326. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 0
1436. Paris for USRO. Reference: Deptel 891.1 Soviets have shown continuing strong interest in removal obstacles to trade which doubtless due to economic as well as political reasons. Regarding former, need for machinery for automation, materials in short supply particularly in non-ferrous metals field, and increased access to Western technology are important factors. In political field Soviets have always been sensitive to any discrimination against them and are acutely conscious of relationship between economic and political questions.
In view Soviet knowledge of pressures in West for relaxation of controls would appear difficult if not impossible exact any specific quid pro quo. A bargain of this nature might be possible in the course of general discussions on easing international tensions such as an eventual summit conference, in which case relaxation of controls might be tossed into the scales against such Soviet concessions as termination jamming Western broadcasts. If impossible hold the line with our Western allies pending such conference believe we might at least gain some advantage by informal discussion with Mikoyan in which we would indicate our readiness work toward relaxation of controls in return for some Soviet concession, although I find it difficult to suggest what concession we should seek. As a minimum we might suggest Soviet cooperation in orderly trading procedures. For domestic reasons I would assume that we would not seek a specific exchange which would be made public but rather that the approach would be that following upon the conclusion of the agreement on exchanges as we are prepared to work for a further relaxation of tension and are prepared to take some steps toward relaxation trade controls. On the other hand we hope that Soviets will make a contribution, for example, moderating their propaganda against West, relaxation [Page 703] in restrictions on granting exit permits to dual citizens and close relatives of American citizens, easing travel controls, avoiding disruption international or some other such concession. For such approach to be effective suggest it should be made promptly before Soviets become aware that relaxation of controls is probably inevitable.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/2–1958. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. A summary of this cable was included in White House Staff Notes No. 311, February 24, which was seen by the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)↩
- In telegram 891 to Moscow, February 14, the Department requested the Embassy’s estimate “whether partial relaxation of control by Western countries could be employed with Soviets in order concessions in other fields.” In effect, the cable continued, the Department wanted information on which to base a judgment on what quid pro quo might be obtained from the Soviets in exchange if controls were removed. (Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/2–1458)↩