Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

42. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

• General Assembly Consideration of the Item on Hungary

Discussion

Concerning your inquiry whether, in the absence of rejection of Hungarian credentials, Hungarian representatives could be barred from the Committees of the General Assembly, the Office of the Legal Adviser has prepared the attached study (Tab B)² which concludes that, strictly as a matter of law, the Assembly is empowered to bar the representatives of Hungary from its Committees while permitting them to be seated in the plenary sessions. The Office of the Legal Adviser states further, however, that logic, traditional practice, and the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure make it unlikely that the Assembly would in fact be more disposed to deny Committee participation to the Hungarians than to reject their credentials. In other words, we could probably obtain a far more impressive result (e.g., rejection) with less effort than would probably be required to deny the Hungarians Committee membership.

In this connection, paragraph 7 of our draft condemnatory resolution (Tab C)³ calls upon the other organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to “take appropriate account” of the Assembly’s determination that Hungary has not fulfilled its Charter obligations. Such phraseology could be used to deny the Hungarians election to office and appointment to Committees or organs in the UN system.

At the beginning of October we asked the UK and France whether they would be willing to join us in an effort to determine if sufficient support (a ⅔ majority) could be mustered to reject Hungarian credentials. While we have had no definite replies to our inquiries, both the UK and French Embassies have cited a joint estimate prepared by the US, UK and French Missions in New York that only a simple rather than a ⅔ majority could be mustered for rejection. This estimate was based on the views of uninstructed delegates and would, of course, probably be effective if the United States took a definite position in favor of rejection of Hungarian credentials.

American Legation Budapest reports that the French and Italian Ministers were summoned by Szarka, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, and requested that France and Italy not support rejection of credentials. While both Ministers agreed to transmit the request to their respective capitals, both reportedly told Szarka that their governments would probably vote in favor of rejection if such a move were supported by a majority of UN members. Furthermore, Hungarians indicated to the Italian Minister, that, while relations would be impaired by Italian support for rejection, Hungary was not planning to initiate a break in relations to retaliate.

On October 28, we transmitted the text of a draft condemnatory resolution to USUN with instructions to consult with the UK, French and Australians to develop a text capable of securing broad cosponsorship and support. Our instructions (Tab D)⁴ made it clear that, while the language of the draft resolution does not effect rejection of Hungarian credentials or compel subsequent efforts to this effect, paragraphs 5 and 6 laid the foundation for rejection if it is later decided to do so. It is believed, therefore, that we should authorize Ambassador Lodge to proceed with consultations among delegates in New York on the basis of the previously transmitted resolution, while reserving our position on the credentials issue until consultations with the British, French and other friendly governments have been completed.

Ambassador Thompson has expressed concern that the language of our original draft resolution may cause the USSR and the satellites to withdraw from the UN. Suslov, in New York, has warned USUN that General Assembly rejection of Hungarian credentials would bring about the “end of the UN”. Without regard to the merits of a move to reject credentials, the Departmental staff is convinced that Soviet threats of this kind must be heavily discounted.

In order to give our resolution a slightly more humanitarian tone, we propose to amend it slightly in accordance with the attached telegram (Tab A).⁵

Recommendation

That you sign the attached telegram transmitting the revisions to our draft resolution on Hungary (Tab A).⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–758. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin, initialed for Wilcox by Walmsley, and concurred in by Kohler and Meeker. Sent to the Secretary through S/S. A note on the source text states that Dulles saw it.
2. Not found as an attachment; a copy is ibid., 310.2/10–2958.
3. Not printed.
4. Not found as an attachment. The text of the draft resolution was transmitted in Gadel 72 (ibid., 320/10–258); the instructions to USUN were sent in Gadel 73. (ibid., 320.5764/10–2358)
5. Not found.
6. Dulte 3 from Seattle, November 10, informed the Department that Dulles found the draft resolution “deficient” because it did not specifically address rejection of Hungarian credentials. It noted that the President had told Dulles the United States “must take a positive line on credentials question even if we get licked.” (Department of State, Central Files, 320.2/11–1058) In Tedul 12 to Seattle, November 13, the Department noted that it assumed this constituted a decision to seek rejection of the Hungarian credentials and suggested high-level approaches in certain capitals regarding this decision. (ibid., 310.2/11–1358) Tedul 13 to Seattle, also November 13, transmitted the text of a revised draft resolution on Hungarian credentials. (Ibid.)