?³ In this connection, he referred to his previous impression from Mr. Kohler that the U.S. thought this language would serve only to get us over the talks with Mikoyan. Mr. Kohler confirmed this was still our position and that we did not consider this language met the need for a prompt decision in principle as represented by the specific language of paragraph D of the contingency guidance.

Mr. Jackling then asked about a further meeting. Mr. Kohler thought Mr. Murphy would soon have some specific observations to make on the French formula. He inquired whether the British had completed their general study of the military aspects of the problem. Jackling replied that the Director of Plans of the War Office had consulted with the British Chiefs of Staff and was back in Washington again.

Mr. Kohler then said we thought that the question whether we should assert our right of land access by force was a much broader question than the military problems of how we should implement this decision of principle. We did not think that we should get into any detailed military analysis before broad guidelines had been set.

Mr. Jackling asked whether we had gotten replies to the questions which he understood we had put to our European Command. He wondered when we would be ready to go into tripartite discussions on the basis of these replies. Mr. Kohler replied that he thought we would be ready shortly but would have to ask Mr. Murphy. He thought he could give him some word as to another meeting in the next twenty-four hours. He then returned to the French proposal, saying that we did not find this an acceptable substitute of the position represented in Paragraph D.

Mr. Jackling then asked whether we accepted the military studies proposed in paragraph 2 of the French draft. Mr. Kohler pointed out that Mr. Murphy was afraid that if we entered into theoretical discussions of the possibility of an airlift the Soviets would get the impression that we were thinking in terms of an airlift and were not prepared to insist upon our land rights.

Returning to the Alsop article, Mr. Jackling expressed his fear that the Foreign Minister would be asked in Parliament what commitments had been made about enforcing land access rights. He thought this might precipitate trouble in the U.K. Mr. Kohler asked whether this wasn’t the type of question to which the Foreign Minister could reply by stating our public position and adding that he could not discuss the details of military operations. Jackling said the Minister would surely be asked whether we were committed to a land operation. Mr. Kohler pointed out that in any event a military operation would be involved and that whether we responded in the air or on the ground military operations were implicit which no one could expect us to divulge in advance. If the Foreign Minister should indicate that we are not decided to respond on the ground we might as well start moving out of Berlin right now.

2. Mr. Jackling then recalled the tripartite agreement that nothing would be said to the Germans on these questions until we had an agreed tripartite position. He wondered whether this was still our position and asked in particular whether the subject had been touched upon in the conversations with German State Secretary Dittmann.

Mr. Kohler said it was his impression that the discussions with Dittmann had been general and questions of this kind had not been mentioned in any detail. He then briefed Mr. Jackling on the basis of Deptels to Bonn no. 1488 and 1517,⁴ which confirmed his recollection on this point.

3. Mr. Jackling then asked what was the status of the Prime Minister’s letter to Mr. Dulles and the British Aide-Mémoire of January 13.⁵ Mr. Kohler said the Secretary had a draft reply⁶ which had been sent to him on Friday. He was still mulling it over. He thought an answer would be going forward shortly and that this would help to bring things into focus.

The conversation closed with a brief discussion of the Mikoyan visit. Mr. Jackling said he thought that it was not to be expected that Mikoyan would make any concessions during his visit. He had thought that he had come to take the temperature of the water and return to report. Mr. Kohler said this had been our original estimate, which had proven correct. He commented, however, that he had thought that in private conversation Mikoyan might have been a little more reassuring on the ultimatum aspect. When finally pinned down on the question, Mikoyan had made it clear the Soviets had not withdrawn their ultimatum.

Mr. Jackling assumed that the Secretary had on his part made the Western position as firmly as could be. Mr. Kohler replied that he had, but he had also gone to great pains to make it clear that we understood the Soviet concern about Germany, that we had exercised restraint in East Germany and that we did not expect the Soviets to accept a settlement which would put them in a position of military disadvantage.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–1959. Secret. Drafted by Lampson on January 19 and initialed by Kohler.
1. For text of this column, in which Alsop stated that the three Western Allies were now committed to use force to keep access to Berlin open, see The Washington Post, January 19, 1959, p. A–43.
2. See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 122.
3. See Document 127. On January 15 Alphand told Murphy that he had been instructed to propose three minor changes in this draft, but Murphy said that the United States would have to study them since they seemed to delay reaching agreement on the principle of responding with force. (Memorandum of conversation, January 15; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–1559) The language was still being studied when Jackling and Kohler talked.
4. See the source note, Document 129, and Document 133.
5. Regarding Macmillan’s letter, see footnote 10, Document 131. In the aide-mémoire the British noted that the Soviet note of January 10 (see Document 124) seemed to present some flexibility on Berlin and that this avenue should be explored. In concluding, however, the British stated that the Western Allies should show no weakness on Berlin and make it plain that they were prepared to risk general war in support of their rights in the city. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–1359)
6. Not further identified.