Office of the Historian

470. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, December 2, 1959—11 p.m.

Delga 598. Re: Outer Space.

1.
Kuznetsov asked to see Lodge this afternoon. After welcoming what he termed “little step forward from your side”, namely that countries from EE side should be recommended by USSR, Kuznetsov proposed formula of 12–7–5, including as neutrals Sweden, UAR, India, Indonesia and Iraq, and omitting Byelorussia and Ukraine.
2.
Lodge replied immediately he had no authority beyond 12–6–6 composition but would of course report proposal to Washington.
3.
Kuznetsov recalled that when we had emphasized problem we would have in eliminating any of present twelve members, USSR had given matter thorough consideration and had responded favorably. He [Page 907] wanted us to know same problem caused USSR “very big headache” with respect to EE countries. Lodge noted USSR had not proposed 7 EE countries last year. However, he could see how it might be easier to omit Byelorussia and Ukraine. Sobolev and Kuznetsov confirmed that this was something which could be managed but to eliminate any other EE countries was real problem.
4.
Lodge repeated U.S. did not wish go beyond 6 EE countries. He also observed [8 words not declassified]. He recalled Austria and Finland had been on previous list.
5.
Sobolev pointed out Austria and Finland both European countries, and USSR considered European representation on comite was already too heavy in comparison with other regions such as Asia and Africa.
6.
Lodge said we thought Malaya was excellent Asian neutral. Kuznetsov reminded us USSR had already said it was unacceptable. Lodge asked about substituting Jordan for Iraq. Kuznetsov immediately responded negatively and suggested Guinea. Lodge noted Guinea was unknown quantity. We did not pursue subject further.
7.
Lodge repeated he would consult Washington and get in touch as soon as possible.
8.
We have now just about run out of time in discussions with USSR prior to commencement of debate on outer space.
9.
There is one further proposal we could make, while adhering to 2–1–1 ratio. This would be to propose 14–7–7 to USSR. Colombia and Uruguay, for example, could be added to our 12 (LAS would be under-represented in 24–member comite); and neutrals we could propose might be India, UAR, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Malaya, and Indonesia.
10.
This composition would dispose of evident difficulty USSR claims it has in dropping one satellite. In return USSR might be persuaded agree to Malaya, to which they have so far objected. If necessary, I would be prepared take Burma instead of Malaya.
11.
Above formula would produce comite of 28, which is admittedly over-large. However, this is also true of 24, and addition of 4 more members does not make a crucial difference. It retains balance favorable to us.
12.
In order avoid collapse of negotiations when gap is narrow, recommend I be authorized proceed as above indicated. Believe it is in our interest do this rather than begin comite discussion with composition issue unsettled, at which point we could expect third parties seek to find common ground between USSR and U.S. This course might confront U.S. with clearly unacceptable proposals for composition in [Page 908] circumstances where it would be much more difficult to demonstrate that it was Soviet intransigence that blocked agreement on composition.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12–259. Confidential; Priority.↩