Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV

254. Memorandum of Discussion at the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

February 18, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations With Well-Developed Economies (NSC 5906/1; NSC Action No. 2121; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Nations Financially Able to Purchase Military Equipment and Training”, dated November 19, 1959; NSC 5916; NSC Actions Nos. 2158 and 2185; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations with Well-Developed Economies”, dated February 17, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray presented this subject to the Council, referring to NSC Action No. 2158 and to the first periodic report by the Departments of State and Defense under that action circulated by the reference Memorandum of February 17. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.) He added that Mr. Dillon had hoped to be present to comment on the periodic report but had unfortunately been delayed on Capitol Hill.²

Secretary Herter thought that minimum comment from him was necessary on the report, which was self-explanatory. He noted, however, that there might be a difference of opinion on the second sentence of Paragraph 2 in the report, which indicated that steps have been taken to assure that except in specific instances where U.S. interests may otherwise require, no new commitments for provision of military equipment on a grant basis would be offered to the UK, Germany, France, Austria and Luxembourg. Mr. Herter thought some members of the Council might wish to delete the “except clause” in this sentence. Mr. Gray said that in all candor he was compelled to state that in his view he did not think the Monday meeting of various individuals on this subject³ had applied the “except clause” to the five countries named by Secretary Herter. Mr. Gray felt that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 had no meaning when the qualification represented by the “except clause” remained in the sentence. He suggested the Cyprus precedent might be followed; that is, the matter might be referred to the National Security Council for decision if the Department of State sometime in the future felt it was necessary in the national interest to give grant military assistance to one of the five countries named.

Secretary Herter said he wished to cite a particular case which illustrated the need for flexibility in this matter. Since 1957 there had been considerable discussion of second generation IRBMs in Europe. Recently there had been indications that a desirable missile might be determined upon, but a difference of opinion had developed among European countries. The UK maintained that a distribution of the manufacturing of the missile would require revision of the atomic agreements with Germany. Also there had been recent conversations concerning the development of a land-based Polaris. If Polaris developments were accelerated, perhaps some Polaris missiles could be established in Europe ahead of the original time-table. Such a development, he felt, would be very desirable, but the question was would the European countries agree to the establishment of second generation IRBMs on a shared-cost basis. He did not know the answer to this question, but he was convinced that if the “except clause” did not remain in the second sentence of Paragraph 2, we would not be able to discuss cost-sharing for second generation IRBMs with our European allies; we would have to insist that they bear the entire cost of the new IRBMs. Flexibility in matters of this kind was all he had in mind by the reservation represented by the “except clause.”

Mr. Scribner said the language of the report referred to new commitments. Accordingly, he wondered by [why?] the Department of State would be precluded from discussing IRBM problems with European countries if the “except clause” were eliminated. Secretary Herter said the establishment of new IRBMs in Europe would be a new commitment. Mr. Scribner said discussions alone need not involve a commitment; he thought the matter could be brought back to the NSC for decision after the Department of State had discussed the problem with the European countries. In Mr. Scribner’s view, US officials in the field would feel that the language of the report, if it included the “except clause”, meant continuation of our old policy. He believed the language of the report as it stood tended to negative [negate?] NSC Action No. 2158 because we should not be doing anything unless it was in the US interest. Sometimes our officials in the field made commitments unknown to Washington. He had no objection to changing the “except clause” to read “except where the NSC decides otherwise.”

Mr. McCone thought the language suggested by Mr. Scribner would put the Department of State in a very awkward position. He felt State was entitled to some exception in the interest of flexibility. Mr. Stans thought there was not too much difference of opinion. As he understood it, State wanted flexibility to deal with unusual situations. Mr. Gates pointed out that the interpretation placed on policy language by officials in the field was not important since these officials could not make new commitments without approval from Washington. Mr. Stans thought there should be no difficulty in creating a flexibility which would allow State to deal with an unusual situation. He had an understanding with Mr. Dillon that further money would not be requested in the case of the five countries mentioned. However, he felt the language in the report as it stood was too broad and had been too broadly interpreted. Secretary Herter said any language was acceptable to him as long as it did not put the Department of State in a complete strait jacket so that it would be unable to hold conversations with our European allies without coming back to the NSC for approval. Secretary Gates suggested that the “except clause” might be revised to read “exceptions will be approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense.” Mr. Stans believed the decision should be in the hands of the President or the NSC. Secretary Herter said it would be impossible to negotiate on a theoretical basis; that is, it would be impossible for the Department of State to discuss new commitments if the Department did not know whether or not it could make a new commitment. Mr. Stans said he would be satisfied with a Presidential decision as to new commitments. Secretary Herter and Secretary Gates also said they would be satisfied with a Presidential decision, although Secretary Gates added he thought the situation was being made unduly awkward. Mr. Stans said he was not worried about what members of the Council might do but he was worried about what officials several echelons down might do. Mr. Gates said officials that far down could not do anything without the approval of higher authority. Mr. Scribner said officials in the lower echelons could hold discussions. Secretary Herter repeated that amendment of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 to indicate that the President would decide on exceptions would be satisfactory to him.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed the report by the Departments of State and Defense on the subject, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2158–b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 17, 1960.

b. Agreed that the second sentence of the second paragraph of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of February 17, 1960, should be revised to read as follows:

“As a result thereof steps have been taken to assure that, except in specific instances where the President may determine that U.S. interests otherwise require, no new commitments for the provision of military equipment on a grant basis will be offered to these countries.”

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.
1. Regarding NSC 5906/1, NSC Action No. 2121, Lay’s November 19 memorandum, and NSC 5916, see footnote 8, Document 250. Regarding NSC Action No. 2158, see footnote 13, Document 250. NSC Action No. 2185, taken February 4, asked the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare the first periodic report requested in NSC Action No. 2158–b. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Lay’s February 17 memorandum transmitted Herter’s and Gates’ report to NSC members. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)
2. Gray’s briefing note is not printed. For text of Dillon’s testimony on the Mutual Security Program before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1960, pp. 380–388.
3. Presumably the meeting recorded in Document 252.
4. Paragraphs a and b and the note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2187. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)