289. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Cullen) to the Council0

SUBJECT

  • CFEP 577—U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Oil Which Affect Canada
1.
Attached is a draft statement of policy on the above subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board. The draft statement has been referred by the NSC Planning Board to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for comment prior to its consideration by the NSC on December 23.1
2.
The Planning Board has recommended that, if the NSC approves the draft statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with a recommendation that the President approve it as guidance from the standpoint of national security and direct that it be taken into account by the President’s Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports.
3.
The foreign economic policy aspects of the draft statement will be considered by the CFEP on December 18, 1958.2
Paul H. Cullen
Lt. Col, USA

Attachment

3

SECTION A. U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF OIL WHICH AFFECT CANADA

Discussion

Present System of Controls

1. The present system of voluntary control of imports was instituted in July 1957 with respect to crude oil and was extended in March 1958 to certain petroleum products. The controls were framed in terms, not of Canada or any other supplying country, but of importing companies and U.S. areas. The quota of each importing company was fixed on a historical basis, i.e., in relation to its past imports during a stated period.

2. The rationale for the imposition of controls was that the level of oil imports was such as to threaten to impair the national security. Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 19554 authorized the President to adjust the level of imports in the event of such a finding.

Effect of Present Controls on Canadian Production

3. So far as concerns Canadian oil, these import restrictions have not yet become a limiting factor on imports, due in part to the effect of the recession on expected demand. Nevertheless, under the present program because of price considerations the trend of imports has been in favor of Middle East and Far East oil sources to the detriment of [Page 582] Western Hemisphere sources. Thus, while quotas under the voluntary system of firms which normally import from Canada are currently 138,000 b/d (a figure substantially below the high point of 209,000 b/d reached in April 1957 during the Suez crisis), actual imports from Canada in CY 1958 are expected to average 80–90,000 b/d.5

4. However, these restrictions can be expected to limit the import of Canadian oil when and if demand increases above the allowables and, in any case, may well have an important effect on the future development of Canadian oil. The present permissible import levels would not be high enough to stimulate exploration and development of Canadian resources.

5. Canadians consider that the most economic and effective development of their oil resources depends on assured access to their natural market in the Northwestern and North Central United States. Canadians believe their oil deserves, and should have, on security grounds, a preferential position in the United States relative to other imported oil. They regard the application of the U.S. import control system to importers from Canada as a sign that Canada will not have such a position in the U. S. market.

6. The prospect that the continuing need for U.S. quotas may affect normal growth of the U.S. market for Canadian oil is one of the factors in Canada’s current consideration of whether to provide an additional outlet for Western Canadian crude through construction of pipelines to the Montreal market. Such action by Canada would have the collateral effect of curtailing the present substantial market for Venezuelan crude in Eastern Canada, with detrimental effect on the development of additional reserves in the Western Hemisphere outside of North America.

Proposed Revision of Controls

7. The President’s Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports is currently considering a revision of the present import control system. What effects this revision will have on imports from Canada and the rest of the Western Hemisphere will depend on the weight given to Canadian and other Western Hemisphere resources in the interest of national security.

Controls a Departure from Past NSC Policy

8. So far as applicable to Canada, the oil import restrictions represent a departure from the policy adopted by the NSC in November 1953 (NSC 97/6, “A National Petroleum Program”)6 which provided [Page 583] that the United States should resist further restrictions on imports of Western Hemisphere oil in order to insure maximum development and wartime availability of Western Hemisphere resources, with the understanding that continued scrutiny would be given to the volume of oil imports with particular relation to any significant adverse effect on the development of domestic resources.7 It should be noted that the President’s Special Committee, in developing the import control program, did not approach the problem from a Western Hemisphere or Canadian viewpoint but equated national security with domestic production.

Considerations Largely Same for Canada and Venezuela

9. While this discussion is directed primarily to Canada, in terms of the national security Canada, Venezuela and other Western Hemisphere sources should be given due consideration. Two factors peculiarly applicable to Canada are:

a.
Pipelines may be used for the transmission of Canadian oil to the United States.
b.
The Midwestern area of the United States bordering on Canada (the so-called “northern tier” area) is a natural Canadian market which cannot economically be supplied from other sources.

Arguments for Eliminating or Reducing Import Restrictions on Canadian Oil

10. a. Restrictions on the importation of Canadian oil are contradictory to the long-standing plan of the United States and Canada to share their resources in time of war on a continental rather than on a national basis.

b. Increased Canadian and other Western Hemisphere oil resources, the development of which U.S. import restrictions tend to inhibit, would be essential in certain emergency situations as a supplement to U.S. resources. For example, because petroleum and petroleum products are expected to be limiting factors in the survival and recovery of the United States in the event of an attack on the continental United States, the immediate and continuing availability in neighboring countries of maximum supplies would be in the interest of national security.

c. Such increased resources would lessen the political leverage and economic impact on Free World security of the denial or interruption of Middle East oil. While preferences for the development of Western Hemisphere (dollar) oil would adversely affect the import of non-dollar oil from areas outside the Middle East (e.g., the Far East), in [Page 584] comparison with the adverse impact which the import control program has on foreign oil development, the effect of a preference for Canada and Venezuela would be small.

d. Although U.S. import quotas will not force Canada to provide access to Montreal market for Western Canadian crude, such access would tend to deny that market to Venezuela oil and thus adversely affect the development of oil sources in Venezuela. The economic effect on Venezuela of the loss of the Canadian market would be most serious and it is likely that the United States would be blamed.

Arguments Against Eliminating or Reducing Import Restrictions on Canadian Oil

11. a. A preference for Canadian oil imports would conflict with our general policy of non-discrimination among country sources and might create serious foreign relations difficulties, both in connection with our trade policy and in the broad economic and political field. However, special treatment of the imports of countries of a given area appears not to violate our obligations under GATT when the exception is “necessary for the protection of its (the United States’) essential security interests in time of war or other emergency in international relations”. It must be admitted that, were the exception applied to Canadian imports only, it is probable that under GATT or under our bilateral trade agreement with Venezuela such preferential treatment would be challenged.

b. In view of the state-imposed controls on oil production in the United States, the removal of all restrictions on oil imports from Canada would tend to give to Canadian producers a preferred position, as against U.S. producers, in the U.S. market.

Policy Guidance

Alternative A Alternative B
12. The interests of national security require that petroleum resources readily available to our geographic areas be encouraged to continue their development consistent with a healthy and dynamic domestic industry. 12. It is in the interest of national security to give preference to imports of petroleum from Canada and other Western Hemisphere countries in any system of import restrictions.

[Here follows a Department of the Interior table of “U.S. Crude Oil Imports” for the years 1954–1958.]

  1. Source: Department of State, E/CFEP Files: Lot 61 D 282A, CFEP 577, U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Oil Which Affect Canada. Secret.
  2. See Document 291.
  3. See Document 290.
  4. Secret. This attachment was Section A of NSC 5822, “Certain Aspects of U.S. Relations with Canada,” December 12. The full text of NSC 5822/1, December 30, is printed in volume vu, Part 1.
  5. See footnote 3, Document 286.
  6. The tables on page 8 show U.S. oil imports, 1954–58. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. The text of NSC 97/6, “A National Petroleum Program,” November 16, 1953, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. I, pp. 10541060.
  8. NSC 97/6 was referred to the Director, ODM, by NSC Action No. 1554, May 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]