407. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State1
1494. Law of Sea. Am conferring constantly with Drew (Canada) in effort to work out joint US-Canadian proposal. Such a formula would probably provide for termination of traditional fishing in out [our] 6-mile continuous zone after 10 years from time convention comes into force and would eliminate such provisions as “groups of species”, “practice of fishing”, “annual average level of fishing” as well as provisions for settlement of disputes, all of which provisions appear complicated and confusing to many less sophisticated states and would adopt language and simplicity of Canadian proposal plus time limit in view attacks of Sen (India) and Gundersen (Norway) on these provisions as unworkable. Things are moving fast and it may be necessary for US to take firm decisions within few days or even over [Page 775] weekend, as Drew insists on firm answer. Failure to give may reduce changes of successful agreement and increase confusion as liaison officers presently handicapped.
It may be possible to reach some agreement in principle with the Canadians here as regards bilateral in addition to 10 years but can’t guarantee it. In view [6 words not declassified] emphasis three- to twelve-mile territorial sea and even greater exclusive fishing limits, believe most unrealistic to believe we could get any commitment from the Mexicans as regards bilateral. Any such approach would be regarded as sign of weakness and Garcia Robles (Mexico) has refused Amador (Cuba) any such assurance.
Am proceeding on assumption I have full authority under paragraph 5 of Position Paper 1 (revision 2) to proceed with negotiations looking toward a joint proposal with Canada and possibly others which would terminate foreign fishing rights after a period of years and have fully notified Dept. Am also proceeding on theory may be extremely prejudicial allow present US proposal to come to vote before introduction joint proposal with time limit in Committee of the Whole. Present estimate Soviet 12-mile proposal at least 43 votes or 20 more than our estimated minimum on present proposal. Western Europe extremely averse to our withdrawing present proposal and some may not vote for compromise until present proposal defeated. Per contra Latin Americans consider non-withdrawal in committee may be fatal to ultimate compromise in plenary because of psychological impact of Soviet victory in committee on those wishing wide fishing limits. Please advise promptly if my assumption correct.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–160. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:44 p.m.↩
- At 8:24 p.m. on April 1, Dillon cabled Dean that he had been following closely his efforts to reach a joint U.S.-Canadian proposal, and stated: “I would agree completely with your analysis that it would prejudice ultimate success to have Soviet proposal initially obtain substantially more votes than either our proposal or Canadian.” (Telegram 2194 to Geneva; ibid.)↩