3. Editorial Note
On January 22, Vice President Nixon, Clarence Randall, and C. Douglas Dillon met in the Vice President’s office to discuss possible responses to the Soviet economic threat. Randall described the session in his journal as “a full hour and a half of intense, though unhurried discussion of how to mobilize forces in the United States to meet the double Soviet threat in the economic field, namely, the drawing into the Soviet orbit of the resources and markets of the new countries, and the deliberate disrupting of the American economy by Soviet moves in our existing markets.”
According to Randall, he asked the Vice President how the subject came to be presented to the Cabinet on January 10 when it was not on the agenda. Nixon replied that he himself was surprised when Dulles raised it, although he and the Secretary had discussed the subject earlier.
Randall’s journal records the discussion in part as follows:
“As a measure of the importance of the subject, the Vice President said with great earnestness, ‘I think that what we three men are talking about in this room is of far more importance to the future of our country than all of the current hysteria about missiles. I think this is the real target of the Soviets.’
“It was heartening to me to hear this from him, because I have been saying it in my speeches and to my friends.
“To meet this he said that in his judgment, all of the resources available to our government must be placed in the hands of one man who might throw promptly against a single target everything that would be required to meet a Russian threat. In our economic armament, he spoke of the Development Fund, PL–480, the Ex-Im Bank, and even the World Bank. He likened it to economic warfare during the war.
“I replied that our economic warfare program had been based upon rigid controls of the domestic economy, and that I did not see how this could be duplicated. He reflected on that and agreed that it was politically impossible.
“I knew that his mind was coming back to the economic czar complex, and that his piercing eyes were on me, so I said, ‘Furthermore, Mr. Vice President, while we have our present constitutional system you cannot give any man in the White House, short of the President, authority over Cabinet officers. We on the White House staff may try to coordinate, as I do, but we may never order.’
“He always seemed to agree with me on this, but he nevertheless kept coming back to the one man idea, and I am afraid it will burst out again.
“At this point, Douglas Dillon mentioned Nelson Rockefeller, and the Vice President’s mind clicked instantly. He said, ‘Wouldn’t that have been a fine idea for me to arrive at conclusions here and ignore [Page 5] Nelson’s Committee on Government Organization?’ Promptly he put through a telephone call to New York and arranged to discuss this subject with Nelson there next week.
“He then himself raised the question of whether the Operations Coordinating Board should handle this matter, and himself dismissed it on the ground that they are staffed at too low a level, and that their job should be to police the carrying out of policy rather than the establishment of policy.
“Through all this, Douglas really had no specific plan or program to offer. Neither did the Vice President. They were both groping.
“My mind had been racing along all during the conference, because I felt an obligation to put a specific idea before them, so I finally said:
“‘I think, Sir, that you want a definite idea about which to focus your thinking, and I will take the responsibility of putting one before you. Here is what I would do. I would give Douglas Dillon a staff of five men, who must have creative minds and vigorous personalities.
“‘They would be fed current intelligence thoroughly. The moment the Soviets made a new move in any country, they would try to design a counter to it. That program would be communicated immediately to me. That would present no difficulty, because Douglas and I work so closely together. Out of my general background and experience in this subject I would hope to have an instinct as to whether a specific program had difficulties in terms of interagency relationships. If I saw none, I would clear it. If I sensed controversy, I would on very short notice put it to the Council for determination. Once the program was approved, Operations Coordinating Board would see that it was carried out.’
“The Vice President’s face broke into a smile and he said, ‘That’s good, I like it. It’s a marriage, and gives to OCB the right function.’” (Eisenhower Library, Clarence B. Randall Diary (duplicate of the original in the Clarence B. Randall Papers, Princeton University Library), entry of January 23, 1958)