Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV

67. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs’ Special Assistant (Leddy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Dillon)⁰

May 1, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Trade Agreements Renewal

On the basis of my discussions with Mr. Willoughby and Mr. Adair I think it possible that, unless we take forestalling action, an unfavorable decision on trade-agreements renewal may be taken by the White House and Commerce Department during the next week or two. The situation appears to be this:

1. The whip-count is planned for next week. Unless this count is unexpectedly favorable, Mr. Mills¹ will probably seek substantial concessions from the Administration in terms of (a) time period, (b) amount of reduction, and (c) the escape clause. He is likely to do this not only in order to get a bill which he can fight through on the floor of the House, but in order to assure his colleagues that he has squeezed all the water possible out of the Administration’s position so that it will not be able to pull the rug out from under the House position when the bill gets to the Senate.

2. Mr. Mills has already said that he doesn’t believe a 5-year bill can be enacted. He and others (see Ted Achilles’ report on his talks with Congressmen on lead and zinc)² seem to think that a 3-year bill is the limit.

If we could retain the 25% and ward off all but minor amendments to the escape clause, a three-year bill might be worth the risk of having to go up again while negotiations with the Common Market were under way. But a 15% bill would not be a starter. I doubt that we could organize a laborious and time-consuming negotiation on the basis of such slim authority; and I am certain that we could accomplish nothing useful with it in any event. A one-year bill would be a better alternative, since it would give us another chance next year.

3. Commerce (Kearns) and Randall (according to Galbreath) are evidently thinking of 3 years, plus other amendments.

4. Mills will go to Kearns. There is no assurance whatever that the State Department will be informed or brought into the picture until the White House and Commerce in advance discussions have already made up their minds. Mr. Kearns does not consult Mr. Mann. Neither he nor his staff (probably itself uninformed) keep in close touch with our staff.

5. I consider it possible that the White House and Commerce would be prepared to recede to three years and 15% plus escape-clause amendments.

Recommendation

1. That you discuss this matter with the Secretary with a view to reaching a firm Department position against retreating to a 15% bill.

2. That you discuss with the Secretary the best means of avoiding a crystalization of opinion in the White House on a 15% bill before we have an opportunity to object.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/5–158. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leddy.
1. Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.
2. Not found. Theodore C. Achilles was Ambassador to Peru.
3. No record of such a conversation has been found. Randall, however, recorded that after the May 2 Cabinet meeting, he met with Dillon, Weeks, Kearns, and Jack Martin, Eisenhower’s administrative assistant, to discuss strategy on the trade bill. They decided unanimously to state that the administration wanted the bill passed as presented. (Eisenhower Library, Randall Journals, CFEP, 1958, vol. VIII, May 1–June 11, 1958, entry for May 2)