Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

415. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State¹

Geneva, April 14, 1960—6 p.m.

1678. Law of Sea. For the Secretary from Dean.

As I informed the Department yesterday (mytel 1662²) the voting in the Committee of the Whole on the joint US-Canadian proposal was 43 for, 33 opposed and 12 abstentions. This means that in order to get a two-thirds majority in plenary it will be necessary to reduce the number opposed by at least six as well as to persuade the abstainees to vote for our joint proposal to make certain that no stone is left unturned to insure the adoption of the joint proposal. We believe that there is a good possibility that this can be accomplished by a combination of maximum effort here, by a few constructive concessions which we hope can be worked out, supplemented by a personal letter from you to the premiers or foreign ministers of selected countries which may possibly be favorably influenced. The general stress of these letters it seems to me should be that a successful conference is vital if there is to be an orderly law with respect to the sea and if worthy UN objective of development and codification international law is to be furthered. Failure of the conference or further delays would create chaos. It is important that each country contribute to a successful conference by realizing what failure of the conference would mean not only to law of sea but to belief of newer nations these matters cannot be worked out by compromise with older nations.

Timing of voting in plenary makes it essential that your letters be transmitted telegraphically not later than April 18 if they are to be effective.

My specific suggestions as regards these letters follow:

Ghana—Ghanian Delegation here has endeavored play leading role in development of compromise which might ensure conference success within context of Afro-Asian solidarity. They were visibly disappointed when neither US and Canadians nor rest of Afro-Asians seemed willing build on their suggestions. Canadian Foreign Minister reportedly addressing Nkrumah, and believe it would be most helpful for you to do likewise, stressing constructive role played by Ghanian Delegation (which abstained on US-Canadian proposal).

Guinea—[1 sentence (4 lines of source text) not declassified] Guinea’s chief preoccupation, in strongly anti-colonial context, has been with possible intensive French fishing claims off Guinean shores. Nevertheless believe there is disposition compromise, and would urge personal letter from you to Toure in this sense. [1 sentence (10 words) not declassified] Re communications difficulites mentioned reftel would seem no reason not telegraph pertinent instructions en clair.

Ethiopia—Considering Emperor’s personal interest in territorial sea (cf Addis Ababa tel 623 to Department³) we believe only possibility moving Ethiopia’s position to abstention or perhaps even affirmative vote would be by personal letter from the President, stressing vital importance we attach to 6-mile territorial sea. It might be noted in this connection that Ethiopian Delegation here has been friendly and cordial, and has repeatedly hinted at possible eventual compromise to ensure conference success. [4 sentences (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Libya—Although Libya voted consistently with Arab bloc, Libyan Delegate Kabazi [Caabasi] two weeks ago personally volunteered to US suggestion that, once 12-mile proposal had been demonstrated incapable achieving requisite two-thirds majority. There would be real opportunity to put across compromise solution based on merger of original US and Canadian proposals. Since then there has been polarization of sentiment around 18-power proposal (of which Libya co-sponsor) and US-Canadian proposal. The latter failed to secure a simple majority (36 for, 39 against, and 13 abstentions) in committee, whereas the joint US-Canadian proposal was approved, by a vote of 43 for, 33 against, and 12 abstentions, most of whom are for our proposal or will vote for it in plenary. We believe Kabazi well disposed, and letter from Secretary to GOL as possibly strengthening his hand.

Tunisia—Despite relative disposition to compromise shown by GOT (of Tunis 1452 to Department⁴), Tunisian Delegate Bouziri has been among most vehement partisans of 12-mile position plus additional rights in Gulf of Gabes. Strongly recommend letter from you, or possibly even from President, to Bourguiba personally in order win his support for, or at least absention on, our compromise proposal.

Morocco—Moroccan Chief Delegation (Driss Slaoui) left conference after third day, and Morocco has been represented here since then only by its chargé at Berne (Hadj Nassar), who has played no significant role in conference. Nevertheless he told US ten days ago that if 12-mile proposal defeated, he would ask for new instructions with view to working out compromise along lines present US-Canadian draft. His principal concern seemed to be with Spanish and Portuguese fishing in Moroccan waters.

Sudan—Sudanese Delegate (Ambassador El Bakri from Paris) was elected President not only of African sub-group but of overall Afro-Asian group at this conference. Considering that Sudan only decided attend at last moment (for reasons Arab League Solidarity) and had no particular axes to grind (either defense or fisheries), El Bakri has played remarkably effective role here, not only in leadership his power bloc but also, we believe, for relative moderation within group. He has repeatedly stressed importance of compromise to achieve conference agreement, and we suspect he might now be toying with some nine-mile formula. He has himself privately suggested to US desirability démarches by our Embassies to Afro-Asian governments, especially at Cairo and Accra. Afro-Asians are insistent play decisive part in outcome this conference, and we may still have to find means of gaining support of at least African Arabs in order carry eventual two-thirds majority.

India—Success of conference depends upon agreement on US-Canadian proposal which was only one that received majority in committee; has assurance of increased support as the conference moves to plenary sessions, and is the only one that can possibly be expected receive two-thirds in plenary. 12-mile territorial sea definitely no longer issue at conference as it failed even receive majority in committee.

Iraq—Same as India.

Iran—

(A) Same as India.

(B) Fact that Iran has 12-mile limit no bar to voting for US-Canadian proposal. Other countries that have 12-mile limit voted for US-Canadian proposal. Iran could make suitable reservation in explanation of vote if thought necessary.

(C) At very least Iran should abstain.

(D) Suggest Ambassador make following comment orally: “On security issue Iran completely out of line and Daftary’s statement here (ourtel 1643⁵) completely inconsistent for CENTO nations. There seems to be no reason why Iran should follow Soviet line with respect need for 12 miles for’security.’”

Jordan—

(A) Same as India.

(B) At very least Jordan could abstain to help conference succeed.

Lebanon—

(A) Same as India.

In view Aman’s 1779⁶ that Jordan can abstain if joined by any other Arab States would hope this could be brought attention GOL. Jordan and Lebanon seem most likely Near Eastern Arab States abstain and if they do so there might be possibility others might also do so to prevent conference failure.

UAR—Same as India.

France and Belgium—The importance of a 6-mile limit of territorial sea for defense purposes needs no reiteration.

It has been agreed not only by our two governments but was also generally supported by members of the NATO Council.

The US-Canadian proposal was widely recognized as the best hope of protecting the NATO position. Iceland opposed the proposal for fishery reasons as anticipated. With that exception, Belgium and France were the only NATO countries which did not cast an affirmative vote in committee. While not unmindful of the reasons for this action, other NATO countries, which are also making considerable sacrifices to achieve our common goals, would find it hard to explain any lack of support.

Sweden—The contributions of the Goverment of Sweden to orderly solutions in the field of international law are already well-known. This conference offers the last realistic opportunity for regulating a situation which is becoming more chaotic as time goes on. Many states including the US are making substantial sacrifices in order to arrive at a solution. It is, however, perfectly clear that unanimous support is needed from all states which are supporters of the rule of law. It is not an exaggeration to say that the success or failure of this conference may hinge on a single vote. For this reason we would urge that the Government of Sweden support the US-Canadian proposal in the plenary voting.

Chile, Ecuador and Peru—We should add we are particularly aware their special problems and prepared consider any suggestions they have to make which might obtain conference support and enable them support US-Canadian proposal in plenary. Furthermore Delegation Geneva now intensively studying proposals they have already made to determine what might be worked out to increase acceptability of the proposal approved in committee.

Mexico, Venezuela—We could point out 18-power proposal defeated even with Soviet bloc support. Therefore, in belief they wish conference succeed we hope they can now support Canadian-US compromise.

El Salvador—This country is a real possibility of winning over to our joint proposal. The impressions from our conversations with this delegation have convinced US of this. Your letter should stress the delicate balance of the vote—a balance which can be tipped in the direction of success or failure. El Salvador is in the position of tipping that balance, and by tipping it in our favor will demonstrate high degree of statesmanship.

Burma—US-Canadian proposal is compromise of various viewpoints of traditional positions, economic sacrifices and difficult political decisions on part of many states. Many of Burma’s Asian neighbors voted for this compromise, including Ceylon, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Malaya.

We are confident Burma desires contribute to adoption by this conference of proposal on which at least two-thirds of states can agree. Adoption of such proposal would go long way toward reducing friction between states which inevitably result from absence of any generally accepted rule. Conditions now favorable for this progressive step. If we fail to reach agreement here, present chaotic situation giving rise to innumerable disputes will continue for many years to come. Particularly noteworthy is compromise involved in grant of exclusive fishing jurisdiction in 12-mile zone to coastal state. This proposal would prevent additional states fishing in the zone and would terminate present fishing by foreign states with a ten-year period to adjust their fishing to new grounds.

Phillippines—While we appreciate reasons why Filipino Delegation abstained in committee on US-Canadian proposal, in plenary every possible affirmative vote must be mustered. Now that Philippines no longer involved as co-sponsor of proposal, we are counting on affirmative vote. Philippine security interests as key member SEATO require narrow territorial sea and we believe Philippines can vote for US-Canadian proposal without affecting their position concerning historic waters, a subject not within terms reference this conference.

Suggest additionally that you might make appeal for support at SEATO Ministerial Conference which we understand to be held in Washington April 15. Philippines only SEATO member not supporting US-Canadian proposal.

Cambodia—Cambodia seems to us susceptible of being moved towards affirmative vote. Personal letter from you to Prime Minister would therefore appear justified, stressing immediate exclusive fish control in 12 miles where no qualification under base period of 5 years, and the relatively short period of time during which foreign craft can continue to fish off Cambodian coast should prove qualified under formula. Since Cambodia originally favored straight Canadian 6 plus 6 and does not seem insist on wider territorial sea, our present US-Canadian compromise would appear small sacrifice asked in order reach conference agreement.

Indonesia—In view Indonesia’s historic dependence on sea communications and fishing and her great potentialities as a maritime power, it is very much in her interest to have general agreement on width of territorial sea and fisheries limits. Failure of conference would be harmful to all, but particularly those states whose welfare is so intimately bound up with the sea as Indonesia. Since US-Canadian proposal is only one with prospect of support from two-thirds of states at conference it should be very much in Indonesia’s interest to support. Such support need not affect Indonesia’s “archipelago” claims which not at issue at this conference.

[Paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–1460. Confidential; Niact.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Dated January 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/1–960)
4. Dated April 12. (Ibid., 399.731/4–1260)
5. Dated April 12. (Ibid.)
6. Dated April 11. (Ibid., 399.731/4–1160)