79. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 29, 19591
SUBJECT
- India’s Role in the United Nations
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Bunker
- IO—Francis Wilcox
- IO—Walter Walmsley
- UN/P—Joseph Sisco
- UNP—Miss Elizabeth Brown
- UNP—C. Franklin Hawley
- SOA—Benjamin A. Fleck
Mr. Wilcox opened the conversation by remarking that, as Ambassador Bunker was aware, the role of India in the UN has become particularly important. For this reason, he welcomed the opportunity to obtain from Ambassador Bunker the latter’s views in regard to Indian personnel and policies at the UN. Mr. Wilcox stated that Ambassador Jha appeared to be a much more reasonable person than his [Page 137] predecessor, Arthur Lall. He added that he had heard some reports that since Ambassador Lodge’s trip to India last year there had been some evidence that Krishna Menon had changed his viewpoint to some extent.
Ambassador Bunker replied that he viewed Ambassador Lall’s departure from the UN as a welcome development. He pointed out that Lall is not at all popular among the top officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and that N.R. Pillai, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs, had expressed satisfaction that Lall had been shunted off to Austria where he could not get into too much trouble. Ambassador Bunker added that he thought Jha would be a distinct improvement over Lall and that Pillai thinks very highly of Jha.
In response to Mr. Wilcox’s comments in regard to Krishna Menon, Ambassador Bunker stated that Krishna Menon has seemed to be much more friendly to the U.S. and to Ambassador Bunker personally since the visit to India of Ambassador Lodge. As an example, Ambassador Bunker cited his recent conversation with Krishna Menon in regard to the shooting down of an Indian Canberra by the Pakistan Air Force. The Ambassador said that Krishna Menon had been much more restrained in discussing this incident than he would have been two years previously. As an example of Krishna Menon’s changing attitude, the Ambassador referred to a remark which Krishna Menon made to him to the effect that the moral stature of the U.S. has increased during the last two years.
Mr. Wilcox asked if the reports that Krishna Menon had used Ambassador Lodge during the latter’s visit were true. Ambassador Bunker replied that Krishna Menon had indeed used the Lodge visit for his own personal purposes. Nevertheless, Ambassador Bunker added, he believed the trip had been on balance worthwhile. The Ambassador stated that friends of the U.S. in the highest levels of the Government of India do not like Krishna Menon, and thus dislike to see Menon in a position to use something like the Lodge visit to increase his stature and to disprove statements that “the Americans do not like me.” He said that the Prime Minister has driven Krishna Menon with a very tight rein during the last year or so. Two examples of this control occurred during the crises over Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits. In both cases, the Ambassador said, Krishna Menon had been practically silent, presumably under instructions from the Prime Minister, and although he obviously wanted very much to join in the discussions at the special session of the General Assembly convened in regard to the Lebanon crisis, he had been kept in India by Mr. Nehru.
In view of Krishna Menon’s continued connection with the Indian delegation to the UN, Mr. Walmsley asked what the tactics of USUN should be. Ambassador Bunker replied that Ambassador Lodge should continue his very skillful handling of Krishna Menon.
[Page 138]Mr. Walmsley inquired whether the Prime Minister still harbored any thoughts of resignation. Ambassador Bunker replied that Nehru had got out of his system any thought of resignation or retirement and would undoubtedly continue to hold the Prime Ministership until the 1962 elections if his health held out. The Ambassador said that Nehru appeared to be remarkably healthy on the eve of his 70th birthday next fall and that he continued to work at an amazing pace. The Ambassador referred to a conversation which he had had with Dr. Radhakrishnan2 at the time of Nehru’s most recent threat of resignation. Dr. Radhakrishnan had indicated that in putting the question up to the Party, Nehru had indicated that he was not sincere in his talk of resignation. Dr. Radhakrishnan had also told Ambassador Bunker that when Rajkumari Amrit Kaur3 had come to him and urged him to step into the breach, he had replied that no vacancy existed.
Mr. Walmsley indicated that the Department was somewhat concerned by the fact that in the past the Indian delegation had taken the initiative in regard to the Chinese Communist representation issue. Mr. Sisco asked the Ambassador whether it would be useful to approach the GOI, requesting it to instruct its delegation not to take the lead in favor of Chinese representation at the General Assembly. Mr. Sisco said that he was not suggesting that the GOI change its policy in regard to the issue but merely that it permit some other delegation to take the initiative in placing the issue on the agenda, in guiding it through the debate, and in making the leading speeches on its behalf.
Ambassador Bunker replied that he was not sure whether such an approach to the GOI would be effective, ineffective, or counter-productive. He said that on the one hand the strong, unfavorable reaction in India to the recent Chinese Communist actions in Tibet would be a plus factor. On the other hand, the GOI, in following its policy of non-alignment, might feel that in view of the Indian reaction to Tibet a balancing action on the part of the Indian Government might be called for and that continued support of Chinese Communist representation in the UN might constitute such a balancing action in the eyes of the GOI.
Mr. Walmsley stated that there was a body of opinion within the Department which believes that the US Government should be more forthright in condemning Chinese Communist actions in Tibet and should initiate consideration of the question by the UN if no other government does so. Ambassador Bunker replied that this was not an easy issue to resolve. On the one hand, certain Indians had said to him that the fact that the U.S. had not condemned the Chinese Communists more vigorously for their actions in Tibet indicated that we are [Page 139] interested only in decrying Communist attacks on white populations and not in Communist aggression against non-white people. On balance, however, the Ambassador stated that he felt our position on Tibet to date had been correct in so far as India was concerned. He stated that the Ministry of External Affairs believes that we have followed the right course. In passing, the Ambassador stated that initially he had been concerned over the possibility that the Lowell Thomas Committee to aid Tibetan refugees might try to build the refugee situation up out of all proportion. The Ambassador stated that the refugee problem is not a major problem. The Ambassador alluded to the statement made recently in Geneva by Mr. Tricumdas of the International Commission of Jurists on the subject of genocide in Tibet and said that Mr. Tricumdas has a very high reputation in India.
Mr. Sisco inquired what the reaction in India would be if we took the initiative in raising the Tibetan situation in the UN. Ambassador Bunker replied that the reaction in India would be very adverse if the U.S. or a country identified as a “stooge” of the U.S. were to take the initiative. However, if a country not identified as a “stooge” of the U.S. were to take the initiative, then we should support it, the Ambassador said.
Mr. Sisco stated that since Ambassador Jha had arrived at the UN, it appeared that the Indian representative was taking less initiative than previously and that the representatives of Japan and the Philippines were taking greater initiative. Ambassador Bunker agreed with Mr. Wilcox that this was a favorable development and referred to the increasing Indian interest in Japan as evidenced by the recent visits to the latter country of the Indian Prime Minister and President and the joint iron ore project entered into by India and Japan.
Mr. Wilcox stated that the Department had been disappointed by the Indian failure to join the Outer Space Committee. Ambassador Bunker stated that he shared this disappointment and that he believed that this was an example of the kind of balancing action on the part of the GOI to which he had previously referred.