Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, April 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Eastern European Seats of Various UN Bodies

I recommend the establishment of a new policy for arrival at decisions on candidacies for various United Nations offices. Whereas I recognize the need for flexibility and provision for exceptions under any policy, I believe that the present practice of deciding on candidates for vacated Eastern European seats on an ad hoc basis is illogical, time-consuming, and cumulatively harmful to our basic policy of supporting the United Nations. My reasons follow.

1. The ad hoc approach creates jurisdictional difficulties. As particular cases arise, EUR inclines to favor continued US support of customary patterns of regional allocation, including customary allocations to Eastern Europe, in the absence of special circumstances. Other Bureaus incline to propose that Eastern European vacancies be filled by worthy candidates from their own areas. It is frustrating to attempt to decide this kind of question on its individual merits, since EUR itself sees no merit in supporting a Soviet bloc candidate except in terms of general principles of regional distribution. If we begin with the assumption that the field is wide open and hence have no obligation to be guided by customary patterns of allocation, I would always favor supporting a friend rather than an enemy or neutral. On the other hand, if EUR in support of a principle continues to resist attacks on Eastern European seats on a case-by-case basis, I foresee time wasted by you and Assistant Secretaries in resolving these disagreements. This is absurd. We need a general guideline which will permit us to resolve the great majority of these inter-regional disputes at the working level.

2. The absence of such a guideline can disadvantage overall US policy. The US has an interest in sustaining established regional allocation patterns as they affect friendly nations, and I think it is a mistake to give the appearance of ignoring these patterns whenever it suits our convenience. Most other governments, including allies, neutrals and the Soviet bloc itself, tend to adhere rather meticulously to customary allocations. A contrary practice isolates the US on this issue. It places us in the position of seeming to wage petty battles against the Soviet bloc without real profit. Finally, I believe present practice tends to undermine our basic position in resisting Soviet demands for parity in UN organs. We have opposed parity primarily on the grounds that UN bodies should fairly represent the whole UN membership. This argument will obviously be undermined unless we demonstrate respect for the right of the Soviet bloc to fair representation in UN organs.

3. The ad hoc approach creates embarrassment for us in those instances where we continue to accept Soviet bloc candidacies. In the past, for example, we have been able to justify a refusal to support Norway for a Eastern European vacancy simply on the grounds that the vacancy occurred in Eastern Europe. However, if it is a matter of general knowledge that we are supporting free world candidates in numerous instances, such as the Philippines for an Eastern European vacancy sought by Poland, I do not see how we can justify a refusal to support anybody for a seat sought by the Ukraine, Hungary or Rumania. In other words, once we preclude ourselves from using the geographical argument, diplomatic pressures from our friends will virtually compel us to oppose Eastern European candidacies in nearly every instance.

4. The ad hoc approach fails to take account of the real needs for regional representation within UN bodies. Thus far, we have occasionally supported Far Eastern and Western European candidates to fill Eastern European vacancies, but we have rarely supported a Near Eastern candidate, and to the best of my knowledge have never supported a candidate from Africa, where the need for increased representation is most acute. The ad hoc approach precludes any balance readjustment of regional representation.

5. Perhaps the most important objection to the present practice is the fact that we have accomplished very little in the way of concrete results. We have almost never been successful in actually displacing a Soviet bloc candidate for a seat which the rest of the world regards as the “legitimate property” of Eastern Europe. If we are really serious in our belief that Eastern Europe is grossly over-represented in UN organs and are also convinced (as I am) that Asia and Africa deserve more representation, then I think we should stop giving purely nominal support to free world candidates on an ad hoc basis and make an active effort to get allied support for a reasonable reduction in Soviet voting strength all across the board.

As an alternative to present practice, I would propose the following course of action:

(a) We should make a direct and forceful approach to the USSR on the enlargement question. We should tell the USSR that we believe Asia and Africa deserve increased representation and that the Soviet bloc is over-represented. We should point out that we are prepared to support fair representation for the Soviet bloc, but that, unless the USSR ceases to block enlargement proposals, we see no alternative to a campaign aimed at reducing Soviet bloc representation to reasonable proportions.

(b) If the USSR refuses to make a deal on enlargement, IO and the geographic bureaus of the Department should work out a careful plan for the reduction and reallocation of Soviet bloc seats in all UN organs. We should leave Eastern Europe with representation in each UN organ roughly equivalent to the ratio of Soviet bloc membership to UN membership as a whole. Any Eastern European seats in excess of this margin should be reallocated, either to particular regions where the need for representation is greatest, or perhaps to a category of “floating seats.”

(c) Once a broad and equitable plan for a general reallocation of Eastern European seats has been developed, we should undertake intensive consultations with our friends and allies on this plan, particularly those in the NATO area and in Latin America, seeking their support. We should explain our position in detail, pointing out that the Soviet Union is responsible for blocking enlargement and that a planned reduction of Soviet bloc seats is the best alternative available. We should try to minimize possible WE and LA anxieties that their own seats may be put in jeopardy by promising firm support to sustain customary allocation patterns in the free world, pending eventual enlargement. We should also explain our willingness to respect the right of the Soviet bloc to fair representation, once over-representation has been corrected.

(d) When these consultations are concluded, we should undertake an open and vigorous campaign to replace EE incumbents in all seats ear-marked for transfer to the free world. We should justify our position publicly, emphasizing that the Soviet Union is continuing to block enlargement but emphasizing also our respect for legitimate representation from the Soviet bloc. We should explain that a truly adequate correction of the under-representation of Asia and Africa can come only through the enlargement of UN bodies, but that meanwhile, so long as the Soviet bloc continues to thwart Asian and African demands for increased representation, it should pay the penalty.

I believe the foregoing course of action would have numerous advantages. It should place the US in a reasonable position before world opinion. It would give us credit for a serious initiative to meet the representational needs of Asia and Africa. It would avoid the impression that we are “nibbling” at Soviet bloc seats as a cold war maneuver. If we can persuade our allies to support us, it would make our opposition to Soviet bloc over-representation effective rather than nominal. It would permit us to work out a fair and balanced redistribution of the seats removed from the Soviet bloc, rather than leaving this redistribution to chance. Finally, the course of action suggested would minimize petty wrangling among the geographic bureaus of the Department and permit the great majority of these seating issues to be resolved more or less automatically.

Recommendation:

That authority be given IO to pursue the course of action outlined above in collaboration with the geographic bureaus.

1. Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Memoranda, 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Nunley and Merchant. Cleared in AF, ARA, FE, NEA, and IO.