Office of the Historian

477. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, December 10, 1959—9 p.m.

Delga 677. Re: Outer Space.

1.
Lodge met this evening with Russians. He began conversation by explaining he had received reaction from Washington to yesterday’s discussions and that Washington still believed US proposals on composition were right. He also confirmed that we were prepared agree have text of res on conference participation go in without standard language and arrange for introduction of appropriate amendment, provided USSR agreed on Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia or Tunisia as 5th neutral. He added that Soviet comments on operative para 1 (III) had caused US take second look and proposed substituting “encouragement” for “coordination”, to which they eventually agreed.
2.
Kuznetsov responded that they had been carefully considering various suggestions and comments made previously and asked for our reaction to Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge said we preferred our four candidates. Sobolev immediately asked whether use of word “preferred” meant we would concede Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge said he was not authorized to accept them. Sobolev suggested adding them [Page 917] to our four and then going through process of elimination. Lodge rejected this idea. Kuznetsov again claimed Austria involved big step on part of USSR.
3.
Lodge pointed out that every neutral USSR proposed voted with it on ChiRep. Both Sobolev and Kuznetsov immediately said ChiRep issue would not arise and that comite would not be engaged with solution of question of China. Sobolev added USSR would be willing state it would not raise this question in comite.
4.
Kuznetsov argued that choice of Finland or Afghanistan would more or less balance other neutrals. Both were good countries which USSR would like have on comite. Sobolev noted Finland always abstained on any sharp division between US and USSR. Lodge admitted Finland was possibly better than Indonesia. Kuznetsov replied USSR preferred Indonesia and had instructions to insist on its inclusion. However, as conciliatory step to meet US half-way Finland or Afghanistan could be substituted. Lodge said it sounded to him as if question of composition would have be decided by first comite.
5.
Kuznetsov regretted he had agreed to Austria since these discussions showed it should have been saved as last country. He repeated that outer space comite would be busy with other problems and would not become involved in ChiRep. He referred again to composition this comite as being very difficult for USSR to explain since on technical basis USSR entitled to parity and there were more favorable precedents in COSPAR and disarmament. He urged US take Finland or Afghanistan and reach agreement.
6.
Sobolev observed that of four countries we proposed USSR had diplomatic relations only with Lebanon. Soviet list of neutrals included only countries with which US had diplomatic relations. Lodge countered that he would have thought Lebanon was good country from Soviet viewpoint since Lebanese people voted for govt which told American forces to leave. Lebanon was very friendly to USSR and neutral on its side. He inquired what was wrong with Lebanon. Kuznetsov said Lebanon was not bad country but his instructions called for Finland or Afghanistan. Lodge suggested that as person of influence and authority he might get instructions changed. Kuznetsov again pressed Finland, suggesting jokingly Lebanon might be selected after two years. Barco observed First Comite more likely support Lebanon than Hungary.
7.
Lodge enumerated various concessions US had made, emphasizing Washington considered we had been giving constantly with nothing in return. Kuznetsov denied this. He asserted we had large majority on all issues, probably 17–7, and asked why we worried about Finland. He contended if comite established by mutual agreement, it would do its work with spirit of cooperation and perform outstanding job. There was much interesting work to be done.
8.
We discussed ChiRep problem again. Kuznetsov contended that, since amendment on conf participation would carry, he saw no reason for concern. USSR could not understand why US approached comite from standpoint of voting; USSR was approaching it from different position, which was that outer space was worldwide problem which required mutual efforts of many countries. He felt confident spirit of friendly cooperation and understanding would prevail in comite and there was no cause for worry. Sobolev repeated question of ChiRep in UN would not be raised.
9.
At this point Lodge suggested possibility of amendment authorized by Dept in operative para 1, thereby making quite clear comite authorized deal only with members of UN and SA’s. Kuznetsov immediately responded negatively and said “do not complicate matters” with amendment. He did not wish to discuss it; it was unnecessary. Lodge pointed out similar provisions included in other res’s and asked why same thing should not be done here. In such circumstances US might possibly be able consider Finland if USSR agreed to such amendment. Russians said this was definitely unacceptable.
10.
Lodge said that of course if USSR willing accept one of neutrals we proposed, such as Lebanon, he would not press this amendment. Issue of conf participation would of course have to be settled by amendment.
11.
We then argued at considerable length, with no apparent effect, merits of amendment in first operative para, res A, pointing out since this was UN comite entirely proper it should be concerned only with states within UN framework. Moreover, differences on membership issues were well known and should not be permitted to intrude into this comite. Sov Reps made quite clear they could not acquiesce in amendment of this character even at price of our taking Finland.
12.
Sobolev returned to voting problem and inquired how USSR could ever get majority for its position. At best, he asserted, there would be 12–12 tie but US in his view could always count on at least majority of one.
13.
Lodge emphasized great efforts he had made with Washington in effort produce constructive results. He had never pushed Dept as hard on anything else. He regarded these instructions as absolute maximum, and he had really thought USSR would accept additional amendment if we took Finland. Their reaction was most disappointing. Kuznetsov said amendment was simply “new obstacle”.
14.
Kuznetsov asked whether, if USSR accepted Lebanon, US could agree not to submit amendment re conf participation. Lodge made plain he could not do this. Kuznetsov argued comite could solve problem and he assumed US thought inclusion of Lebanon provided proper voting balance. He expressed willingness to discuss acceptance of Lebanon without amendment with allies. Lodge repeated this [Page 919] would not do and that it was desirable to settle this matter in GA res. Kuznetsov pressed hard on dropping idea of amendment and urged Lodge to put this proposal to Washington. Lodge expressed willingness to inform Washington but emphasized repeatedly his absolute certainty that we must retain right to offer amendment on conf participation and would do so. Kuznetsov contended this was “very small matter”, particularly with Sov agreement on Lebanon. Lodge repeated that even if USSR accepted Lebanon, amendment would undoubtedly be required. We agreed we would be in touch tomorrow morning.
15.
As meeting broke up Kuznetsov asked see Lodge alone. [3 sentences (8 lines of source text) not declassified] He asked Lodge again whether we could agree to omit amendment procedure which involved “needless worry.” Lodge emphasized this was US Govt position and he could not honestly say there was any chance of our not pressing for amendment in B. Lodge expressed hope USSR would accept Lebanon and acquiesce in amendment. Kuznetsov smiled and promised to call first thing tomorrow morning. [1 sentence (31 words) not declassified]
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12–1059. Confidential; Priority.↩